Full conference schedule in printable format.

Tuesday, June 25, 2019
8:15 – 9:00 AM
Breakfast (Foyers)
8:30 – 9:50 AM
1a: Theory of Matching Markets
Location: 232A
Chair: Scott Kominers
1b: Machine Learning and Applications
Location: 232B
Chair: Greg Lewis
1c: Prophet Inequalities
Location: 232C
Chair: Matt Weinberg
8:30 – 8:50 AM
Stable fractional matchings
Ioannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Rohit Vaish
Fundamental Limits on Testing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Discrete Choice
Arjun Seshadri and Johan Ugander
Nearly Optimal Pricing Algorithms for Production Constrained and Laminar Bayesian Selection
Nima Anari, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi and Ali Shameli
8:50 – 9:10 AM
Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-offs
Jiehua Chen, Piotr Skowron and Manuel Sorge
How Do Machine Learning Algorithms Perform in Predicting Hospital Choices? Evidence from Changing Environments
Devesh Raval, Ted Rosenbaum and Nathan Wilson
Prophet inequality for bipartite matching: merits of being simple and non adaptive
Nick Gravin and Hongao Wang
9:10 – 9:30 AM
Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints
Thanh Nguyen, Hai Nguyen and Alexander Teytelboym
Identifying Bid Leakage In Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach
Dmitry Ivanov and Alexander Nesterov
Posted Pricing and Prophet Inequalities with Inaccurate Priors
Paul Duetting and Thomas Kesselheim
9:30 – 9:50 AM
Trading Networks with General Preferences
Jan Christoph Schlegel
The Congressional Classification Challenge: Domain Specificity and Partisan Intensity
Hao Yan, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Sirui Li and Betsy Sinclair
Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection
Hedyeh Beyhaghi and Robert Kleinberg
9:50 – 10:05 AM
15-minute break
10:05 – 11:05 AM
EC Plenary Session: ACM SIGecom Best Full Paper and Best Paper with a Student Lead Author
Location: North 120B
10:05 – 10:35 AM
ACM SIGecom Best Full Paper Award: Prophet Inequalities for i.i.d. Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution
Jose Correa, Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer and Kevin Schewior
10:35 – 11:05 AM
ACM SIGecom Best Paper with a Student Lead Author Award: Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner and Anna Karlin
11:05 – 11:20 AM
Coffee Break (Foyers)
11:20 AM – 12:30 PM
FCRC Keynote Session (Symphony Hall, immediately south of Convention Center)
Cynthia Dwork, Harvard University
12:30 – 2:00 PM
Lunch (301)
2:00 – 3:40 PM
2a: Signaling and Strategic Learning
Location: 232A
Chair: Bobby Kleinberg
2b: Online Platforms
Location: 232B
Chair: Sven Seuken
2c: Mechanism Design I
Location: 232C
Chair: Shengwu Li
2:00 – 2:20 PM
Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and k-Cores
Ozan Candogan
Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency in a Simple Labor Market
Zoe Cullen and Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Exemplary Applied Modeling Track Paper
Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions
Yang Cai and Mingfei Zhao
2:20 – 2:40 PM
Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Exploration
Lee Cohen and Yishay Mansour
Managing Market Mechanism Transitions: A Randomized Trial of Decentralized Pricing Versus Platform Control
Apostolos Filippas, Srikanth Jagabathula and Arun Sundararajan
Buy-Many Mechanisms are Not Much Better than Item Pricing
Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng and Christos Tzamos
2:40 – 3:00 PM
Social Learning and the Innkeeper’s Challenge
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz
The Supply and Demand Effects of Review Platforms
Gregory Lewis and Georgios Zervas
Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities
Yang Cai, Nikhil Devanur, Kira Goldner and R. Preston McAfee
3:00 – 3:20 PM
The Perils of Exploration under Competition: A Computational Modeling Approach
Guy Aridor, Kevin Liu, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Zhiwei Steven Wu
Observational Data for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Application to Recommender Systems
