



ec17
MIT

The 18th ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation



TECHNICAL PROGRAM

Monday June 26

8:00 – 9:00	Breakfast (Stata 1 st floor)				
9:00 – 12:30	Tutorial: Advances in Game Theory for Security and Privacy <i>Organizers: Bo An, Fei Fang, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik</i>		3rd Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory and Data Science <i>Organizers: Jean Honorio, Denis Nekipelov, Renato Paes Leme, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Elie Tamer</i>		Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good <i>Organizers: Rediet Abebe, Kira Goldner</i>
LOCATION >	32-155		32-141		32-G449
12:30 – 2:00	Lunch (Stata 1 st floor) Poster session for Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good (Stata 1 st floor)				
2:00 – 5:30	Tutorial: An information theoretical view of information elicitation mechanisms <i>Organizers: Yuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck</i>		3rd Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory and Data Science <i>Organizers: Jean Honorio, Denis Nekipelov, Renato Paes Leme, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Elie Tamer</i>		Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good <i>Organizers: Rediet Abebe, Kira Goldner</i>
LOCATION >	32-155		32-141		32-G449

Tuesday June 27

8:00 – 9:00	Breakfast (Stata 1 st floor)				
9:00 – 12:30	Tutorial: Incentivizing and Coordinating Exploration <i>Organizers: Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins</i>	Tutorial: Bargaining, Trading, and Coordination in Networks (Part 1) <i>Organizer: Benjamin Golub</i>	12th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon) <i>PC Chairs: Vincent Conitzer, Roche Guerin</i>		Forecasting Workshop <i>Organizers: Rafael Frongillo, David Rothschild, Bo Waggoner</i>
LOCATION >	32-155	32-141	32-G449		32-D463
12:30 – 2:00	Lunch (Stata 1 st floor)				
2:00 – 5:30	Tutorial: Pricing in Combinatorial Markets <i>Organizers: Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier</i>	Tutorial: Bargaining, Trading, and Coordination in Networks (Part 2) <i>Organizer: Benjamin Golub</i>	12th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon) <i>PC Chairs: Vincent Conitzer, Roche Guerin</i>		Forecasting Workshop <i>Organizers: Rafael Frongillo, David Rothschild, Bo Waggoner</i>
LOCATION >	32-155	32-141	32-G449		32-D463
6:00 – 8:00	EC17 Welcome Reception + Poster Session (Location: Stata 4 th floor lounge)				

Wednesday June 28


8:00 – 9:00	Breakfast (Stata 1 st floor)	
9:00 – 10:15	Plenary Session (Location: 32-123) Michael Kearns (University of Pennsylvania) Fair Algorithms for Machine Learning	
10:15–10:40	Coffee Break (Stata 1 st floor)	
10:40–12:00	1A: Static Revenue Maximization 1 (32-123)	1B: Peer Predictions (32-141)
10:40	Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison Andrew Chi-Chih Yao	The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering Rupert Freeman (Duke University); David M. Pennock (Microsoft Research); Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (Microsoft Research)
11:00	Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service Vasilis Gkatzelis, Evangelos Markakis, Tim Roughgarden	Forecast Aggregation Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
11:20	The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: the General Case Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg	Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction Yang Liu, Yiling Chen
11:40	Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, Christos-Alexandros Psomas	Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users Arpit Agarwal, Debmalaya Mandal, David C. Parkes, Nisarg Shah
12:00–1:30	Lunch (Stata 1 st floor)	
1:10 – 2:30	EC Business Meeting (Location: 32-123) All are welcome	
2:40 – 4:00	2A: Matching 1 (32-123)	2B: Predictions and Queries (32-141)
2:40	The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li	A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games Noam Nisan, Gali Noti
3:00	Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions Yash Kanoria, Daniela Saban	The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete? An Application to Human Perception of Randomness Jon Kleinberg, Annie Liang, Senthil Mullainathan
3:20	Matching while Learning Ramesh Johari, Vijay Kamble, Yash Kanoria	Comparison-based Choices Jon Kleinberg, Senthil Mullainathan, Johan Ugander
3:40	Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer	Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction Sepehr Assadi
4:00 – 4:30	Coffee Break (Stata 1 st floor)	
4:30 – 5:50	3A: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1 (32-123)	3B: Economic Equilibrium (32-141)
4:30	The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro, Gabriel Weintraub	Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation Frank Cheng, Michael P. Wellman
4:50	Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities Santiago R. Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme	Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets Erik Brinkman, Michael P. Wellman
5:10	Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Sam Taggart	Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation Pieter Kleer, Guido Schaefer
5:30	Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers José Correa, Patricio Foncea, Ruben Hoeksma, Tim Oosterwijk, Tjark Vredeveld	Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase Juan Camilo Castillo, Dan Knoepfle, Glen Weyl
6:00 – 7:00	Open discussion on job market advice for graduate students Lead by Kevin Leyton-Brown, Ruta Mehta and Matt Weinberg (Location: 32-123)	

Thursday June 29


8:00 – 9:00	Breakfast (Stata 1 st floor)	
9:00 – 10:20	4A: Matching 2 (32-123)	4B: Voting (32-141)
9:00	Stable Secretaries Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky	Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions Gerdus Benade, Anson Kahng, Ariel D. Procaccia
9:20	Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets Saeed Alaei, Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi, Eva Tardos	Voting in the Limelight Ronen Gradwohl
9:40	Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria, Peng Shi	Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules Ashish Goel, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Kamesh Munagala
10:00	Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks Ravi Jagadeesan	Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates Yu Cheng, Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe
10:20-10:50	Coffee Break (Stata 1 st floor)	
10:50-12:10	5A: Static Revenue Maximization 2 (32-123)	5B: Information Games (32-141)
10:50	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg	Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers David Lingenbrink, Krishnamurthy Iyer
11:10	Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar	Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks Ronen Gradwohl
11:30	The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg	Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities Shaddin Dughmi, Haifeng Xu
11:50	Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments Gerardo Berbeglia, Gwenael Joret	Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents Sampath Kannan, Michael Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern, Mallesh Pai, Aaron Roth, Rakesh Vohra, Zhiwei Steven Wu
12:10–1:40	Lunch (Stata 1 st floor)	
1:40–2:40	Best paper and Best Dissertation presentations (Location: 32-123) Combinatorial Cost Sharing Shahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovdia SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award presentation by Peng Shi	
2:50 – 3:50	6A: Scheduling (32-123)	6B: Fair Division 1 (32-141)
2:50	Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Alan Roytman	Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod
3:10	Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Janardhan Kulkarni, Rad Niazadeh	Controlled Dynamic Fair Division Eric Friedman, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi
3:30	Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa	A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting Ariel D. Procaccia, Junxing Wang
3:50 – 4:20	Coffee Break (Stata 1 st floor)	
4:20 – 5:40	7A: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2 (32-123)	7B: Experiments (32-141)
4:20	Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning Sebastien Bubeck, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Rad Niazadeh	The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized? Filippos Apostolos, John Joseph Horton
4:40	Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers Yiwei Chen, Cong Shi	Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews Shrabastee Banerjee, Chris Dellarocas, Georgios Zervas
5:00	Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework Siddhartha Banerjee, Daniel Freund, Thodoris Lykouris	Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri, James R. Wright
5:20	Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization Aaron Roth, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Jonathan Ullman, Zhiwei Steven Wu	Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness Mohammad Akbarpour, Matthew Jackson
6:00 – 9:00	EC Dinner Reception – hosted by Microsoft Location: Microsoft NERD Center, One Memorial Drive	

8:00 – 9:00	Breakfast (Stata 1 st floor)	
9:00 – 10:00	8A: Mechanism Design: General (32-123)	8B: Decision Making and Learning (32-141)
9:00	Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness <i>Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Giorgos Christodoulou, Evangelos Markakis</i>	Planning with Multiple Biases <i>Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Manish Raghavan</i>
9:20	From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies <i>Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer</i>	Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making <i>Ilan Label, Renato Paes Leme, Adrian Vladu</i>
9:40	Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness <i>Sophie Bade, Yannai A. Gonczarowski</i>	Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments <i>Ger Yang, Georgios Piliouras, David Basanta</i>
10:00-10:20	Coffee Break (Stata 1 st floor)	
10:20-11:20	9A: Auctions: Equilibrium (32-123)	9B: Fair Division 2 (32-141)
10:20	Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms <i>Johannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Fa Wu, Mingfei Zhao</i>	Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents <i>Simina Branzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta</i>
10:40	Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions <i>Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden, Stefano Turchetta</i>	Fair Public Decision Making <i>Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah</i>
11:00	Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium <i>Santiago R. Balseiro, Yonatan Gur</i>	Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division <i>Siddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy</i>
11:30–12:30	Plenary Session (Location: 32-123) Jennifer Chayes (Microsoft Research) Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks	
12:30–2:00	Lunch (Stata 1 st floor)	
2:00 – 3:20	10A: Matching 3 (32-123)	10B: Strategic Games (32-141)
2:00	Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms <i>John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Westkamp</i>	Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players <i>Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko</i>
2:20	Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints <i>Thanh Nguyen, Rakesh Vohra</i>	Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games <i>Christian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinc-Karzan, Tuomas Sandholm</i>
2:40	Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon-Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design <i>Benjamin N. Roth, Ran I. Shorrer</i>	A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic <i>Zhigang Cao, Bo Chen, Xujin Chen, Changjun Wang</i>
3:00	How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing <i>Nick Arnosti, Peng Shi</i>	A Polynomial Time Algorithm For Spatio-Temporal Security Games <i>Soheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi, Aleksandrs Slivkins</i>
3:20 – 3:45	Coffee Break (Stata 1 st floor)	
3:45 – 4:30	ACM SIGecom Test of Time Award video acceptance and discussion (Location: 32-123)	

Stata 1st Floor



Stata 4th Floor



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