- Jens Witkowski and David C. Parkes, A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations
- David M. Pennock and Lirong Xia, An Efficient Monte-Carlo Algorithm for Pricing Combinatorial Prediction Markets for Tournaments
- Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm, Approximating optimal combinatorial auctions for complements using restricted welfare maximization
- Toby Walsh, Complexity of and Algorithms for Borda Manipulation
- Lirong Xia, Computing the Margin of Victory for Various Voting Rules
- Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz, Yoram Bachrach and Peter Key, Congestion Games with Agent Failures
- Arpita Ghosh and Preston McAfee, Crowdsourcing with Endogenous Entry
- Avital Gutman and Noam Nisan, Fair Allocation Without Trade
- Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo, Generalizing Envy-Freeness Toward Group of Agents
- Vincent Conitzer, Curtis R. Taylor and Liad Wagman, Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases
- Mahsa Maghami and Gita Sukthankar, Identifying Influential Agents for Advertising in Multi-agent Markets
- Arpita Ghosh and Patrick Hummel, Implementing Optimal Outcomes in Social Computing: A Game-Theoretic Approach
- Tuomas Sandholm, Satinder Singh, Lossy Stochastic Game Abstraction with Bounds
- Sven Seuken, David Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney Tan, Market User Interface Design
- Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala, Mechanisms and Allocations with Positive Network Externalities
- Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm, Mixed-bundling auctions with reserve prices --- By Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm
- John Lai and David Parkes, Monotone Branch-and-Bound Search for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions
- Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Jackson R. Mayo, Robert C. Armstrong, and Joseph R. Ruthruff, Noncooperatively Optimized Tolerance: Decentralized Strategic Optimization in Complex Systems
- Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm, Optimal auctions for spiteful bidders by Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm
- Pankaj Dayama, Aditya Karnik and Y. Narahari, Optimal Mix of Incentive Strategies for Product Marketing on Social Networks
- Reshef Meir, Yair Zick, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Optimization and Stability in Games with Restricted Interactions
- Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, and Paul Harrenstein, Pareto optimality in Coalition Formation
- Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John Lai, Benjamin Lubin and David Parkes, Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
- Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, and Renato Paes Leme, Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope
- David M. Pennock and Lirong Xia, Price Updating in Combinatorial Prediction Markets with Bayesian Networks
- Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm, Safe Opponent Exploitation
- Anand Bhalgat, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, and Sanjeev Khanna, Social Welfare in One-sided Matching Markets without Money
- Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm, and Kevin Waugh, Strategy Purification and Thresholding: Effective Non-Equilibrium Approaches for Playing Large Games
- Tyler Lu and Craig Boutilier, Vote Elicitation with Probabilistic Preference Models: Empirical Estimation and Cost Tradeoffs
