Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Keynote address

Centrality, gossip, and diffusion of information in networks

  • Matthew O. Jackson

Session 1

Strategic trading in informationally complex environments

  • Nicolas S. Lambert
  • Michael Ostrovsky
  • Mikhail Panov

Incentivizing exploration

  • Peter Frazier
  • David Kempe
  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Robert Kleinberg

Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling

  • Hu Fu
  • Nima Haghpanah
  • Jason Hartline
  • Robert Kleinberg

An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms

  • Timo Mennle
  • Sven Seuken

Session 2a

Generalized second price auction with probabilistic broad match

  • Wei Chen
  • Di He
  • Tie-Yan Liu
  • Tao Qin
  • Yixin Tao
  • Liwei Wang

Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions

  • Paul Dütting
  • Felix Fischer
  • David C. Parkes

Optimising trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions

  • Yoram Bachrach
  • Sofia Ceppi
  • Ian A. Kash
  • Peter Key
  • David Kurokawa

Optimizing prices in descending clock auctions

  • Tri-Dung Nguyen
  • Tuomas Sandholm

Session 2b

A dynamic network game for the adoption of new technologies

  • Matt V. Leduc

Characterizing strategic cascades on networks

  • Travis Martin
  • Grant Schoenebeck
  • Mike Wellman

The polarizing effect of network influences

  • MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
  • Hamid Mahini
  • David Malec

Re-incentivizing discovery: mechanisms for partial-progress sharing in research

  • Siddhartha Banerjee
  • Ashish Goel
  • Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy

Session 3a

Clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints

  • Gagan Goel
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Renato Paes Leme

Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation

  • Paul Milgrom
  • Ilya Segal

The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions

  • Paul Dütting
  • Vasilis Gkatzelis
  • Tim Roughgarden

Session 3b

Individual security and network design

  • Diego Cerdeiro
  • Marcin Dziubiński
  • Sanjeev Goyal

Cryptographically blinded games: leveraging players' limitations for equilibria and profit

  • Pavel Hubáček
  • Sunoo Park

The complexity of fairness through equilibrium

  • Abraham Othman
  • Christos Papadimitriou
  • Aviad Rubinstein

Session 4a

Optimal mechanisms with simple menus

  • Zihe Wang
  • Pingzhong Tang

Modularity and greed in double auctions

  • Paul Dütting
  • Tim Roughgarden
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions

  • Yiannis Giannakopoulos
  • Elias Koutsoupias

Approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings

  • Shuchi Chawla
  • Hu Fu
  • Anna Karlin

Session 4b

Efficient voting via the top-k elicitation scheme: a probabilistic approach

  • Yuval Filmus
  • Joel Oren

A local-dominance theory of voting equilibria

  • Reshef Meir
  • Omer Lev
  • Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Universal pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions

  • Haris Aziz
  • Florian Brandl
  • Felix Brandt

Neutrality and geometry of mean voting

  • Sebastien Lahaie
  • Nisarg Shah

Session 5a

Optimal allocation without money: an engineering approach

  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Peng Shi

Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences

  • Guillaume Haeringer
  • Vincent Iehlé

Dynamic matching market design

  • Mohammad Akbarpour
  • Shengwu Li
  • Shayan Oveis Gharan

Misdirected search effort in a matching market: causes, consequences and a partial solution

  • John Joseph Horton

Session 5b

Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems

  • Chien-Ju Ho
  • Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Removing arbitrage from wagering mechanisms

  • Yiling Chen
  • Nikhil R. Devanur
  • David M. Pennock
  • Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Information aggregation in exponential family markets

  • Jacob Abernethy
  • Sindhu Kutty
  • Sébastien Lahaie
  • Rahul Sami

A general volume-parameterized market making framework

  • Jacob D. Abernethy
  • Rafael M. Frongillo
  • Xiaolong Li
  • Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Session 6a

Reasoning about optimal stable matchings under partial information

  • Baharak Rastegari
  • Anne Condon
  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Robert Irving
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists

