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5:00 - 8:00 |
Welcome Reception, Room 440 |
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8:00 - 8:30 am |
Registration and Breakfast |
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8:30 - 8:45 |
Welcome Remarks, Room 147 |
8:45 - 10:00 |
Session 1 "Sponsored Search", chair Ilya Segal, Room 147 Natural Language Generation for Sponsored Search Advertisements Optimizing Query Rewrites for Keyword-Based Advertising Optimal Bidding in Stochastic Budget Constrained Slot Auctions |
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10:00 - 10:25 |
Coffee Break, Foyer (Room 112) |
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10:25 - 12:05 |
Session 2 "Characterizing incentive compatibility", chair Kartik Hosanagar, Room 147 Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of Mechanism Design Over Discrete Domains On Characterizations of Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Monotonicity and Implementability |
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12:05 - 1:30 |
Lunch Break, Room 540 |
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1:30 - 2:45 |
Session 3 "Pricing", chair Sebastien Lahaie, Room 147 Posted prices vs. negotations: an asymptotic analysis Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization Optimal Envy-Free Pricing with Metric Substitutability |
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2:45 - 3:15 |
Coffee Break, Foyer (Room 112) |
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3:15 - 4:55 |
Session 4 "Communication complexity in mechanisms", chair Boi Faltings, Room 147 Tight Information-Theoretic Lower Bounds for Welfare Maximization in On the Communication Requirements of Verifying the VCG Outcome Informational Overhead of Incentive Compatibility Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending |
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7:00 - 9:00 |
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8:00 - 8:30 am |
Registration and Breakfast |
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8:30 - 9:30 |
INVITED TALK: In 2008, the software market is rapidly evolving towards
Software-as-a-Service and Cloud computing, and away from the
on-premise delivery model. In exploring these new models we will see
that this is more than a business or delivery model phenomena
affecting ecommerce - it is a shift that fundamentally changes
expectations of what software can accomplish. In this model data is
king. Algorithms and analytics become significantly more relevant as
the data is now housed in a central location. Drawing on examples from
our portfolio I will show how the most interesting companies today are
built from the ground up with data as the core asset. These companies
represent the new wave of technology that venture capital investors
are looking to fund.
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9:30 - 10:00 |
Coffee Break, Foyer (Room 112) |
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10:00 - 12:05 |
Session 5 "Eliciting the truth and worrying about lying", chair Moshe Babaioff, Room 147 A Sufficient Condition for Voting Rules to Be Frequently Manipulable Generalized Scoring Rules and the Frequency of Coalitional Incentives for Truthful Opinions in Online Polls Elicitability The Complexity of Forecast Testing |
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12:05 - 1:30 |
Lunch Break, Room 540 |
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1:30 - 2:45 |
Session 6 "Networks", chair Edith Elkind, Room 147 Altruism, Selfishness, and Spite in Traffic Routing Behavioral Experiments in Networked Trade Security and insurance management in networks with heterogeneous agents |
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2:45 - 3:15 |
Coffee Break, Foyer (Room 112) |
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3:15 - 5:20 |
Session 7 "Prediction Markets", Vincent Conitzer, Room 147 Self-Financed Wagering Mechanisms for Forecasting Permutation Betting Markets: Singleton Betting with Extra Complexity of Combinatorial Market Makers Non-myopic Strategies in Prediction Markets Fault Tolerance in Large Games |
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5:30 - 6:00 |
Business Meeting, Room 147 |
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8:00 - 8:30 am |
Registration and Breakfast |
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8:30 - 9:30 |
INVITED TALK:
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communication. The standard approach is the simultaneous ascending auction, in which many related lots are auctioned simultaneously in a sequence of rounds. I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the approach with examples from US spectrum auctions. I then present a variation, the package clock auction, adopted by the UK, which addresses many of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction while building on its strengths. The package clock auction is a simple dynamic auction in which bidders bid on packages of lots. Most importantly, the pricing rule and information policy are carefully tailored to mitigate gaming behavior. An activity rule based on revealed preference promotes price discovery throughout the clock stage of the auction. Truthful bidding is encouraged, which simplifies bidding and improves efficiency. Experimental tests confirm the advantages of the approach.
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9:30 - 10:00 |
Coffee Break, Foyer (Room 112) |
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10:00 - 12:05 |
Session 8 "Economic redistribution, Better Redistribution Mechanisms Through Inefficient Allocation Efficiency and Redistribution in Dynamic Mechanism Design A Visual Interface for Critiquing-based Recommender Systems Popularity, Novelty and Attention Crowdsourcing and Knowledge Sharing: Strategic User Behavior |
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12:05 - 1:30 |
Lunch Break, Room 540 |
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1:30 - 2:20 |
Session 9 "Convergence to, and robustness of, solutions", chair William Walsh, Room 147 Uncoordinated Two-Sided Markets Fast Convergence to Nearly Optimal Solutions in Potential Games |
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2:20 - 2:45 |
Coffee Break, Foyer (Room 112) |
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2:45 - 4:25 |
Session 10 "Social networks and peer production", chair Rica Gonen, Room 147 Strong regularities in online peer production Strategic Network Formation with Structural Holes On the Windfall of Friendship: Inoculation Strategies on Social Predicting Trusts among Users of Online Communities -- an Epinions |
