Session 1: Privacy
Auditorium (ground floor)

Approximately Optimal Auctions for Selling Privacy when Costs are Correlated with Data
Lisa K. Fleischer and Yu-Han Lyu (Dartmouth College)

Privacy-Aware Mechanism Design
Kobbi Nissim and Claudio Orlandi (Bar-Ilan University); Rann Smorodinsky (Technion)

Conducting Truthful Surveys, Cheaply
Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania); Grant Schoenebeck (Princeton University)

Session 2a: Foundations of Incentive Compatibility
Auditorium (ground floor)

Single-Call Mechanisms
Christopher A. Wilkens (University of California, Berkeley); Balasubramanian Sivan (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Mechanism Design: from Partial to Probabilistic Verification
Ioannis Caragiannis (University of Patras & CTI); Edith Elkind (Nanyang Technological University); Mario Szegedy (Rutgers University); Lan Yu (Nanyang Technological University)

Mechanism Design on Discrete Lines and Cycles
Elad Dokow (Bar-Ilan University and Carlos III de Madrid); Michal Feldman (Harvard University & Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Reshef Meir and Ilan Nehama (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Session 2b: Equilibrium Computation I
Room 1.10 (upstairs)

Lossy Stochastic Game Abstraction with Bounds
Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University) and Satinder Singh (University of Michigan)

Striving for Social Status
Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern University); Rachel Kranton (Duke University); Greg Stoddard (Northwestern University)

Computing Dominance-based Solution Concepts
Felix Brandt and Markus Brill (Technische Universität München)

Session 3a: Advertising I
Auditorium (ground floor)

Social Influence in Social Advertising: Evidence from Field Experiments
Eytan Bakshy (Facebook); Dean Eckles (Stanford University & Facebook); Rong Yan and Itamar Rosenn (Facebook)

Traffic Shaping to Optimize Ad Delivery
Deepayan Chakrabarti and Erik Vee (Yahoo! Research)

Optimal Bidding in Multi-Item Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions
Vibhanshu Abhishek and Kartik Hosanagar (University of Pennsylvania)

Session 3b: Incentive Design
Room 1.10 (upstairs)

Local Bargaining and Endogenous Fluctuations *Top-10% Paper*
Thành Nguyen (Northwestern University)

On Bitcoin and Red Balloons
Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley); Shahar Dobzinski (Cornell University); Sigal Oren (Cornell University); Aviv Zohar (Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley)

Peer Prediction Without a Common Prior
Jens Witkowski (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg); David C. Parkes (Harvard University)

Session 4: Modeling User Behavior
Auditorium (ground floor)

The Groupon Effect on Yelp Ratings: A Root Cause Analysis
John W. Byers (Boston University); Michael Mitzenmacher (Harvard University); Georgios Zervas (Yale University)

Market User Interface Design
Sven Seuken (University of Zurich); David C. Parkes (Harvard University); Eric Horvitz (Microsoft Research);Kamal Jain (eBay Research Labs); Mary Czerwinski and Desney Tan (Microsoft Research)

Matching Models for Preference-sensitive Group Purchasing
Tyler Lu and Craig Boutilier (University of Toronto)

Session 5a: Auctions I
Auditorium (ground floor)

Efficiency of Sequential English Auctions with Dynamic Arrivals
Olivier Compte (Paris School of Economics); Ron Lavi (Technion); Ella Segev (Ben-Gurion University)

Secondary Spectrum Auctions for Symmetric and Submodular Bidders
Martin Hoefer and Thomas Kesselheim (RWTH Aachen University)

Optimization with Demand Oracles
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski and Sigal Oren (Cornell University)

Session 5b: Prediction Markets
Room 1.10 (upstairs)

A Tractable Combinatorial Market Maker using Constraint Generation
Miroslav Dudík, Sebastien Lahaie and David M. Pennock (Yahoo! Research)

Profit-Charging Market Makers with Bounded Loss, Vanishing Bid/Ask Spreads, and Unlimited Market Dep
Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)

A Bayesian Market Maker
Aseem Brahma (Qualcomm Inc.); Mithun Chakraborty,Sanmay Das and Allen Lavoie (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute); Malik Magdon-Ismail (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)

Session 6: Networks and Matching
Auditorium (ground floor)

Coalitional Bargaining in Networks
Thành Nguyen (Northwestern University)

Behavioral Experiments on a Network Formation Game
Michael Kearns and Stephen Judd (University of Pennsylvania); Yevgeniy Vorobeychik (Sandia National Laboratories)

