EC '18 Accepted Papers

Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir and David C. Parkes. Social Choice for General Utilities
Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier and Piotr Skowron. Stable Marriage with Multi-Modal Preferences
Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li. Credible Mechanisms
Martin Lackner and Piotr Skowron. Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules
Tamas Fleiner, Ravi Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Janko and Alexander Teytelboym. Trading networks with frictions
Yuqing Kong and Grant Schoenebeck. Eliciting Expertise without Verification
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner. Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing
Brandon Fain, Kamesh Munagala and Nisarg Shah. Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods
Yiling Chen, Chara Podimata, Ariel Procaccia and Nisarg Shah. Strategyproof Linear Regression in High Dimensions
Siddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy and Rohit Vaish. Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations
Jerry Anunrojwong and Nat Sothanaphan. Naive Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
John Hatfield, Scott Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp. Chain Stability in Trading Networks
Gerdus Benade, Aleksandr Kazachkov, Ariel Procaccia and Christos-Alexandros Psomas. How to Make Envy Vanish Over Time
Kyle Barron, Edward Kung and Davide Proserpio. The Sharing Economy and Housing Affordability: Evidence from Airbnb
Brett Hollenbeck, Sridhar Moorthy and Davide Proserpio. Advertising strategy in the presence of reviews: an empirical analysis
Yossi Azar, Ashish Chiplunkar and Haim Kaplan. Prophet Secretary: Surpassing the $1-1/e$ Barrier
Pingzhong Tang and Yulong Zeng. The price of prior dependence in auctions
Eric Balkanski and Renato Paes Leme. On the Construction of Substitutes
Elissa M. Redmiles, Michelle L. Mazurek and John P. Dickerson. Dancing Pigs or Externalities? Measuring the Rationality of Security Decisions
Ioannis Caragiannis and Alexandros Voudouris. The efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget-constrained users
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour and Shay Moran. Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization
Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan and Aviad Rubinstein. Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer
Yun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole and Yixin Tao. Dynamics of Distributed Updating in Fisher Markets
Jose Correa, Cristobal Guzman, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova and Marc Schroder. Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators
Ruggiero Cavallo, Maxim Sviridenko and Christopher Wilkens. Matching Auctions for Search and Native Ads
Alice Lu, Peter Frazier and Oren Kislev. The Effect of Dynamic Pricing on Uber's Driver-Partners
Jinshuo Dong, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Bo Waggoner and Zhiwei Steven Wu. Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences
Yuqing Kong and Grant Schoenebeck. Water from Two Rocks: Maximizing the Mutual Information
Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Juba Ziani. Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation
Shahar Dobzinski and Nitzan Uziely. Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski and Sigal Oren. Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen and Abraham Neyman. The Big Match with a clock and a bit of memory
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen and Troels Bjerre Lund. Computational Complexity of Proper Equilibrium
Yasushi Kawase, Yutaro Yamaguchi and Yu Yokoi. Computing a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Matching Game
Umut Dur, Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken. First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler and Aviad Rubinstein. Competition-Efficient Approximation Schemes
Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Mingfei Zhao. The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
Eduardo Azevedo, Alex Deng, Jose Montiel Olea, Justin Rao and E. Glen Weyl. A/B Testing
Jon Kleinberg and Robert Kleinberg. Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search
Masood Seddighin, Mohammad Ghodsi, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, Saeed Seddighin and Hadi Yami. Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvements and Generalizations
Benjamin Lubin, Benedikt Bünz and Sven Seuken. Designing Core-selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach
Elchanan Mossel, Manuel Mueller Frank, Allan Sly and Omer Tamuz. Social learning equilibria
Zhe Feng, Chara Podimata and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Learning to Bid without Knowing your Value
Ian Kash, Peter Key and Spyros Zoumpoulis. Optimal Pricing and Introduction Timing of New Virtual Machines
Annie Liang and Xiaosheng Mu. Overabundant Information and Learning Traps
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ilan Nehama. Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking
Omar Besbes and Amine Allouah. Prior-Independent Optimal Auctions
Piotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers and Mohammad Akbarpour. Redistribution through Markets
Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Dynamic Information Acquisition from Multiple Sources
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky. The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game.
John Birge, Ozan Candogan, Hongfan Chen and Daniela Saban. Optimal Commissions & Subscriptions in Networked Markets
Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm and Ellen Vitercik. A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit Maximization
Krishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub and Nir Hak. Bayesian Social Learning in a Dynamic Environment
Jakub Cerny, Branislav Bosansky and Christopher Kiekintveld. Incremental Strategy Generation for Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
Imanol Arrieta Ibarra and Johan Ugander. A Personalized BDM Mechanism for Efficient Market Intervention Experiments
Costas Busch and Rajgopal Kannan. Polynomial Time Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games
Apostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton and Joseph Golden. Reputation in the Long-Run
Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique. Learnability and Models of Decision Making under Uncertainty
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo. Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design
Mohammad Akbarpour, Suraj Malladi and Amin Saberi. Diffusion, Seeding, and the Value of Network Information
Soheil Behnezhad and Nima Reyhani. Almost Optimal Stochastic Weighted Matching with Few Queries
Tung Mai, Milena Mihail, Ioannis Panageas, Vijay Vazirani, Will Ratcliff and Peter Yunker. Cycles in Zero Sum Differential Games and Biological Diversity
Soheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi and Saeed Seddighin. Spatio-Temporal Security Games Beyond One Dimension
Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Mohammadreza Khani and Saeed Seddighin. Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems: Vertex Cover and Knapsack
Max Dupré La Tour and Adrian Vetta. The Combinatorial Clock Auction: the Effects of Strategic Behaviour and the Price Increment Rule on Social Welfare
Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier and Rad Niazadeh. Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
Hyunjin Kim and Michael Luca. The Costs of Entering through Tying: Experimental Evidence
Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider and S. Matthew Weinberg. Selling to a No-Regret Buyer
Shipra Agrawal, Constantinos Daskalakis, Vahab Mirrokni and Balasubramanian Sivan. Robust Repeated Auctions under Heterogeneous Buyer Behavior
James Bailey and Georgios Piliouras. Multiplicative Weights Update in Zero-Sum Games