  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets

  • Nick Arnosti
  • Ramesh Johari
  • Yash Kanoria

Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem

  • Piotr Krysta
  • David Manlove
  • Baharak Rastegari
  • Jinshan Zhang

Session 6b

The wisdom of smaller, smarter crowds

  • Daniel G. Goldstein
  • Randolph Preston McAfee
  • Siddharth Suri

Revealing and incorporating implicit communities to improve recommender systems

  • Euijin Choo
  • Ting Yu
  • Min Chi
  • Yan Sun

Trick or treat: putting peer prediction to the test

  • Xi Alice Gao
  • Andrew Mao
  • Yiling Chen
  • Ryan Prescott Adams

Corporate prediction markets: evidence from Google, Ford, and Firm X

  • Bo Cowgill
  • Eric Zitzewitz

Session 7a

Incentivized optimal advert assignment via utility decomposition

  • Frank Kelly
  • Peter Key
  • Neil Walton

Strategyproof allocation of discrete jobs on multiple machines

  • Eric Friedman
  • Ali Ghodsi
  • Christos-Alexandros Psomas

Time-inconsistent planning: a computational problem in behavioral economics

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Sigal Oren

Session 7b

Towards a better measure of business proximity: topic modeling for analyzing M&As

  • Zhan Shi
  • Gene Moo Lee
  • Andrew B. Whinston

Why marketplace experimentation is harder than it seems: the role of test-control interference

  • Thomas Blake
  • Dominic Coey

Whole page optimization: how page elements interact with the position auction

  • Pavel Metrikov
  • Fernando Diaz
  • Sebastien Lahaie
  • Justin Rao

Session 8a

Local computation mechanism design

  • Avinatan Hassidim
  • Yishay Mansour
  • Shai Vardi

Reallocation mechanisms

  • Liad Blumrosen
  • Shahar Dobzinski

Knightian self uncertainty in the VCG mechanism for unrestricted combinatorial auctions

  • Alessandro Chiesa
  • Silvio Micali
  • Zeyuan Allen Zhu

Session 8b

Extensive-form game abstraction with bounds

  • Christian Kroer
  • Tuomas Sandholm

Bounds for the query complexity of approximate equilibria

  • Paul W. Goldberg
  • Aaron Roth

Finding approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games via payoff queries

  • John Fearnley
  • Rahul Savani

Session 9

Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin shares

  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Junxing Wang

Price of anarchy for auction revenue

  • Jason Hartline
  • Darrell Hoy
  • Sam Taggart

Mechanism design for data science

  • Shuchi Chawla
  • Jason Hartline
  • Denis Nekipelov

Session 10a

Routing and staffing when servers are strategic

  • Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan
  • Sherwin Doroudi
  • Amy R. Ward
  • Adam Wierman

Multiplicative bidding in online advertising

  • MohammadHossein Bateni
  • Jon Feldman
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Sam Chiu-wai Wong

Cournot competition in networked markets

  • Kostas Bimpikis
  • Shayan Ehsani
  • Rahmi Ilkiliç

Session 10b

Network formation games with heterogeneous players and the internet structure

  • Eli A. Meirom
  • Shie Mannor
  • Ariel Orda

Simple approximate equilibria in large games

  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Siddharth Barman
  • Ron Peretz

Asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion games

  • Ryan M. Rogers
  • Aaron Roth

Session 11a

On the efficiency of the Walrasian mechanism

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Noam Nisan
  • Renato Paes Leme

Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: an equivalence

  • John William Hatfield
  • Fuhito Kojima
  • Scott Duke Kominers

Optimal impartial selection

  • Felix Fischer
  • Max Klimm

Session 11b

Long-run learning in games of cooperation

  • Winter Mason
  • Siddharth Suri
  • Duncan J. Watts

Strategic information platforms: selective disclosure and the price of "free"

  • Chen Hajaj
  • David Sarne

Level-0 meta-models for predicting human behavior in games

  • James R. Wright
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

Keynote address

Pragmatic algorithmic game theory

  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

Session 12a

Mechanism with unique learnable equilibria

  • Paul Dütting
  • Thomas Kesselheim
  • Éva Tardos

Simultaneous Bayesian auctions and computational complexity

  • Yang Cai
  • Christos Papadimitriou

Contract complexity

  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Eyal Winter

Optimal contest design for simple agents

  • Arpita Ghosh
  • Robert Kleinberg

Session 12b

Buying private data without verification

  • Arpita Ghosh
  • Katrina Ligett
  • Aaron Roth
  • Grant Schoenebeck

Differentially private and incentive compatible recommendation system for the adoption of network goods

  • Kevin He
  • Xiaosheng Mu

A dynamic model of certification and reputation

  • Mihaela van der Schaar
  • Simpson Z. Zhang

The empirical implications of privacy-aware choice

  • Rachel Cummings
  • Federico Echenique
  • Adam Wierman

Session 13

Recency, records and recaps: learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problem

  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Alexander Peysakhovich

Dynamically eliciting unobservable information

  • Christopher P. Chambers
  • Nicolas S. Lambert

Bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsacks

  • Shipra Agrawal
  • Nikhil R. Devanur