To match or not to match: Economics of cookie matching in online advertising
Arpita Ghosh (Yahoo! Research); Mohammad Mahdian and R. Preston McAfee (Google, Inc.); Sergei Vassilvitskii (Yahoo! Research)

Finding Overlapping Communities in Social Networks: Toward a Rigorous Approach
Sanjeev Arora, Rong Ge, Sushant Sachdeva and Grant Schoenebeck (Princeton University)

Session 7: Revenue Optimization 1
Auditorium (ground floor)

Symmetries and Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design *Best Student Paper*
Constantinos Daskalakis and S. Matthew Weinberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Approximate Revenue Maximization for Multiple Items
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan (Hebrew University)

Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction
Saeed Alaei (University of Maryland, College Park); Hu Fu (Cornell University); Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline (Northwestern University); Azarakhsh Malekian (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Session 8a: Revenue Optimization II
Auditorium (ground floor)

Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply
Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research Silicon Valley); Shaddin Dughmi (Microsoft Research Redmond); Robert Kleinberg (Cornell University); Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research Silicon Valley)

Supply-Limiting Mechanisms
Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Qiqi Yan (Stanford University)

Learning on a Budget: Posted Price Mechanisms for Online Procurement
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru and Robert Kleinberg (Cornell University); Yaron Singer (Google)

Session 8b: Advertising II
Room 1.10 (upstairs)

On Aggregation Bias in Sponsored Search Data: Existence and Implications
Vibhanshu Abhishek, Kartik Hosanagar and Peter Fader (University of Pennsylvania)

Ad Serving Using a Compact Allocation Plan
Peiji Chen, Wenjing Ma, Srinath Mandalapu and Chandrashekhar Nagarajan (Yahoo! Labs); Jayavel Shanmugasundaram (Google); Sergei Vassilvitskii, Erik Vee, Manfai Yu and Jason Zien (Yahoo! Labs)

A Truthful Learning Mechanism for Contextual Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions with Externalities
Nicola Gatti (Politecnico di Milano); Alessandro Lazaric (INRIA Lille); Francesco Trovò (Politecnico di Milano)

Session 9a: Recommender Systems
Auditorium (ground floor)

Simpler Sybil-Proof Mechanisms for Multi-Level Marketing
Fabio A. Drucker and Lisa K. Fleischer (Dartmouth College)

Accuracy improvements for multi-criteria recommender systems
Dietmar Jannach, Zeynep Karakaya and Fatih Gedikli (TU Dortmund)

Two-Sided Search With Experts
Yinon Nahum (Weizmann Institute of Science); David Sarne (Bar-Ilan University); Sanmay Das (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute); Onn Shehory (IBM Research)

Session 9b: Game Theoretic Models
Room 1.10 (upstairs)

Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University); Ji Shen (London School of Economics & Political Science); Yun Xu (Yale University); Edmund Yeh (Northestern University)

Interviewing Secretaries in Parallel
Moran Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz (Microsoft Research)

Mean Field Equilibria of Multiarmed Bandit Games
Ramakrishna Gummadi and Ramesh Johari (Stanford University); Jia Yuan Yu (IBM Research, Dublin)

Session 10: Computational Game Theory and Equilibrium Computation
Auditorium (ground floor)

Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and
Ioannis Caragiannis (University of Patras and CTI); Angelo Fanelli and Nick Gravin (Nanyang Technological University); Alexander Skopalik (TU Dortmund)

Safe Opponent Exploitation
Sam Ganzfried and Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)

Finding a Walrasian equilibrium is easy for a fixed number of agents
Federico Echenique and Adam Wierman (California Institute of Technology)

Session 11a: Matching
Auditorium (ground floor)

Online Prophet-Inequality Matching with Applications to Ad Allocation
Saeed Alaei, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi and Vahid Liaghat (University of Maryland, College Park)

Asymptotically Optimal Algorithm for Stochastic Adwords
Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research); Balasubramanian Sivan (University of Wisconsin-Madison);
Yossi Azar (Tel-Aviv University)

Information and the Value of Execution Guarantees
Krishnamurthy Iyer and Ramesh Johari (Stanford University); Ciamac C. Moallemi (Columbia University)

Session 11b: Computational Social Choice
Room 1.10 (upstairs)

Clone Structures in Voters' Preferences
Edith Elkind (Nanyang Technological University); Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University of Science and Technology); Arkadii Slinko (University of Auckland)

