Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library

SESSION: Session 1a: New Solutions in Fair Division

EFX Exists for Three Agents

• Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury
• Jugal Garg
• Kurt Mehlhorn

Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in Resource Allocation

• Rupert Freeman
• Nisarg Shah
• Rohit Vaish

One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy

• Johannes Brustle
• Jack Dippel
• Vishnu V. Narayan
• Mashbat Suzuki
• Adrian Vetta

SESSION: Session 1b: Information and Incentives

Data and Incentives

• Annie Liang
• Erik Madsen

Judged in Hindsight: Regulatory Incentives in Approving Innovations

• Suraj Malladi

Sequential Fundraising and Social Insurance

• Amir Ban
• Moran Koren

SESSION: Session 1c: Equilibrium Computation

The Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Game

• Enric Boix-Adserà
• Benjamin L. Edelman
• Siddhartha Jayanti

Escaping Saddle Points in Constant Dimensional Spaces: An Agent-based Modeling Perspective

• Grant Schoenebeck
• Fang-Yi Yu

A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff

• Jakub Dargaj
• Jakob Grue Simonsen

SESSION: Session 2a: X: Evidence from Y

Designing Informative Rating Systems: Evidence from an Online Labor Market

• Nikhil Garg
• Ramesh Johari

The Effects of Influencer Advertising Disclosure Regulations: Evidence From Instagram

• Daniel Ershov
• Matthew Mitchell

The Engagement-Diversity Connection: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Spotify

• David Holtz
• Ben Carterette
• Praveen Chandar
• Zahra Nazari
• Henriette Cramer
• Sinan Aral

SESSION: Session 2b: Games on Networks

Strategic Formation and Reliability of Supply Chain Networks

• Victor Amelkin
• Rakesh Vohra

Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk

• Steffen Schuldenzucker
• Sven Seuken

Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games

• George Christodoulou
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
• Mohamad Latifian
• Alkmini Sgouritsa

SESSION: Session 2c: Mechanism Design without Money

Allocation with Correlated Information: Too Good to be True

• Deniz Kattwinkel

Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests

• Yakov Babichenko
• Oren Dean
• Moshe Tennenholtz

Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Strictly Convex Space

• Pingzhong Tang
• Dingli Yu
• Shengyu Zhao

SESSION: Session 2d: Secretaries and Prophets

Prophet Inequalities with Linear Correlations and Augmentations

• Nicole Immorlica
• Sahil Singla
• Bo Waggoner

On Optimal Ordering in the Optimal Stopping Problem

• Shipra Agrawal
• Jay Sethuraman
• Xingyu Zhang

The Secretary Recommendation Problem

• Niklas Hahn
• Martin Hoefer
• Rann Smorodinsky

SESSION: Session 2e: Revenue Maximization

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer

• Moshe Babaioff
• Michal Feldman
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski
• Brendan Lucier
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents

• Nikhil R. Devanur
• Kira Goldner
• Raghuvansh R. Saxena
• Ariel Schvartzman
• S. Matthew Weinberg

More Revenue from Two Samples via Factor Revealing SDPs

• Constantinos Daskalakis
• Manolis Zampetakis

SESSION: Session 3a: Pricing

Pricing for the Stars: Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Rating Systems

• André Stenzel
• Christoph Wolf
• Peter Schmidt

The Value of Observability in Dynamic Pricing

• José R. Correa
• Dana Pizarro
• Gustavo Vulcano

Loot Box Pricing and Design

• Ningyuan Chen
• Adam N. Elmachtoub
• Michael Hamilton
• Xiao Lei

SESSION: Session 3b: Incentives in Labor Markets

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces

• Arash Asadpour
• Ilan Lobel
• Garrett van Ryzin

Balancing Agent Retention and Waiting Time in Service Platforms

• Marcelo Olivares
• Andres Musalem
• Daniel Yung

Online Policies for Efficient Volunteer Crowdsourcing

• Vahideh Manshadi
• Scott Rodilitz

SESSION: Session 3c: Queues

Queue Lengths as Constantly Adapting Prices: Allocative Efficiency Under Random Dynamics

• Itai Ashlagi
• Jacob Leshno
• Pengyu Qian
• Amin Saberi

Stability and Learning in Strategic Queuing Systems

• Jason Gaitonde
• Éva Tardos

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion

• Jerry Anunrojwong
• Krishnamurthy Iyer
• Vahideh Manshadi

SESSION: Session 3d: Markets and Beyond

The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects

• Elizabeth Baldwin
• Omer Edhan
• Ravi Jagadeesan
• Paul Klemperer
• Alexander Teytelboym

To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness

• Yannai A. Gonczarowski
• Scott Duke Kominers
• Ran I. Shorrer

A Learning Framework for Distribution-Based Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts

• Tushant Jha
• Yair Zick

SESSION: Session 4a: Computation of Fair Allocations

An Improved Approximation Algorithm for Maximin Shares

• Jugal Garg
• Setareh Taki

Consensus-Halving: Does It Ever Get Easier?

