Poster Session
Location: Building OCC, Exhibit Halls A1-B

Session 1 (session chair: Michal Feldman)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Econometrics for Learning Agents
Denis Nekipelov (University of Virginia), Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research) and Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

Why Prices Need Algorithms
Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University) and Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Stanford)

Session 2a (session chair: Rudolf Muller)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Hidden Substitutes
John Hatfield (University of Texas at Austin) and Scott Kominers (Harvard University)

Full Substitutability in Trading Networks
John Hatfield (University of Texas at Austin), Scott Kominers (Harvard University), Alexandru Nichifor (University of St Andrews), Michael Ostrovsky (Stanford GSB) and Alexander Westkamp (Maastricht University)

Near Feasible Stable Matchings with Complementarities
Thanh Nguyen (Purdue) and Rakesh Vohra (Penn)

Session 2b (session chair: Avinatan Hassidim)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Decentralized Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game
Bary Pradelski (University of Oxford)

Making the Most of Your Samples
Zhiyi Huang (University of Hong Kong), Yishay Mansour (Tel Aviv University) and Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University)

Commitment Without Regrets: Online Learning in Stackelberg Security Games
Nina Balcan (Carnegie Mellon University), Avrim Blum (Carnegie Mellon University), Nika Haghtalab (Carnegie Mellon University) and Ariel Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University)

Session 3a (session chair: Katrina Ligett)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Online reputation management: Estimating the impact of management responses on consumer reviews
Proserpio Davide (Boston University) and Georgios Zervas (Boston University)

The Impact of the Sharing Economy on the Hotel Industry: Evidence from Airbnb's Entry in Texas
Georgios Zervas (Boston University), Proserpio Davide (Boston University) and John W. Byers (Boston University)

Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticultural Perspective
Nicolas Bousquet (McGill University), Zhentao Li (ENS Paris) and Adrian Vetta (McGill University)

Efficient Allocation via Sequential Scrip Auctions
Gil Kalai (Hebrew University and Microsoft Research), Reshef Meir (Harvard University) and Moshe Tennenholtz (Technion)

Session 3b (session chair: Yishay Mansour)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Near-Optimum Online Ad Allocation for Targeted Advertising
Joseph (Seffi) Naor (Technion) and David Wajc (School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon U)

Core-competitive Auctions
Gagan Goel (Google), Mohammad Khani (University of Maryland) and Renato Paes Leme (Google Research NYC)

Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising
Nick Arnosti (Stanford University), Marissa Beck (Stanford University) and Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

Online Stochastic Budgeted Allocation with Traffic Spikes
Hossein Esfandiari (University of Maryland), Nitish Korula (Google) and Vahab Mirrokni (Google)

Session 4a (session chair: Ian Kash)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round
Paul Duetting (London School of Economics), Thomas Kesselheim (Max-Planck-Institut fuer Informatik) and Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

Smooth Online Mechanisms: A Game-Theoretic Problem in Renewable Energy Markets
Thomas Kesselheim (Max-Planck-Institut fuer Informatik), Robert Kleinberg (Cornell University) and Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms
Brendan Lucier (Microsoft) and Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research)

Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms
Paul Duetting (London School of Economics) and Thomas Kesselheim (Max-Planck-Institut fuer Informatik)

Session 4b (session chair: Nick Gravin)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

A non-asymptotic approach to analyzing kidney exchange graphs
Yichuan Ding (University of British Columbia), Dongdong Ge (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics), Simai He (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics) and Christopher Ryan (University of Chicago)

Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints
Masahiro Goto (Kyushu University), Fuhito Kojima (Stanford University), Ryoji Kurata (Kyushu University), Akihisa Tamura (Keio University) and Makoto Yokoo (Kyushu University)

Private Pareto Optimal Exchange
Sampath Kannan (University of Pennsylvania), Jamie Morgenstern (Carnegie Mellon University), Ryan Rogers (University of Pennsylvania) and Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania)

An Approximate Law of One Price in Random Assignment Games
Assaf Romm (Harvard University) and avinatan hassidim (Bar Ilan University)

Breakfast

Session 5a (session chair: Ariel Procaccia)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Designing Dynamic Contests
Kostas Bimpikis (Stanford Graduate School of Business), Shayan Ehsani (Stanford University) and Mohamed Mostagir (University of Michigan)

