Papers accepted for presentation in ACM EC 2013 (in the order they were submitted):
- Designing for Diversity in Matching, Scott D Kominers and Tayfun Sonmez
- Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd", Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour and Motty Perry
- Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective, Yoav Wilf and Michal Feldman
- The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions, Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan
- Differential Pricing with inequity aversion in social networks, Noga Alon, Yishay Mansour and Moshe Tennenholtz
- Social Learning and Aggregate Network Uncertainty, Ilan Lobel and Evan Sadler
- Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method, Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi and Kamesh Munagala
- Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary Transfers, Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim and Berthold Voecking
- Truthful Mechanisms for Agents that Value Privacy, Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian Kash, Tal Moran and Salil Vadhan
- Complex Contagion and The Weakness of Long Ties in Social Networks: Revisited, Roozbeh Ebrahimi, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh and Jie Gao
- Prior-Independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents, Hu Fu, Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy
- Optimizing Password Composition Policies, Jeremiah MBlocki, Saranga Komanduri, Ariel Procaccia and Or Sheffet
- Potential games are necessary to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games, Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason Marden and Adam Wierman
- Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents, Nikhil R Devanur, Bach Ha and Jason Hartline
- Near-Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders, Sayan Bhattacharya, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan Kulkarni, Kulkarni Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden and Xiaoming Xu
- A Network Approach to Public Goods, Matt Elliott and Ben Golub
- Peaches, Lemons, and Cookies: Designing Auction Markets with Dispersed Information, Ittai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff and Michael Grubb
- Learning Equilibria of Games via Payoff Queries, Rahul Savani, John Fearnley, Martin Gairing and Paul Goldberg
- Sincere and sophisticated players in the envy-free allocation problem, Rodrigo Velez
- A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice Modeling, Jose Blanchet, Guillermo Gallego and Vineet Goyal
- Super Efficient Rational Proofs, Pablo Azar and Silvio Micali
- Improved Bounds on the Price of Stability in Network Cost Sharing Games, Euiwoong Lee and Katrina Ligett
- Real-time Optimization of Personalized Assortments, Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh and Paat Rusmevichientong
- Bertrand Networks, Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan
- Kidney Exchange in Dynamic Sparse Heterogenous Pools, Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi
- Selection and Influence in Cultural Dynamics, David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Aleksandrs Slivkins
- A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions, Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain and Chris Wilkens
- Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored Search Auctions, Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian Kash and Peter Key
- Harnessing the Power of Two Crossmatches, Avrim Blum, Anupam Gupta, Ariel Procaccia and Ankit Sharma
- When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth?, Ioannis Caragiannis Ariel Procaccia and Nisarg Shah
- Incentives, gamification, and game theory: An economic approach to badge design, David Easley and Arpita Ghosh
- Auctions with Unique Equilibria, Shuchi Chawla and Jason Hartline
- Competition Among Asymmetric Sellers With Fixed Supply, Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz
- On Discrete Preferences and Coordination, Flavio Chierichetti, Jon Kleinberg and Sigal Oren
- House Allocation with Indifferences: A generalization and a unified view, Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman
- An Axiomatic Characterization of Adaptive-Liquidity Market Makers, Xiaolong Li and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
- Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
- Latency Arbitrage, Market Fragmentation, and Efficiency: A Two-Market Model, Elaine Wah and Michael Wellman
- Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty, Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova and Jeff S. Shamma
- Existence of Stable Matchings in Large Markets with Complementarities, Eduardo Azevedo and John Hatfield
- Approximation in Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Yunan Li
- Loss Calibarated Methods for Bipartite Rationing Problems, Herve Moulin and Jay Sethuraman
- Mechanism Design for Fair Division: Allocating Divisible Items without Payments, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Gagan Goel
- Budget Smoothing in Internet Ad Auctions: a Game Theoretic approach, Denis Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R Devanur and Lei Wang
- On the Ratio of Revenue to Welfare in Single-Parameter Mechanism Design, Robert Kleinberg and Yang Yuan
- Privacy and coordination: Computing on databases with endogenous participation, Arpita Ghosh and Katrina Ligett
- Human-Agent Based Models of Cooperation in Public Goods Games, Michael Wunder, Siddharth Suri and Duncan Watts
- Incentivizing participation in online forums for education, Arpita Ghosh and Jon Kleinberg
- Sybil-proof Mechanisms in Query Incentive Networks, Wei Chen, Wang Yajun, Dongxiao Yu and Li Zhang
- The Empirical Implications of Rank in Bimatrix Games, Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique and Adam Wierman
- Which side chooses in large random matching markets?, Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria and Jacob Leshno
- Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis
- What You Jointly Know Determines How You Act - Strategic Interactions in Prediction Markets, Xi Alice Gao, Jie Zhang and Yiling Chen
- Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport, Costis Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos
- Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale, Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier and Renato Paes Leme
- Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions, Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos
- Failure-Aware Kidney Exchange, John Dickerson, Ariel Procaccia and Tuomas Sandholm
- Measuring the Performance of Large-Scale Combinatorial Auctions, Sang Won Kim, Marcelo Olivares and Gabriel Weintraub
- Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker", Eric Budish and Aditya Bhave
- Accounting for Price Dependencies in Simultaneous Sealed-Bid Auctions, Brandon Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald and Michael Wellman
- Down-to-the-Minute Effects of Super Bowl Advertising on Online Search Behavior, Randall A Lewis and David Reiley
- A Combinatorial Prediction Market for the U.S. Elections, Miroslav Dudik, Sébastien Lahaie, David Pennock and David Rothschild
- Multi-parameter Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation, Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg and Aleksandrs Slivkins
- Whole-page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders, Nikhil R Devanur, Nitish Korula, Zhiyi Huang, Vahab Mirrokni and Qiqi Yan
- The Virality--Efficiency Tradeoff, Sean J Taylor, Eytan Bakshy and Sinan Aral
- Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition, Gabriel Carroll
- Optimal and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
- Two-sided Matching with Partial Information, Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica and Kevin Leyton-Brown
- Cost Function Market Makers for Measurable Spaces, Yiling Chen, Michael Ruberry and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
- Best-Response Dynamics Out of Sync: Complexity and Characterization, Roee Engelberg, Alex Fabrikant, Michael Schapira and David Wajc
- Pick Your Poison: Pricing and Inventories at Unlicensed Online Pharmacies, Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore and Nicolas Christin
- Revenue Optimization in the Generalized Second-Price Auction, David Thompson and Kevin Leyton-Brown