Computing the Margin of Victory for Various Voting Rules
Lirong Xia (Harvard University)

Optimal Social Choice Functions: A Utilitarian View
Craig Boutilier (University of Toronto); Ioannis Caragiannis (University of Patras & CTI); Simi Haber (Carnegie Mellon University); Tyler Lu (University of Toronto); Ariel D. Procaccia and Or Sheffet (Carnegie Mellon University)

Session 12: Top Papers
Auditorium (ground floor)

Improving the Effectiveness of Time-Based Display Advertising *Best Paper Award*
Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee and Siddharth Suri (Yahoo! Research)

The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information *Top-10% Paper*
Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University)

Cooperation and Assortativity with Endogenous Partner Selection *Top-10% Paper*
Jing Wang (New York University); Siddharth Suri and Duncan J. Watts (Yahoo! Research)

Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers *Best Paper Award*
Paul Dütting (École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Felix Fischer (University of Cambridge); Pichayut Jirapinyo and John K. Lai (Harvard University); Benjamin Lubin (Boston University); David C. Parkes (Harvard University)

Keynote Talk: Colin Camerer (joint with AAMAS)
Paraninfo (Building 3a)

Session 13a: Networks and Information Spread
Auditorium (ground floor)

The Structure of Online Diffusion Networks
Sharad Goel, Duncan J. Watts and Daniel G. Goldstein (Yahoo! Research)

How to Schedule a Cascade in an Arbitrary Graph
Flavio Chierichetti and Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Alessandro Panconesi (Sapienza University)

Mechanisms and Allocations with Positive Network Externalities
Anand Bhalgat (University of Pennsylvania); Sreenivas Gollapudi (Microsoft Research Search Labs); Kamesh Munagala (Duke University)

Sequential Voting with Externalities: Herding in Social Networks
Noga Alon (Microsoft Research, Herzliya & Tel Aviv University); Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley); Ron Karidi (Microsoft Israel Innovation Labs); Ron Lavi (Microsoft Research, Herzliya); Moshe Tennenholtz (Microsoft Research, Herzliya & Technion)

Session 13b: Auctions II
Room 1.10 (upstairs)

Combinatorial Auctions with Restricted Complements
Ittai Abraham and Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley); Shaddin Dughmi (Microsoft Research, Redmond); Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University)

Monotone Branch-and-Bound Search for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions
John K. Lai and David C. Parkes (Harvard University)

Bayesian Sequential Auctions
Vasilis Syrgkanis and Éva Tardos (Cornell University)

Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness: Extensions, Limitations, and Indivisibilities
David C. Parkes (Harvard University); Ariel D. Procaccia and Nisarg Shah (Carnegie Mellon University)

Session 14: Mechanism Design
Auditorium (ground floor)

Conditional Equilibrium Outcomes via Ascending Price Processes with Applications to Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
Hu Fu and Robert Kleinberg (Cornell University); Ron Lavi (Technion)

Strategyproofness in the Large as a Desideratum for Market Design
Eduardo M. Azevedo (Harvard University); Eric Budish (University of Chicago)

The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial Auctions *Top-10% Paper*
Shahar Dobzinski (Cornell University); Jan Vondrák (IBM Almaden Research Center)

Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Information
Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research Silicon Valley); Robert Kleinberg and Renato Paes Leme (Cornell University)

Session 15a: Equilibrium Computation II
Auditorium (ground floor)

Computing a Proper Equilibrium of a Bimatrix Game
Troels Bjerre Sørensen (University of Warwick)

Tatonnement in Ongoing Markets of Complementary Goods
Yun Kuen Cheung and Richard Cole (New York University); Ashish Rastogi (Goldman Sachs & Co.)

Session 15b: Revenue Optimization III
Room 1.10 (upstairs)

Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
Yuval Emek (ETH Zurich); Michal Feldman (Hebrew University and Harvard University); Iftah Gamzu (Microsoft Research); Renato Paes Leme (Cornell University); Moshe Tennenholtz (Microsoft Research & Technion)

Revenue Maximizing Envy-free Multi-unit Auctions with Budgets
Michal Feldman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & Harvard University); Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv University);Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome); Piotr Sankowski (University of Warsaw & Sapienza University of Rome)

Send Mixed Signals - Earn more, Work less
Peter Bro Miltersen and Or Sheffet (Carnegie Mellon University)

Posters (joint with AAMAS) + Coffee
Lobby, Building 1g

Keynote Talk: Moshe Tennenholtz (joint with AAMAS)
Paraninfo (Building 3a)