Managing Innovation in a Crowd
Daron Acemoglu (MIT), Mohamed Mostagir (University of Michigan) and Asuman Ozdaglar (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Incentive-compatible experiment design
Panos Toulis (Harvard University), David Parkes (Harvard University), Elery Pfeffer (Harvard University) and James Zou (MSR)

Session 5b (session chair: Mohammad Mahdian)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Information Asymmetries in Common Value Auctions with Discrete Signals
Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research), David Kempe (University of Southern California) and Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies
Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research, Redmond), Jamie Morgenstern (Carnegie Mellon University), Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research) and Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)

Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
Hu Fu (Microsoft), Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern & MSR NE), Brendan Lucier (Microsoft) and Philipp Strack (University of California Berkeley)

Session 6a (session chair: Scott Kominers)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Ignorance is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching With Few Queries
Avrim Blum (Carnegie Mellon University), John Dickerson (Carnegie Mellon University), Nika Haghtalab (Carnegie Mellon University), Ariel Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University), Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University) and Ankit Sharma (Carnegie Mellon University)

Matching with Stochastic Arrival
Neil Thakral (Harvard University)

Leximin Allocations in the Real World
David Kurokawa (Carnegie Mellon University), Ariel Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University) and Nisarg Shah (Carnegie Mellon University)

Session 6b (session chair: Brendan Lucier)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Competitive analysis via benchmark decomposition
Ning Chen (Nanyang Technological University), Nick Gravin (Microsoft Research New England) and Pinyan Lu (Microsoft Research Asia)

Simple Mechanisms for a Combinatorial Buyer
Aviad Rubinstein (UC Berkeley) and Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)

Public projects, Boolean functions and the borders of Borders theorem
Parikshit Gopalan (Microsoft), Noam Nisan (Hebrew University) and Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University)

Session 7a (session chair: Shaddin Dughmi)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Improved Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
Pinyan Lu (Microsoft Research Asia) and Tao Xiao (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

Truthful Mechanism Design via Correlated Tree Rounding
Yossi Azar (Tel Aviv University), Martin Hoefer (Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik), Idan Maor, Rebecca Reiffen l(RWTH Aachen University) and Berthold Voecking (Aachen University)

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints
Costis Daskalakis (MIT), Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research, Redmond) and Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)

Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
Costis Daskalakis (MIT), Alan Deckelbaum (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Christos Tzamos (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Session 7b (session chair: Reshef Meir)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Customer Referral Incentives and Social Media s
Ilan Lobel (New York University), Evan Sadler (New York University) and Lav Varshney (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Estimating the causal impact of recommendation systems using observational data
Amit Sharma (Cornell University), Duncan Watts (Microsoft Research, New York City) and Jake Hofman (Microsoft Research)

Inducing Approximately Optimal Flow Using Truthful Mediators
Ryan Rogers (University of Pennsylvania), Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania), Jonathan Ullman (Harvard University) and Zhiwei Steven Wu (University of Pennsylvania)

The Burden of Risk Aversion in Mean-Risk Selfish Routing
Evdokia Nikolova (Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering) and Nicolas Stier-Moses (Facebook)

Session 8a (session chair: Jenn Wortman Vaughan)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

At What Quality and What Price?: Eliciting Buyer Preferences as a Market Design Problem
John Horton (NYU Stern School of Business) and Ramesh Johari (Stanford)

Procurement Mechanisms for Differentiated Products
Daniela Saban (Columbia University) and Gabriel Weintraub (Columbia Business School)

Team Performance with Test Scores
Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University) and Maithra Raghu (Cornell University)

Session 8b (session chair: Vasilis Gkatzelis)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Mechanisms for Fair Attribution
Eric Balkanski (Harvard University) and Yaron Singer (Harvard)

Sound Auction Specification and Implementation
Marco Caminati (University of Birmingham), Manfred Kerber (University of Birmingham), Christoph Lange (Fraunhofer IAIS and University of Bonn) and Colin Rowat (Department of Economics)

Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration s
Yishay Mansour (Tel Aviv University), Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research) and Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research)

Business Meeting
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Session 9a (session chair: Sebastien Lahaie)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Integrating Market Makers, Limit Orders, and Continuous Trade in Prediction Markets
Hoda Heidari (Universirty of Pennsylvania), Sébastien Lahaie (Microsoft Research), David Pennock (Microsoft Research) and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (Microsoft Research)

