Papers accepted for presentation in ACM EC 2011 (in the order they were submitted):
- John Hatfield and Scott Kominers,
Multilateral Matching
- Federico Echinique, Daniel Golovin and Adam Wierman, A Revealed Preference Approach to Computational Complexity in Economics
- Jacob Leshno and Eduardo Azevedo, The college admissions problem with a continuum of students
- Hamid Nazerzadeh and Georgia Perakis, Non-linear Price Competition and a Common Agency with Informed Principals
- Yuval Emek, Ron Karidi, Moshe Tennenholtz and Aviv Zohar, Mechanisms for Multi-Level Marketing
- Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz, Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment
- Jacob Abernethy, Yiling Chen and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, An Optimization-Based Framework for Automated Market-Making
- Santiago Balseiro, Jon Feldman, Vahab Mirrokni and S. Muthukrishnan, Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange
- Arpita Ghosh and Aaron Roth, Selling Privacy at Auction
- Arpita Ghosh and Patrick Hummel, A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Rank-Order Mechanisms for User-Generated Content
- Albert Xin Jiang and Kevin Leyton-Brown, Polynomial-time Computation of Exact Correlated Equilibrium in Compact Games
- Ruben Juarez and Rajnish Kumar, Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks
- Larry Blume, David Easley, Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg and Eva Tardos, Network Formation in the Presence of Contagious Risk
- Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer and David Parkes, Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design
- Daniel Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee and Siddharth Suri, The Effects of Exposure Time on Memory of Display Advertisements
- Christos Papadimitriou and Christopher Wilkens, Economies with Non-Convex Production and Complexity Equilibria
- Scott Kominers and E. Glen Weyl, Concordance among Holdouts
- Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan, Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts
- Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour and Noam Nisan, Non-Price Equilibria in Markets of Discrete Goods
- Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant and Aviv Zohar, Best-Response Auctions
- Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Jared Saia and Piotr Sankowski, Single Valued Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets
- Philipp von Falkenhausen and Tobias Harks, Optimal Cost Sharing Protocols for Scheduling Games
- Jason Hartline and Qiqi Yan, Truth, Envy, and Profit
- David Zuckerman, Pseudorandom Financial Derivatives
- Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer and Jérôme Lang, Strategic Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains and Multiple-Election Paradoxes
- Yi Sun and Mukund Sundararajan, Axiomatic Attribution for Multilinear Functions
- Furcy Pin and Peter Key, Stochastic Variability in Sponsored Search Auctions: Observations and Models
- Stephen Guo, Mengqiu Wang and Jure Leskovec, Role of Social Networks in Online Shopping: Information Passing, Price of Trust, and Consumer Choice
- Brendan Lucier and Renato Paes Leme GSP Auctions with Correlated Types
- Ravi Kumar, Silvio Lattanzi, Sergei Vassilvitskii and Andrea Vattani, Hiring a Secretary from a Poset
- Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, Ramesh Govindan and Ian Post, Liquidity in Credit Networks: A Little Trust Goes a Long Way
- Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Multi-Keyword Sponsored Search
- Michele Budinich and Lance Fortnow, Repeated Matching Pennies with Limited Randomness
- Shahar Dobzinski, Christos Papadimitriou and Yaron Singer, Mechanisms for Complement-Free Procurement
- Shuchi Chawla, David Malec and Azarakhsh Malekian, Bayesian Mechanism Design for Budget-Constrained Agents
- Benjamin Birnbaum, Nikhil Devanur and Lin Xiao, Distributed Algorithms and New Convex Programs for Fisher Markets with Linear and Spending Constraint Utilities
- Arpita Ghosh, Satyen Kale and R. Preston McAfee Who Moderates the Moderators? Crowdsourcing Abuse Detection in User-generated Content
- Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Maria Kyropoulou, On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
- Itai Ashlagi and Alvin Roth, Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
- Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim, Matching with Couples Revisited
- Nikhil Devanur, Kamal Jain, Balasubramanian Sivan and Christopher Wilkens, Near Optimal Online Algorithms and Fast Approximation Algorithms for Resource Allocation Problems
- Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Nicolas Lambert and Omer Reingold, Only Valuable Experts Can Be Valued
- Panagiotis Toulis and David Parkes, A Random Graph Model of Kidney Exchanges: Efficiency, Individual-Rationality and Incentives
- Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Mukund Sundararajan, Mean Field Equilibria of Dynamic Auctions with Learning
- Changrong Deng and Sasa Pekec, Money for Nothing: Exploiting Negative Externalities
- Nima Haghpanah, Nicole Immorlica, Kamesh Munagala and Vahab Mirrokni, Optimal Auctions with Positive Network Externalities
- Shaddin Dughmi, A Truthful Randomized Mechanism for Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Optimization
- Tanmoy Chakraborty and Michael Kearns, Market Making and Mean Reversion
- Daniel Enemark, Mathew McCubbins, Ramamohan Paturi and Nicholas Weller, Does more connectivity help groups to solve social problems?
