EC '18 Accepted Papers
Tamas Fleiner, Ravi Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Janko and Alexander Teytelboym. Trading networks with frictions Brandon Fain, Kamesh Munagala and Nisarg Shah. Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goods
Yiling Chen, Chara Podimata, Ariel Procaccia and Nisarg Shah. Strategyproof Linear Regression in High Dimensions
Jerry Anunrojwong and Nat Sothanaphan. Naive Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
Gerdus Benade, Aleksandr Kazachkov, Ariel Procaccia and Christos-Alexandros Psomas. How to Make Envy Vanish Over Time Kyle Barron, Edward Kung and Davide Proserpio. The Sharing Economy and Housing Affordability: Evidence from Airbnb
Brett Hollenbeck, Sridhar Moorthy and Davide Proserpio. Advertising strategy in the presence of reviews: an empirical analysis
Pingzhong Tang and Yulong Zeng. The price of prior dependence in auctions
Eric Balkanski and Renato Paes Leme. On the Construction of Substitutes
Yun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole and Yixin Tao. Dynamics of Distributed Updating in Fisher Markets
Jose Correa, Cristobal Guzman, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova and Marc Schroder. Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators Ruggiero Cavallo, Maxim Sviridenko and Christopher Wilkens. Matching Auctions for Search and Native Ads
Alice Lu, Peter Frazier and Oren Kislev. The Effect of Dynamic Pricing on Uber's Driver-Partners
Yuqing Kong and Grant Schoenebeck. Water from Two Rocks: Maximizing the Mutual Information Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Juba Ziani. Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation
Masood Seddighin, Mohammad Ghodsi, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, Saeed Seddighin and Hadi Yami. Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvements and Generalizations Benjamin Lubin, Benedikt Bünz and Sven Seuken. Designing Core-selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach Elchanan Mossel, Manuel Mueller Frank, Allan Sly and Omer Tamuz. Social learning equilibria
Zhe Feng, Chara Podimata and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Learning to Bid without Knowing your Value
Ian Kash, Peter Key and Spyros Zoumpoulis. Optimal Pricing and Introduction Timing of New Virtual Machines
Annie Liang and Xiaosheng Mu. Overabundant Information and Learning Traps
Omar Besbes and Amine Allouah. Prior-Independent Optimal Auctions
Piotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers and Mohammad Akbarpour. Redistribution through Markets
Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Dynamic Information Acquisition from Multiple Sources
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky. The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game.
John Birge, Ozan Candogan, Hongfan Chen and Daniela Saban. Optimal Commissions & Subscriptions in Networked Markets
Krishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub and Nir Hak. Bayesian Social Learning in a Dynamic Environment
Imanol Arrieta Ibarra and Johan Ugander. A Personalized BDM Mechanism for Efficient Market Intervention Experiments Costas Busch and Rajgopal Kannan. Polynomial Time Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo. Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design Mohammad Akbarpour, Suraj Malladi and Amin Saberi. Diffusion, Seeding, and the Value of Network Information
Soheil Behnezhad and Nima Reyhani. Almost Optimal Stochastic Weighted Matching with Few Queries Tung Mai, Milena Mihail, Ioannis Panageas, Vijay Vazirani, Will Ratcliff and Peter Yunker. Cycles in Zero Sum Differential Games and Biological Diversity Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Mohammadreza Khani and Saeed Seddighin. Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems: Vertex Cover and Knapsack
Max Dupré La Tour and Adrian Vetta. The Combinatorial Clock Auction: the Effects of Strategic Behaviour and the Price Increment Rule on Social Welfare Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier and Rad Niazadeh. Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
Hyunjin Kim and Michael Luca. The Costs of Entering through Tying: Experimental Evidence
Shipra Agrawal, Constantinos Daskalakis, Vahab Mirrokni and Balasubramanian Sivan. Robust Repeated Auctions under Heterogeneous Buyer Behavior
James Bailey and Georgios Piliouras. Multiplicative Weights Update in Zero-Sum Games