• Aris Filos-Ratsikas
• Alexandros Hollender
• Katerina Sotiraki
• Manolis Zampetakis

Fair Cake Division Under Monotone Likelihood Ratios

• Siddharth Barman
• Nidhi Rathi

SESSION: Session 4b: Search, Rankings, and Reviews

Pandora's Box Problem with Order Constraints

• Shant Boodaghians
• Federico Fusco
• Philip Lazos
• Stefano Leonardi

Product Ranking on Online Platforms

• Mahsa Derakhshan
• Negin Golrezaei
• Vahideh Manshadi
• Vahab Mirrokni

Does Quality Improve with Customer Voice? Evidence from the Hotel Industry

• Uttara Ananthakrishnan
• Davide Proserpio
• Siddhartha Sharma

SESSION: Session 4c: Matching Applications

Matching Algorithms for Blood Donation

• Duncan C. McElfresh
• Christian Kroer
• Sergey Pupyrev
• Eric Sodomka
• Karthik Abinav Sankararaman
• Zack Chauvin
• Neil Dexter
• John P. Dickerson

Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money

• Mohammad Akbarpour
• Julien Combe
• Yinghua He
• Victor Hiller
• Robert Shimer
• Olivier Tercieux

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

• Alex Rees-Jones
• Ran Shorrer
• Chloe J. Tergiman

SESSION: Session 4d: Social Networks

Contagion in Graphons

• Selman Erol
• Francesca Parise
• Alexander Teytelboym

Adversarial Perturbations of Opinion Dynamics in Networks

• Jason Gaitonde
• Jon Kleinberg
• Éva Tardos

An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning

• Krishna Dasaratha
• Kevin He

SESSION: Session 4e: Combinatorial Markets

Menu-size Complexity and Revenue Continuity of Buy-many Mechanisms

• Shuchi Chawla
• Yifeng Teng
• Christos Tzamos

On the (in-)approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer

• Natalie Collina
• S. Matthew Weinberg

A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets

• Tomer Ezra
• Michal Feldman
• Ophir Friedler

SESSION: Session 5a: Ridesharing

Driver Surge Pricing

• Nikhil Garg
• Hamid Nazerzadeh

Blind Dynamic Resource Allocation in Closed Networks via Mirror Backpressure

• Yash Kanoria
• Pengyu Qian

Spatial Distribution of Supply and the Role of Market Thickness: Theory and Evidence from Ridesharing

• Soheil Ghili
• Vineet Kumar

SESSION: Session 5b: Bounded Rationality

Ordered Search with Boundedly Rational Consumers

• Mauro Papi

Finite State Machines Play Extensive-Form Games

• Jakub Černý
• Branislav Bosanský
• Bo An

A Formal Separation Between Strategic and Nonstrategic Behavior

• James R. Wright
• Kevin Leyton-Brown

SESSION: Session 5c: Data and Privacy

Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing

• S. Nageeb Ali
• Greg Lewis
• Shoshana Vasserman

Dynamic Privacy Choices

• Shota Ichihashi

Differentially Private Call Auctions and Market Impact

• Emily Diana
• Hadi Elzayn
• Michael Kearns
• Aaron Roth
• Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi
• Juba Ziani

SESSION: Session 5d: Matching Theory

Two-sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance Procedures

• Simon Mauras

The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable Matching by Trial and Error

• Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski
• David Kempe

Efficient Matchmaking in Assignment Games with Application to Online Platforms

• Peng Shi

SESSION: Session 6a: Auctions

Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study

• Neil Newman
• Kevin Leyton-Brown
• Paul Milgrom
• Ilya Segal

Information Choice in Auctions

• Nina Bobkova

Budget-Constrained Incentive Compatibility for Stationary Mechanisms

• Santiago Balseiro
• Anthony Kim
• Mohammad Mahdian
• Vahab Mirrokni

SESSION: Session 6b: Cryptocurrencies

Vertically Disintegrated Platforms

• Christoph Aymanns
• Mathias Dewatripont
• Tarik Roukny

An Economic Analysis of Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms in Proof-of-Work Blockchain Systems

