Inspired by the SIGecom Exchanges’ annual survey of job market candidates, this is the second annual collection of profiles of the junior faculty job market candidates of the market design community. The nine candidates are listed alphabetically. Along with information regarding the candidate’s bio, job market paper, other representative papers, and short research summary, each profile also contains links to the candidate’s homepage and CV.

–Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm, and Ran Shorrer
EVREN, HAYDAR (Homepage, CV)


Advisors: M. Utku Ünver, M. Bumin Yenmez, and Tayfun Sönmez

Other fields: Microeconomics, Econometrics

PhD: Boston College, Economics (Expected: 2022)

Short research summary: I develop applied algorithms using statistics and computer science tools to improve social and economic impact, with a focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion. My job market paper creates an algorithmic solution. It runs simulations on 60 job advertisements from historical labor data consisting of 12k public jobs in India and successfully achieves the main goals of affirmative action schemes argued in the high court of India.

Other paper:

GRIGORYAN, ARAM (Homepage, CV)

Job market paper: School Choice and the Housing Market

Advisor: Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Other fields: Matching theory, Economics of education, Economics and computation

PhD: Duke University (Expected: 2022)

Short research summary: I am interested in effective and equitable allocation of scarce resources. My job market paper studies the welfare and distributional consequences of school choice in a model where families decide where to live prior to school admission. My recent work develops effectiveness-based assignment algorithms for real-life problems such as allocation of public school seats or COVID-19 vaccines.

Other papers:

IDEM, BERK (Homepage, CV)

Job market paper: Coexistence of Centralized and Decentralized Markets

Advisors: Vijay Krishna, Ran Shorrer, Nima Haghpanah, and Kalyan Chatterjee

Other fields: Information economics, Industrial organization

PhD: Pennsylvania State University, Economics (Expected: 2022)
**Short research summary:** I am interested in market design problems where the designed market is part of a larger market. My JMP is about the interactions between profit-maximizing centralized marketplaces introduced in a decentralized market with frictions. I show that the centralized marketplace always coexists with decentralized trade. The thickness of the marketplace is unaffected by the decentralized trade. The profit of the marketplace in coexistence is at least half of the profit it would make if there were no decentralized trade. In a separate line of work, I study environments where the designer or agents can manipulate the information structure for their benefits.

**Other paper:**

**JAGADEESAN, RAVI (Homepage, CV)**

**Job market paper:** Matching and Prices. Abstract in *EC 2021*. With Teytelboym, Alexander.

**Advisor:** Scott Kominers

**Other fields:** Microeconomic theory, Public economics

**PhD:** Harvard University, Business Economics (2020)

**Post-doc:** Stanford University, Economics (2020–2022)

**Short research summary:** My main research interests are in the design of matching markets and other markets for indivisible goods. My job market paper studies matching markets in which budget constraints or other financial constraints limit how much participants can spend. Such constraints are important in markets for goods that comprise large fractions of participants’ net worth or cash on hand—such as housing markets and spectrum auctions. We show that while the deferred acceptance algorithm generally fails to yield a stable outcome in the presence of budget constraints, stable outcomes do exist as long as agents view the goods that are traded in the market as net substitutes. However, under net substitutability, the ability of prices to adjust flexibly is not only important for market efficiency, but also critical to obtaining stable outcomes.

**Other papers:**

**KHANNA, MANSHU (Homepage, CV)**

**Job market paper:** Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets. With Caspari, Gian.

**Advisors:** M. Utku Ünver, Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Bumin Yenmez

**Other fields:** Microeconomics, Experimental economics
PhD: Boston College, Economics (Expected: 2022)
Short research summary: I work on problems related to markets, mechanisms, and society. My latest research informs design of matching mechanisms, affirmative action schemes, bargaining protocols, and COVID-19 testing policies.
Other papers:

KHUBULASHVILI, ROBIZON (Homepage, CV)
Job market paper: Behavioral Market Design for Online Gaming Platforms
Advisors: Ran Shorrer and Chloe Tergiman
Other fields: Experimental economics, Applied and empirical micro
PhD: Pennsylvania State University, Economics (2020)
Post-doc: University of Pittsburgh (2020–2022)
Short research summary: My primary research focuses on Behavioral Market Design. In my research, the main question is how we can use users’ revealed preferences to improve the performance of online markets/platforms. I have studied this question in two settings: when monetary incentives are missing (online gaming platform) and when monetary incentives are present (online gambling platform). My work suggests that the heterogeneity among users plays an essential role in designing better online platforms; that is, the policy benefiting one type of user might harm the other.
Other papers:

LI, YINGKAI (Homepage, CV)
Job market paper: Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information
Advisor: Jason Hartline
Other fields: Information design, Repeated games
PhD: Northwestern University, Computer Science (Expected: 2022)
Short research summary: My main research interests lie in mechanism design, with a focus on the theoretical guarantees of simple mechanisms. I show that simple mechanisms are robust [HLJ’20] and approximately optimal in various settings, including auctions with non-linear agents [FHL’21], information elicitation [HLSW’21], and selling information [L’21]. I also share interests in repeated games,
e.g., characterizing the equilibrium behavior of the agents in reputation models [LP’21] or with model misspecification [LP’20].

Other papers:

SKANCKE, ERLING (Homepage, CV)

Job market paper: Welfare and Strategic Externalities in Matching Markets with Interviews
Advisor: Al Roth
Other fields: Behavioral and experimental economics
PhD: Stanford University, Economics (Expected: 2022)
Short research summary: I’m interested in matching markets with interviews. My JMP focuses on the externalities that result from agents’ interview decisions. I show that a firm’s decision to interview more workers imposes a negative welfare externality on all other firms. I also derive conditions under which the strategic externalities leads to an interview game of either strategic substitutes or complementarities. Moreover, market thickness may exacerbate the interview externalities, leading to increasingly inefficient equilibria as markets thicken.

SOLIMINE, PHILIP (Homepage, CV)

Job market paper: Resource Sharing on Endogenous Networks
Advisors: Matthew Gentry and Luke Boosey
Other fields: Networks, Industrial organization, Experimental economics, Economics and computation
PhD: Florida State University, Economics (Expected: 2022)
Short research summary: I am currently working on projects involving theory, experimentation, and measurement in digital economies. My dissertation uses structural methods to examine the role of reputation and coordination in the formation and evolution of networks in online ecosystems, using a combination of experimental and empirical evidence. I intend to continue developing this research thread into a design paradigm for digital platforms, to encourage networked interaction that is characterized by diversity and efficiency, and to understand how incentives can support or erode effective social structure.

Other paper: