Workshops and Tutorial schedule has been announced.
NEW: The schedule is now available in Google calendar format here.
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6:00 - 8:00 PM |
Reception and Poster Session in Gates Hall | ||
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8:15 - 9:00 AM |
Breakfast (Location: Park Atrium) | ||
9:00 - 9:15 AM |
Opening (Statler Auditorium) | Plenary | |
9:15 - 10:15 AM |
Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Jon Kleinberg Invited talk: Sendhil Mullainathan |
Plenary | |
10:15 - 10:45 AM |
Coffee Break (Location: Park Atrium) | ||
10:45 - 11:45 AM |
Session 1A: Information Acquisition I Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Sven Seuken Strategyproof linear regression in high dimensions Optimal data acquisition for statistical estimation Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition
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Session 1B: Sharing Economy Location: Room #196 Chair: Augustin Chaintreau Surge Pricing Moves Uber's Driver-Partners The sharing economy and housing affordability: Evidence from Airbnb Advertising strategy in the presence of reviews: an empirical analysis |
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11:45 - 11:55 AM |
10-minute Break | ||
11:55 AM - 12:55 PM |
Session 2A: Information Acquisition II Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Ozan Candogan Learnability and models of decision making under uncertainty Strategic classification from revealed preferences Overabundant information and learning traps |
Session 2B: Social Choice and Pricing Location: Room #196 Chair: Vincent Conitzer Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules Social choice with non-quasi linear utilities Optimal pricing and Introduction timing of new virtual machines |
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12:55 - 2:25 PM |
Lunch (Location: Carrier Ballroom) | ||
2:25 - 3:45 PM |
Session 3A: Combinatorial Auctions Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Yang Cai Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect The Combinatorial clock auction: the effects of strategic behaviour and the price increment rule on social welfare Designing core-selecting payment rules: A computational search approach Fast core pricing for rich advertising auctions |
Session 3B: Equilibria Computation Location: Room #196 Chair Ruta Mehta Computational complexity of proper equilibrium Computing a subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential matching game The Big Match with a clock and a bit of memory Incremental strategy generation for Stackelberg equilibria in extensive-form Games |
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3:45 - 4:15 PM |
Coffee Break (Location: Park Atrium) | ||
4:15 - 5:35 PM |
Session 4A: Mechanism Design I Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Nima Haghpanah Non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism design Robust repeated auctions under heterogeneous buyer behavior A general theory of sample complexity for multi-item profit maximization Are two (samples) really better than one? On the non-asymptotic performance of empirical revenue maximization |
Session 4B: Information Acquisition and Rationality Location: Room #196 Chair: Georgios Piliouras Water from two rocks: maximizing the mutual information Eliciting expertise without verification The one-shot crowdfunding game. Dancing pigs or externalities? Measuring the rationality of security decisions |
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6:00-7:00 PM |
Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Glen Weyl Invited talk: Vitalik Buterin |
Plenary | |
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8:15 - 9:00 AM |
Breakfast (Location: Park Atrium) | Women in EC Breakfast ( 8am-9am Carrier Ballroom) | |
9:00 - 10:00 AM |
Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Edith Elkind Invited talk: Eric Budish |
Plenary | |
10:00 - 10:30 AM |
Coffee Break (Location: Park Atrium) | ||
10:30 - 11:30 AM |
Session 5A: Prophet Inequalities Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Brendan Lucier Delegated search approximates efficient search Prophet secretary: surpassing the 1-1/e barrier Prophets and secretaries with overbooking |
Session 5B: Matching Location: Room #196 Chair: Nisarg Shah Almost optimal stochastic weighted matching with few queries First-choice maximal and first-choice stable school choice mechanisms Stable marriage with multi-modal preferences |
