Accepted Posters:
Fairness Beyond the Core: New Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions, Ben Lubin, Benedikt Bünz and Sven Seuken
Rational Proofs with Multiple Powers, Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley and Shikha Singh
Strategic Market Choice: Frequent Call Markets vs Continuous Double Auctions for Fast & Slow Traders, Elaine Wah, Dylan Hurd and Michael Wellman
Timeability of Extensive-Form Games, Sune Jakobsen, Troels Soerensen and Vincent Conitzer
Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Behavioral Biases, Reshef Meir and David Parkes
Truthful Secretaries with Budgets, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman and Adi Vardi
Submodular Adaptive Seeding, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Christos Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein, Lior Seeman and Yaron Singer
Computational Extensive-Form Games, Joseph Halpern, Rafael Pass and Lior Seeman
Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms For Market Intermediation, Rad Niazadeh, Yang Yuan and Robert Kleinberg
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing, Saeed Alaei, Jason Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, and Yang Yuan
Boredom, Learning, and Efficient Coding in Online Experiments, Weiwen Leung
Crowdsourcing with Posted Prices and a Budget, Eric Balkanski and Jason Hartline
The population dynamics of websites, Kartik Ahuja, Simpson Zhang and Mihaela van der Schaar
Complex Contagions in Time Evolving and Small World Networks, Roozbeh Ebrahimi, Jie Gao, Golnaz Ghasemiesfe and Grant Schoenebeck
Algorithmic Statistical Discrimination: How Automated Prediction Can Exacerbate Group Differences, Jelveh Zubin and Michael Luca
Endgame Solving in Large Imperfect-Information Games, Sam Ganzfried and Tuomas Sandholm
Competing Dynamic Matching Markets, Sanmay Das, John Dickerson, Zhuoshu Li and Tuomas Sandholm
Allocating Indivisible Items in Categorized Domains, Erika Mackin and Lirong Xia
Simultaneous Abstraction and Equilibrium Finding in Games, Noam Brown and Tuomas Sandholm
A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games, Michal Feldman and Ophir Friedler