Akos Lada, Alexander Peysakhovich, Diego Aparicio and Michael Bailey
Exemplary Empirics Track Paper
Consumer-Optimal Market Segmentation
Nima Haghpanah and Ron Siegel
3:20 – 3:40 PM
Regression Equilibrium
Omer Ben - Porat and Moshe Tennenholtz
You Can Lead a Horse to Water: Spatial Learning and Path Dependence in Consumer Search
Greg Lewis and Charles Hodgson
The Value of Price Discrimination in Large Random Networks
Jiali Huang, Ankur Mani and Zizhuo Wang
3:40 – 4:00 PM
Coffee Break
4:00 – 6:00 PM
3a: Voting and Social Choice
Location: 232A
Chair: James Wright
3b: Applied Matching Markets
Location: 232B
Chair: Martin Bichler
3c: Pricing and Contracts
Location: 232C
Chair: Shuchi Chawla
3d: Joint Session With STOC
Location: North 226
Chair: Michal Feldman
4:00 – 4:20 PM
Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice Rules
Kamesh Munagala and Kangning Wang
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Lior Kovalio, Noam Nisan and Assaf Romm
Simple versus Optimal Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
[STOC] Settling the Sample Complexity of Single-parameter Revenue Maximization
Chenghao Guo, Zhiyi Huang, and Xinzhi Zhang
4:20 – 4:40 PM
Group Fairness in Committee Selection
Yu Cheng, Kamesh Munagala and Kangning Wang
Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
Surender Baswana, Partha P Chakrabarti, Sharat Chandran, Yash Kanoria and Utkarsh Patange
Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design
Ian Ball and Deniz Kattwinkel
[EC] Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms
Samuel Taggart and Jason Hartline
4:40 – 5:00 PM
No Stratification Without Representation
Johannes Gerhardus Benade, Paul Gölz and Ariel Procaccia
School Choice in Chile
Jose Correa, Rafael Epstein, Juan Escobar, Ignacio Rios, Bastian Bahamondes, Carlos Bonet, Natalie Epstein, Nicolas Aramayo, Martin Castillo, Andres Cristi and Boris Epstein
Sample-Based Optimal Pricing
Amine Allouah and Omar Besbes
[STOC] Tight Approximation Ratio of Anonymous Pricing
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Qi Qi, Zhihao Gavin Tang, and Tao Xiao
5:00 – 5:20 PM
Equitable Voting Rules
Laurent Bartholdi, Wade Hann-Caruther, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz and Leeat Yariv
Playing on a level field: Sincere and sophisticated players in the Boston mechanism with a coarse priority structure
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Assaf Romm
Static Pricing: Universal Guarantees for Reusable Resources
Omar Besbes, Adam Elmachtoub and Yunjie Sun
[EC] Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values
Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman and S. Matthew Weinberg
5:20 – 5:40 PM
Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games
François Durand, Antonin Macé and Matías Núñez
Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes
Ran Shorrer
Power of Dynamic Pricing in Revenue Management with Strategic (Forward-looking) Customers
Yiwei Chen and Stefanus Jasin
[STOC] Optimal (and Benchmark-Optimal) Competition Complexity for Additive Buyers over Independent Items
Hedyeh Beyhaghi, and S. Matthew Weinberg
5:40 – 6:00 PM
Incorporating Compatible Pairs in Kidney Exchange: A Dynamic Weighted Matching Model
Zhuoshu Li, Kelsey Lieberman, William Macke, Sofia Carrillo, Chien-Ju Ho, Jason Wellen and Sanmay Das
Dynamic learning and market making in spread betting markets with informed bettors
John Birge, Yifan Feng, Bora Keskin and Adam Schultz
[EC] The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue
Hu Fu, Christopher Liaw and Sikander Randhawa
6:00 – 8:00 PM
EC Reception and Poster Session (Location: 301)
Wednesday, June 26, 2019
7:30 – 8:30 AM
EC Women's Breakfast (102BC)
8:15 – 9:00 AM
Breakfast (Foyers)
8:30 – 9:50 AM
4a: Networks
Location: 232A
Chair: Nico Stier
4b: Cryptocurrency and Financial Markets
Location: 232B
Chair: Jason Hartline
4c: Fair Division
Location: 232C
Chair: Vasilis Gkatzelis
8:30 – 8:50 AM
Seeding with Costly Network Information
Dean Eckles, Hossein Esfandiari, Elchanan Mossel and M. Amin Rahimian
Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Christos-Alexandros Psomas and S. Matthew Weinberg
High-Multiplicity Fair Allocation: Lenstra empowered by N-fold Integer Programming
Robert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Dušan Knop and Rolf Niedermeier
8:50 – 9:10 AM
Influence Maximization on Undirected Graphs: Towards Closing the (1-1/e) Gap
Grant Schoenebeck and Biaoshuai Tao
Mind the Mining
Guy Goren and Alexander Spiegelman
Communication Complexity of Cake Cutting
Simina Branzei and Noam Nisan
9:10 – 9:30 AM
Displaying Things in Common to Encourage Friendship Formation: A Large Randomized Field Experiment
Tianshu Sun and Sean Taylor
Energy Equilibria in Proof-of-Work Mining
Amos Fiat, Anna Karlin, Elias Koutsoupias and Christos Papadimitriou
Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: The virtue of donating items
Ioannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin and Xin Huang
9:30 – 9:50 AM
Graphon games
Francesca Parise and Asuman Ozdaglar
Information and Learning in Heterogeneous Markets
Yaarit Even, Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi and Xavier Vives
Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice
Maria Kyropoulou, Josue Ortega and Erel Segal-Halevi
9:50 – 10:05 AM
15-minute break
10:05 – 11:05 AM
EC Plenary Session: ACM SIGecom Dissertation Award and Best Paper Award
Location: North 120B
10:05 – 10:35 AM
ACM SIGecom Dissertation Award: Aspects of Complexity and Simplicity in Economic Mechanisms
Yannai Gonczarowski
10:35 – 11:05 AM
ACM SIGecom Best Paper Award: Obvious Dominance and Random Priority
Peter Troyan and Marek Pycia
Also awarded Exemplary Theory Track Paper
11:05 – 11:20 AM
Coffee Break (Foyers)
11:20 AM – 12:30 PM
FCRC Keynote Session (Symphony Hall, immediately south of Convention Center)
Shriram Krishnamurthi, Brown University
12:30 – 2:00 PM
Lunch (301)
2:00 – 3:40 PM
5a: Social Learning
Location: 232A
Chair: Inbal Talgam-Cohen
5b: Routing and Ridesharing
Location: 232B
Chair: Ian Kash
5c: Applied Pricing
Location: 232C
Chair: Nima Haghpanah
2:00 – 2:20 PM
Robust non-Bayesian social learning
Segev Shlomov, Yakov Babichenko and Itai Arieli
On the Price of Anarchy for flows over time
Jose Correa, Andrés Cristi and Tim Oosterwijk
Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets
Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka, Nicolas Stier-Moses and Chris Wilkens
2:20 – 2:40 PM
Local non-Bayesian social learning with stubborn agents
Daniel Vial and Vijay Subramanian
Price of Anarchy in Stochastic Atomic Congestion Games with Affine Costs
Roberto Cominetti, Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder and Nicolas Stier-Moses
LP-based Approximation for Personalized Reserve Prices
Mahsa Derakhshan, Negin Golrezaei and Renato Paes Leme
2:40 – 3:00 PM
Naive Learning Through Probability Matching
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko and Manuel Mueller-Frank
Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars
Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz
Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Market Places
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov and Onno Zoeter
3:00 – 3:20 PM
Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications
Gad Allon, Kimon Drakopoulos and Vahideh Manshadi
Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms
Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang and David C. Parkes
Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back
Ludwig Dierks and Sven Seuken
3:20 – 3:40 PM
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky
Spatial Capacity Planning
Francisco Castro, Omar Besbes and Ilan Lobel
Optimal Pricing in Markets with Non-Convex Costs
Navid Azizan, Yu Su, Krishnamurthy Dvijotham and Adam Wierman
3:40 – 4:00 PM
Coffee Break (Foyers)
4:00 – 5:00 PM
EC Plenary Session: The Future of Work
Location: North 120B
Plenary talk: Automation vs. Procreation
Hal Varian (Google),
Discussant: Jonathan Hall (Uber)
5:15 – 6:45 PM
EC Business Meeting
Location: North 120B
7:15 – 8:30 PM
UBER hosts Happy Hour for EC'19 attendees!
