

# Matching Algorithms for Blood Donation

## Donor blood is a **scarce resource**:

- every 2 seconds, someone in the US needs blood
- shortages especially impact developing countries, and in particular, children and women facing complications during childbirth
- donation rates are correlated with a country's wealth; high-income countries have median donation rate of 31.5 donations per 1000 people, while low-income countries have a median of 5.0 donations per 1000 people.

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


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# Donor Coordination & Recruitment


In our setting, blood donors and recipients use a **web application** to connect with one another.

The web app can send **notifications** to donors, about a particular donation opportunity. These notifications are sent automatically, by a **notification policy**.




Taking the perspective of the web app, we study the **Facebook Blood Donation Tool**, which connects donors with opportunities to donate in several countries around the world, with ~70 million registered donors.\*

**Blood donors** can find donation opportunities, and can choose to receive notifications about opportunities



**Blood recipients** can state their need & availability

- Individuals
- Hospitals
- Blood drives



\* : As of June 2020 <https://socialgood.fb.com/health/blood-donations/>

# Matching Model

We formalize an *online matching model* for this setting, which differs from standard online matching in several key ways

Standard Online Matching / Adwords	Blood Donor Matching	Same?
$U$ entirely offline	$U$ entirely offline	✓
Fixed time horizon $T$	Fixed time horizon $T$	✓
$U$ removed when matched	$U$ return after $K$ days	✗
$V$ have capacity 1	$V$ have <b>unlimited capacity</b>	✗
$V$ arrive one-by-one	$V$ arrive in <b>batches</b> , and some are offline	✗
$ V  \gg  U $	$ V  \ll  U $	✗

## Donors $u \in U$

- *offline*, but *rate limited*: donors can only be matched once every  $K$  days


## Edges (potential recipients) $e = (u, v) \in E$

- *potential notifications*, which may depend on distance or donor/recipient preferences
- Edge *weights*  $w_{et} \in [0, 1]$  (likelihood of MA)

## Recipients $v \in V$

- Both *offline* recipients (always available), and *online* recipients (sometimes available)
- Probability  $p_{vt} \in [0, 1]$  that  $v$  is available at time  $t$

**Finite time horizon (days):**  $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$




# Initial Results

In **simulations** we find that a greedy policy (which maximizes edge weight) increases overall matching weight by 5-20%.

This comes at a cost of ignoring some recipients, which are not well-connected, or have low edge weights.

In online **experiments**, using 1.3 million donors, we find that notifications which maximize (estimated) edge weight also increase overall donor action rate by about 5% ( $p < 0.001$ ).



\* : normalized by expected weight assigned by the random policy