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11:30 - 11:40 AM |
10-minute Break | ||
11:40 AM - 12:30 PM |
Test of Time award (Location: Statler Auditorium) Chair: Tuomas Sandholm First Analyses of the Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) for Sponsored Search: Hal R. Varian, Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz, Gagan Aggarwal, Ashish Goel, and the late Rajeev Motwani. |
Plenary | |
12:30 - 2:00 PM |
Lunch (Location: Carrier Ballroom) | ||
2:00 - 3:30 PM |
Business meeting (Statler Auditorium) | ||
3:30 - 4.30 PM |
Session 6A: Mechanism Design II Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Mohammad Mahdian Interdependent values without single-crossing Credible mechanisms The best of both worlds: asymptotically efficient mechanisms with a guarantee on the expected gains-from-trade |
Session 6B: Equilibrium Dynamics Location: Room #196 Chair: Aviad Rubinstein Multiplicative weights update in zero-sum games Cycles in zero sum differential games and biological diversity Dynamics of distributed updating in Fisher markets |
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4:30 - 5:00 PM |
Coffee Break (Location: Park Atrium) | ||
5:00 - 6:00 PM |
Session 7A: Mechanism Design III Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Adrian Vetta Optimal deterministic mechanisms for an additive buyer Revenue loss in shrinking markets
99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition |
Session 7B: Equilibrium Analysis Location: Room #196 Chair: Nicolas Stier Network pricing: how to induce optimal flows under strategic link operators Polynomial time equilibria in bottleneck congestion games Spatio-temporal security games beyond one dimension |
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6:30 PM |
Conference Dinner (Location: Duffield Atrium) | ||
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8:15 - 9:00 AM |
Breakfast (Location: Park Atrium) | ||
9:00 - 10:00 AM |
AGT Fest: invited talks from conferences (Location: Statler Auditorium) Chair: Nicole Immorlica Safe and Nested Subgame Solving for Imperfect-Information Games
, NIPS'17 First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue, Econometrica Welfare Guarantees from Data
, NIPS'17 |
Plenary | |
10:00 - 10:30 AM |
Coffee Break (Location: Park Atrium) | ||
10:30 - 11:50 AM |
Session 8A: Mechanism Design IV Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Alex Slivkins The price of prior dependence in auctions Prior-independent optimal auctions Learning to bid without knowing your value Selling to a no-regret buyer |
Session 8B: Market Experiments Location: Room #196 Chair: Kevin Leyton-Brown A/B testing A personalized BDM mechanism for efficient market intervention experiments The costs of entering through tying: experimental evidence Reputation in the long-run |
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11:50 AM - 12:00 PM |
10-minute Break | ||
12:00 - 12:40 PM |
Dissertation Award (Location: Statler Auditorium) Chair: Nicole Immorlica Hardness of Approximation Between P and NP |
Plenary | |
12:40 - 2:10 PM |
Lunch (Location: Carrier Ballroom) | ||
2:10 - 3:30 PM |
Session 9A: Fair Allocation Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Omer Tamuz Fair allocation of indivisible goods: improvements and Generalizations Finding fair and efficient allocations Fair allocation of indivisible public goods How to make envy vanish over time |
Session 9B: Markets and Networks Location: Room #196 Chair: Grant Schoenebeck Redistribution through markets Optimal commissions and subscriptions in networked markets Trading networks with frictions Chain stability in trading networks |
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3:30 - 4:00 PM |
Coffee Break (Location: Park Atrium) | ||
4:00 - 5:20 PM |
Session 10A: Learning and Social Networks Location: Statler Auditorium Chair: Hossein Esfandiari Naive Bayesian learning in social networks Bayesian social learning in a dynamic environment Social learning equilibria Diffusion, seeding, and the value of network information |
Session 10B: Mechanism Design V Location: Room #196 Chair: Inbal Talgam-Cohen On the construction of substitutes Frugal auction design for set systems: vertex cover and knapsack Matching auctions for search and native ads The efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget-constrained users |
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5:20 PM |
Main EC program ends | ||