• Shunya Noda
• Kyohei Okumura
• Yoshinori Hashimoto

Continuous Credit Networks and Layer 2 Blockchains: Monotonicity and Sampling

• Ashish Goel
• Geoffrey Ramseyer

SESSION: Session 6c: Optimization

Convex Optimization for Bundle Size Pricing Problem

• Xiaobo Li
• Hailong Sun
• Chung Piaw Teo

Optimizing Offer Sets in Sub-Linear Time

• Vivek F. Farias
• Andrew A. Li
• Deeksha Sinha

Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling

• Itai Arieli
• Yakov Babichenko
• Rann Smorodinsky
• Takuro Yamashita

SESSION: Session 7a: Social Learning

Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

• Itai Arieli
• Yakov Babichenko
• Fedor Sandomirskiy
• Omer Tamuz

Learning through the Grapevine: The Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate Bias

• Matthew O. Jackson
• Suraj Malladi
• David McAdams

Incentivizing Exploration with Selective Data Disclosure

• Nicole Immorlica
• Jieming Mao
• Aleksandrs Slivkins
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: Session 7b: Fairness and Ethics

On Fair Selection in the Presence of Implicit Variance

• Vitalii Emelianov
• Nicolas Gast
• Krishna P. Gummadi
• Patrick Loiseau

Fair Prediction with Endogenous Behavior

• Christopher Jung
• Sampath Kannan
• Changhwa Lee
• Mallesh Pai
• Aaron Roth
• Rakesh Vohra

Biased Programmers? Or Biased Data? A Field Experiment in Operationalizing AI Ethics

• Bo Cowgill
• Fabrizio Dell'Acqua
• Samuel Deng
• Daniel Hsu
• Nakul Verma
• Augustin Chaintreau

SESSION: Session 7c: Optimal Auctions

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

• Matheus V. X. Ferreira
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions

• Constantinos Daskalakis
• Maxwell Fishelson
• Brendan Lucier
• Vasilis Syrgkanis
• Santhoshini Velusamy

Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness

• Johannes Brustle
• Yang Cai
• Constantinos Daskalakis

SESSION: Session 7d: Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts

One for All, All for One---Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto

• Mehmet S. Ismail

The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

• Siddharth Barman
• Federico Echenique

On Sustainable Equilibria

• Srihari Govindan
• Rida Laraki
• Lucas Pahl

SESSION: Session 7e: Dynamic Matching

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models

• Tomer Ezra
• Michal Feldman
• Nick Gravin
• Zhihao Gavin Tang

Dynamic Stochastic Matching Under Limited Time

• Ali Aouad
• Ömer Saritaç

Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards: Optimal Competitive Ratio via Path Based Formulation

• Vineet Goyal
• Rajan Udwani

SESSION: Session 8a: Social Choice

Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism

• Dominik Peters
• Piotr Skowron

Optimal Communication-Distortion Tradeoff in Voting

• Debmalya Mandal
• Nisarg Shah
• David P. Woodruff

Meddling Metrics: the Effects of Measuring and Constraining Partisan Gerrymandering on Voter Incentives

• Brian Brubach
• Aravind Srinivasan
• Shawn Zhao

SESSION: Session 8b: Econometric Methods

Machine Learning Instrument Variables for Causal Inference

• Amandeep Singh
• Kartik Hosanagar
• Amit Gandhi

Variance-Weighted Estimators to Improve Sensitivity in Online Experiments

• Kevin Liou
• Sean J. Taylor

Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias

• Ramesh Johari
• Hannah Li
• Gabriel Weintraub

SESSION: Session 8c: Crowdsourcing

Surrogate Scoring Rules

• Yang Liu
• Juntao Wang
• Yiling Chen

Small Steps to Accuracy: Incremental Belief Updaters Are Better Forecasters

• Pavel Atanasov
• Jens Witkowski
• Lyle Ungar
• Barbara Mellers
• Philip Tetlock

Prizes on Crowdsourcing Platforms: An Equilibrium Analysis of Competing Contests

• Konstantinos I. Stouras
• Sanjiv Erat
• Kenneth C. Lichtendahl

SESSION: Session 8d: Dynamic Mechanisms

Quick or Cheap? Breaking Points in Dynamic Markets

• Panayotis Mertikopoulos
• Heinrich H. Nax
• Bary S. R. Pradelski

Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite Matching

• Hanrui Zhang
• Vincent Conitzer

Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs in Dynamic Fair Division

• David Zeng
• Alexandros Psomas