Sunday, June 16, 2013

9:00 -11:30 AM

Tutorial on Social Computing and User Generated Content

Presenters: Yiling Chen (Harvard) and Arpita Ghosh (Cornell)
Room: Heilmeier Hall Rm 100 Towne Bldg.

Social computing --- such as on online knowledge-sharing forums (Y! Answers, StackOverflow), review aggregation platforms (Amazon, Yelp), crowdsourcing-based systems such as TopCoder or Games with a Purpose, or markets for obtaining and aggregating information --- is increasingly common on the Web. A number of questions related to incentives arise in the context of social computing, as is inevitable in any system with self-interested users.

This tutorial will address strategic issues in social computing systems, surveying the literature on formal models for social computing sytems and mechanism design and equilibrium analysis, and will cover topics such as contest design for crowdsourcing, models and mechanisms for user-generated content, and models and mechanisms for information elicitation with or without verification.


2:00 - 5:30 PM

Tutorial: Prior-Robust Optimization

Presenters : Nikhil Devanur (MSR)  and Balasubramanian Sivan (U. Wisconsin-Madison)
Room: Berger Autitorium, Skirkanich Hall

The focus of this tutorial is optimization in the presence of uncertain inputs. In a broad class of algorithmic problems, uncertainty is modeled as input being drawn from one among a large known universe of distributions, however the specific distribution is unknown to the algorithm. The goal then is to develop a single algorithm that for every distribution in this universe, performs approximately as well as the optimal algorithm tailored for that specific distribution. Such algorithms are robust to assumptions on prior distributions.

Prior robust optimization retains the robustness of worst-case analysis while going beyond the pessimistic lower bounds of worst-case analysis. Apart from this theoretical appeal, the ability to use the same algorithm for every prior distribution makes prior robust algorithms well-suited for deployment in real systems. Indeed, most prior robust algorithms in literature are simple to implement and some of them have been observed to perform well in large-scale systems.

In this tutorial, we present general techniques for developing prior robust algorithms for two distinct lines of research: online algorithms and mechanism design. In online algorithms, we do this by surveying a recent series of results on resource allocation problems, whose several applications including to internet ad serving is of interest to the EC community. In mechanism design, we illustrate the techniques by surveying classic and recent results on revenue maximization in auctions, as well as recent results on makespan minimization in machine scheduling. No prior knowledge of mechanism design will be assumed. Finally, since developing prior robust algorithms is a relatively new research agenda, several interesting open questions remain, and will be pointed out along the way.

Monday, June 17, 2013

9:00 - 12:30 PM




Tutorial: Econometrics

Presenter: Bo Cowgill (UC Berkeley) and Randall Lewis (Google)
Room: Wu and Chen Auditorium, 100 Levine

Computer scientists increasingly use data for research. This tutorial will describe econometric techniques for analyzing data, their formal assumptions, proofs of optimality and practical application to research problems. Emphasis will be placed on the intuition behind techniques and how to apply them in research. The goal will be for the audience to walk away with (a) a set of readily-available tools for making causal inferences from data in research, and (b) an elevated language for evaluating and critiquing data analysis in computer science.

Tutorial: Market Design I
Presenter: Utku Unver (Boston College)
Room: Berger Auditorium, Skirkanich Hall

The emerging field of market design applies auction theory and matching theory  to solve real-life resource allocation problems. These tutorials will provide an overview of some recent research and policy work on matching markets. The focus of the course is the evolution of the literature both from a theoretical and also practical perspective. Topics include two-sided matching, house allocation, school choice, kidney exchange, matching with contracts, and cadet branching. The two tutorials are largely independent, so it should be possible to attend only one but together they aim to give a rather comprehensive picture of the state of the art in market design.

2:00 - 5:30 PM



Tutorial: Market Design II
Presenter: Tayfun Sonmez (Boston College)
Room: Berger Auditorium, Skirkanich Hall

The emerging field of market design applies auction theory and matching theory  to solve real-life resource allocation problems. These tutorials will provide an overview of some recent research and policy work on matching markets. The focus of the course is the evolution of the literature both from a theoretical and also practical perspective. Topics include two-sided matching, house allocation, school choice, kidney exchange, matching with contracts, and cadet branching. The two tutorials are largely independent, so it should be possible to attend only one but together they aim to give a rather comprehensive picture of the state of the art in market design.