Location: Kimpton Hotel Palomar — 2 E Jefferson St, Phoenix, AZ 85004
Thursday, June 27, 2019
8:15 – 9:00 AM
Breakfast (Foyers)
8:30 – 9:50 AM
6a: Game Theory
Location: 232ABC
Chair: Sebastien Lahaie
6b: Data Markets
Location: 228A
Chair: Bo Waggoner
6c: Dynamic Algorithms
Location: 228B
Chair: Vahideh Manshadi
8:30 – 8:50 AM
Optimal Strategies of Blotto Games: Beyond Convexity
Soheil Behnezhad, Avrim Blum, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi, Christos Papadimitriou and Saeed Seddighin
Prior-free Data Acquisition for Accurate Statistical Estimation
Shuran Zheng and Yiling Chen
Tight Weight-dependent Competitive Ratios for Online Edge-weighted Bipartite Matching and Beyond
Will Ma and David Simchi-Levi
8:50 – 9:10 AM
Iterated Deep Reinforcement Learning in Games: History-Aware Training for Improved Stability
Mason Wright, Yongzhao Wang and Michael Wellman
How to Sell a Dataset? Pricing Policies for Data Monetization
Sameer Mehta, Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman and Vijay Mookerjee
Edge Weighted Online Windowed Matching
Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, Amin Saberi and Chris Sholley
9:10 – 9:30 AM
Robust commitments and partial reputation
Vidya Muthukumar and Anant Sahai
Adversarial Contract Design for Private Data Commercialization
Parinaz Naghizadeh and Arunesh Sinha
Learning in structured MDPs with convex cost functions: Improved regret bounds for inventory management
Randy Jia and Shipra Agrawal
9:30 – 9:50 AM
Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games
Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh, Zinovi Rabinovich and Michael Wooldridge
A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solution
Anish Agarwal, Munther Dahleh and Tuhin Sarkar
9:50 – 10:05 AM
15-minute break
10:05 – 11:05 AM
EC Plenary Session: Highlights Beyond EC
Location: 232ABC
10:05 – 10:25 AM
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play
presented by Annie Liang
10:25 – 10:45 AM
Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms
presented by Piotr Dworczak
10:45 – 11:05 AM
Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice
presented by Felix Brandt
11:05 – 11:20 AM
Coffee Break (Foyers)
11:20 AM – 12:30 PM
FCRC Keynote Session (Symphony Hall, immediately south of Convention Center)
Jeannette Wing, Columbia University
12:30 – 2:00 PM
Lunch (301)
2:00 – 2:30 PM
EC Plenary Session: ACM SIGecom Test-of-Time Award
Location: 232ABC
ACM SIGecom Test-of-Time Award: The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal
2:30 – 3:30 PM
EC Plenary Session: Data Markets
Location: 232ABC
Plenary talk: Markets for Information
Dirk Bergemann (Yale),
Discussant: Yiling Chen (Harvard)
3:30 – 4:00 PM
Coffee Break (Foyers)
4:00 – 6:00 PM
7a: Combinatorial Markets and Social Choice
Location: 232ABC
Chair: Grant Schoenebeck
7b: Fairness and Social Good
Location: 228A
Chair: Jamie Morgenstern
7c: Mechanism Design II
Location: 228B
Chair: Yang Cai
4:00 – 4:20 PM
Computing Large Market Equilibria using Abstractions
Christian Kroer, Alexander Peysakhovich, Eric Sodomka and Nicolas Stier-Moses
Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization
Taylor Lundy, Alexander Wei, Hu Fu, Scott Duke Kominers and Kevin Leyton-Brown
Obvious Manipulations
Thayer Morrill and Peter Troyan
4:20 – 4:40 PM
Computing Core-Stable Outcomes in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Bidders
Martin Bichler and Stefan Waldherr
Individual Fairness in Hindsight
Swati Gupta and Vijay Kamble
Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility
Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm and Ellen Vitercik
Exemplary Artificial Intelligence Track Paper
4:40 – 5:00 PM
Adaptive-Price Combinatorial Auctions
Sebastien Lahaie and Benjamin Lubin
Simplicity Creates Inequity: Implications for Fairness, Stereotypes, and Interpretability
Jon Kleinberg and Sendhil Mullainathan
The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors
Evangelia Gergatsouli, Christos Tzamos and Brendan Lucier
5:00 – 5:20 PM
Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals
Rupert Freeman, David Pennock, Dominik Peters and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Tracking and Improving Information in the Service of Fairness
Sumegha Garg, Michael P. Kim and Omer Reingold
Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing: beyond linear utility
Yiding Feng, Jason Hartline and Yingkai Li
5:20 – 5:40 PM
Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences
Haris Aziz, Anna Bogomolnaia and Herve Moulin
How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically?
Jon Kleinberg and Manish Raghavan
Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations
Nick Gravin, Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu and Chenhao Zhang
5:40 – 6:00 PM
Principal-Agent VCG Contracts
Ron Lavi and Elisheva Shamash
Price of Privacy in the Keynesian Beauty Contest
Hadi Elzayn and Zachary Schutzman
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
Georgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer and Guido Schäfer
6:00 PM
Main EC program ends