Learning What's Going On: Reconstructing Preferences and Priorities from Opaque Transactions
Avrim Blum (Carnegie Mellon University), Yishay Mansour (Tel Aviv University) and Jamie Morgenstern (Carnegie Mellon University)

Low-Cost Learning via Active Data Procurement
Jacob Abernethy (University of Michigan), Yiling Chen (Harvard University), Chien-Ju Ho (UCLA) and Bo Waggoner (Harvard)

Session 9b (session chair: Eva Tardos)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller
Masterov Dimitriy (eBay Research Labs), Uwe Mayer (eBay Data Labs) and Steven Tadelis (UC Berkeley Haas School of Business)

A Ride Whenever you Need One: The Value of Dynamic Pricing in Ride-sharing Platforms
Siddhartha Banerjee (Stanford University), Ramesh Johari (Stanford) and Carlos Riquelme (Stanford University)

Bias and Reciprocity in Online Reviews: Evidence From Field Experiments on Airbnb
Andrey Fradkin (National Bureau of Economic Research), Elena Grewal (Airbnb, Inc.), David Holtz (Airbnb, Inc.) and Matthew Pearson (Airbnb, Inc.)

Session 10a (session chair: Nicole Immorlica)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

The Wisdom of Multiple Guesses
Johan Ugander (Microsoft Research), Ryan Drapeau (University of Washington) and Carlos Guestrin (University of Washington)

Generalized Decision Scoring Rules: Statistical, Computational, and Axiomatic Properties
Lirong Xia (RPI)

Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory
David Easley (Cornell University) and Arpita Ghosh (Cornell University)

Session 10b (session chair: Nikhil Devanur)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Dynamic Fair Division with Minimal Disruptions
Eric Friedman (ICSI and University of California, Berkeley), Christos-Alexandros Psomas (UC Berkeley) and Shai Vardi (Tel Aviv University)

Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments
Jonathan Yaniv (Technion - Israel Institute of Technology), Brendan Lucier (Microsoft), Ishai Menache (Microsoft Research), Yossi Azar (Tel Aviv University), Joseph (Seffi) Naor (Technion) and Inna Kalp-Shaltiel (Tel Aviv University)

Markets with Production: A Polynomial Time Algorithm and a Reduction to Pure Exchange
Jugal Garg (Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik) and Ravi Kannan (Microsoft Research India)

Session 11a (session chair: Preston McAfee)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Short Lists in Centralized Clearinghouses
Nick Arnosti (Stanford University)

Redesigning the Israeli Medical Internship Match
Slava Bronfman (Bar-Ilan University), Noga Alon (Microsoft Research), Avinatan hassidim (Bar Ilan University) and Assaf Romm (Harvard University)

Assigning more students to their top choices: A tiebreaking rule comparison
Afshin Nikzad (Stanford University), Itai Ashlagi (MIT) and Assaf Romm (Harvard University)

Session 11b (session chair: Moshe Babaioff)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Reverse Mechanism Design
Nima Haghpanah (Northwestern University) and Jason Hartline (Northwestern University)

Price Competition, Fluctuations and Welfare Guarantees
Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley), Renato Paes Leme (Cornell University) and Balasubramanian Sivan (Microsoft Research)

Robust Dynamic Pricing With Strategic Customers
Yiwei Chen (MIT) and Vivek Farias

Session 12a (session chair: David Kempe)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C123-C124

Combining Traditional Marketing and Viral Marketing with Amphibious Influence Maximization
Wei Chen (Microsoft Research Asia), Fu Li (Tsinghua University), Tian Lin (Tsinghua University) and Aviad Rubinstein (UC Berkeley)

Approximability and Incentives in Adaptive Seeding
Aviad Rubinstein (UC Berkeley), Lior Seeman (Cornell University) and Yaron Singer (Harvard)

Session 12b (session chair: Michael Schwarz)
Location: Building OCC, 1st Floor, Rooms C120-C122

Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard
Siddharth Barman (California Institute of Technology) and Katrina Ligett (California Institute of Technology)

Faster First-Order Methods for Extensive-Form Game Solving
Christian Kroer (Carnegie Mellon University), Kevin Waugh (Carnegie Mellon University), Fatma Kilinç-Karzan (Carnegie Mellon University) and Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)

Session 13 (chair: David Pennock)
ACM SIGecom Test of Time Award Talk

Eric J. Friedman and Paul Resnick