Accepted Posters:
- Game-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests, Li Yuqian* and Vincent Conitzer
- General Truthfulness Characterizations Via Convex Analysis, Rafael Frongillo* and Ian Kash
- Designing Frugal Best-Response Mechanisms for Social Network Coordination Games, Bruno Escoffier, Diodato Ferraioli*, Laurent Gourvès and Stefano Moretti
- Price Competition on Networked Markets, Ollar Mariann*
- Game-theoretic Randomization for Security Patrolling with Dynamic Execution Uncertainty, Albert Xin Jiang*, Zhengyu Yin, Chao Zhang, Sarit Kraus and Milind Tambe
- Towards Peer Governance of Social Systems: A Multi-disciplinary Formal Approach to Mechanism Design, Maryam Ghaffari Saadat*
- Partially Strategyproof Mechanisms for the Assignment Problem, Timo Mennle* and Sven Seuken
- A Game-theoretic Machine Learning Approach for Revenue Maximization in Sponsored Search, Di He, Wei Chen, Liwei Wang and Tie-Yan Liu*
- Preference Elicitation For General Random Utility Models, Hossein Azari Soufiani, David Parkes, Lirong Xia*
- Socially Stable Matchings, Georgios Askalidis*, Nicole Immorlica, Augustine Kwanashie, David Manlove and Emmanouil Pountourakis
- Computational Bundling for Auctions , Christian Kroer* and Tuomas Sandholm
- Positional differences in valuations of clicks in context advertisement auctions, Sergey Lyashenko*, Dmitry Arkhangelsky, Dilyara Khakimova and Sergei Izmalkov
- Optimal Reserve Prices in Anonymous Asymmetric Auctions, Sergei Izmalkov and Valery Topinsky*
- On evaluation of CTRs of different positions in sponsored search auctions, Dmitry Arkhangelsky, Dilyara Khakimova* and Sergei Izmalkov
- Trick or Treat: Putting Peer Prediction to the Test, Xi Alice Gao*, Andrew Mao and Yiling Chen
- Quid Pro Quo: A Mechanism for Fair Collaboration in Networked Systems, Agustin Santos*, Antonio Fernandez Anta and Luis Lopez Fernandez
- Parametric Auctions in Practice, Marco Pedroso*, Pablo Azar an Silvio Micali
- Complexity in Finite Games with Imperfect Recall, Adrian Marple* and Yoav Shoham
- Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing Lp Norm of Costs, Itai Feigenbaum, Jay Sethuraman and Ye Chun*
- Reducing Manipulability of Prediction Markets via Trade Limits, Eric Huang* and Yoav Shoham
- Gradient Descent in Potential Games and Application in Atomic Splittable Congestion Games , Po-An Chen* and Chi-Jen Lu
- Mechanism Design for Scheduling Groups of Sociable Agents, Hooyeon Lee*, Adrian Marple and Yoav Shoham
*=presenter
