Information Asymmetries in Pay-Per-Bid Auctions
John Byers, Boston University, Michael Mitzenmacher, Harvard University, Georgios Zervas, Boston University

Auctions with Online Supply
Moshe Babiaoff, Microsoft Research, Liad Blumrosen, The Hebrew University, Aaron  Roth, Carnegie Mellon University

Auctions with Intermediaries
Jon Feldman, Google, Vahab Mirrokni, Google, S.  Muthukrishnan, Google, Mallesh M Pai, Northwestern University

Computation and Incentives in Combinatorial Public Projects
Dave  Buchfuhrer, Caltech, Michael  Schapira, Yaron  Singer, UC Berkeley

Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation
Moshe  Babaioff, Microsoft Research, Robert  Kleinberg, Cornell University, Aleksandrs  Slivkins, Microsoft Research

Composition of Markets with Conflicting Incentives
Dimitrov Stanko, University of Michigan, Rahul  Sami, University of Michigan

Computing Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Compact  Symmetric Games
Christopher Ryan, University of British Columbia, Albert Xin Jiang, University of British Columbian, Kevin Leyton-Brown, University of British Columbia

Approximating Pure Nash Equilibrium in Cut Party Affiliation and Satisfiability Games
Anand Bhalgat, University of Pennsylvania, Tanmoy Chakraborty, University of Pennsylvania, Sanjeev Khanna, University of Pennsylvania

Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Extensive-Form Games
Joshua C Letchford, Duke University, Vincent Conitzer, Duke University

Congestible Services and Network Effects
Ramesh Johari, Stanford University, Sunil Kumar, Stanford University

Platforms for Controlling Downstream Innovation
Geoffrey Parker, Tulane University, Marshall Van Alstyne, Boston University & MIT

Market Design and Analysis for a P2P Backup System
Sven Seuken, Harvard University, Denis Charles, Microsoft, Max Chickering, Microsoft, Sidd Puri, Microsoft

Optimal Online Assignment with Forecasts
Erik Vee, Yahoo! Research, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Yahoo! Research, Jayavel Shanmugasundaram, Yahoo! Research

Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
John Hatfield, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Scott Kominers, Harvard Business School

Matchings in Lopsided Bipartite Graphs with Applications to Display Ads
Denis Charles, Microsoft, Max Chickering, Microsoft, Nikhil Devanur, Microsoft, Kamal Jain, Microsoft Research, Manan Sanghi, Microsoft

Revenue Maximization with a Single Sample
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Stanford University, Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University, Qiqi Yan, Stanford University

Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers
Mukund Sundararajan, Google, Qiqi Yan, Stanford University

The Power of Randomness in Bayesian Optimal Mechanism Design
Shuchi Chawla, University of Wisconsin, David Malec, University of Wisconsin, Balasubramanian Sivan, University of Wisconsin

Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
Edith Cohen, AT&T Labs-Research, Michal Feldman, Hebrew University, Amos Fiat, Tel Aviv University, Haim Kaplan, Tel Aviv University, Svetlana Olonetsky, Tel Aviv University

Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification
Joan Feigenbaum, Yale University, Aaron D. Jaggard, Rutgers University, Michael Schapira, Yale University

Better Vaccination Strategies for Better People
Po-An Chen, University of Southern California, Mary David, University of Southern California, David Kempe, University of Southern California

A New Understanding of Prediction Markets Via No-Regret Learning
Yiling Chen, Harvard University, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Harvard University

Information Aggregation in Smooth Markets
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Stanford University, Ramesh Johari, Stanford University, Ciamac Moallemi, Columbia University

Aggregation and Manipulation in Prediction Markets:  Effects of Trading Mechanism and Information Distribution
Lian Jian, University of Michigan, Rahul Sami, University of Michigan

The Labor Economics of Paid Crowdsourcing
John Horton, Harvard University, Lydia Chilton, University of Washington

Assessing Regret-based Preference Elicitation with the UTPref Recommendation System
Darius Braziunas, University of Toronto, Craig Boutilier, University of Toronto

Recommender Systems and their Effects on Consumers: The Fragmentation Debate
Daniel Fleder, Wharton School, Univ of Pennsylvania, Kartik Hosanagar, University of Pennsylvania, Andreas Buja, Wharton School, Univ of Pennsylvania

Collective Wisdom: Information Growth in Wikis and Blogs
Sanmay Das, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Malik Magdon-Ismail, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Emergence of Cooperation in Anonymous Social Networks through Social Capital
Nicole Immorlica, Northwestern University, Brendan Lucier, University of Toronto, Brian Rogers, Northwestern University

A Behavioral Study of Bargaining in Social Networks
Tanmoy Chakraborty, University of Pennsylvania, Stephen Judd, University of Pennsylvania, Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania, Jinsong Tan, University of Pennsylvania

Socially Desirable Approximations for Dodgson's Voting Rule
Ioannis Caragiannis, University of Patras, Christos Kaklamanis, University of Patras, Nikos Karanikolas, University of Patras, Ariel D. Procaccia, Harvard University

The Unavailable Candidate Model: A Decision-Theoretic View of Social Choice
Tyler Lu, University of Toronto, Craig Boutilier, University of Toronto

A Scheduling Approach to Coalitional Manipulation
Lirong Xia, Duke University, Vincent Conitzer, Duke University, Ariel D. Procaccia, Harvard University

Efficiency with Linear Prices? A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of the CC Auction
Martin Bichler, Department of Informatics, TU München, Pasha Shabalin, Department of Informatics, TU München, Georg Ziegler, Technische Universität München

Strategy and Mechanism Lessons from the First Ad Auctions Trading Agent Competition
Patrick Jordan, University of Michigan, Guha Balakrishnan, University of Michigan, Michael Wellman, University of Michigan

Northern Exposure: A Field Experiment Measuring Externalities between Search Advertisements
David Reiley, Yahoo! Research, Sai-Ming Li, Yahoo! Labs, Randall Lewis,Yahoo! Research

Mix and Match
Itai Ashlagi, Harvard University, Ian Kash, Harvard University, Felix Fischer, Harvard University, Ariel D. Procaccia, Harvard University

Asymptotically Optimal Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Two-Facility Games
Pinyan Lu, Microsoft Research Asia, Xiaorui Sun, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Yajun Wang, Microsoft Research Asia, Zeyuan Allen Zhu, Tsinghua University

Truthful Assignment without Money
Shaddin Dughmi, Stanford University, Arpita Ghosh, Yahoo! Research

Ranking Games that have Competitiveness-based Strategies
Leslie Ann Goldberg, University of Liverpool, Paul W. Goldberg, University of Liverpool, Piotr Krysta, University of Liverpool, Carmine Ventre, University of Liverpool

Cooperation and Competition in Strategic Games with Private Information
Adam Kalai, Microsoft Research, Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University

Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstentions
Yvo Desmedt, University College London & RSIS, Edith Elkind, Nanyang Technological University

Prediction Without Markets
Sharad Goel, Yahoo! Research, Daniel Reeves,Yahoo! Research, Duncan Watts, Yahoo! Research, David Pennock, Yahoo! Research

Automated Market-Making in the Large: The Gates Hillman Prediction Market
Abraham Othman, Carnegie Mellon University, Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University

A Practical Liquidity-Sensitive Automated Market Maker
Abraham Othman, Carnegie Mellon University, David Pennock, Yahoo! Research, Daniel Reeves, Yahoo! Research, Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University