EC'09 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference Schedule

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Tuesday, June 7, 2011
8:30 - 9:40 AM

Session 1: Network externalities
Chair: John Morgan

Network Formation in the Presence of Contagious Risk
Larry Blume (Cornell); David Easley (Cornell); Jon Kleinberg (Cornell); Robert Kleinberg (Cornell); Eva Tardos (Cornell)

Optimal Auctions with Positive Network Externalities
Nima Haghpanah (Northwestern); Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern); Kamesh Munagala (Duke); Vahab Mirrokni (Google)

Does more connectivity help groups to solve social problems?
Daniel Enemark (UC San Diego); Mathew McCubbins (University of Southern California); Ramamohan Paturi (University of Southern California); Nicholas Weller (University of Southern California)

9:40 - 10:10 AM
10:10 - 11:20 AM

Session 2: Online Mechanisms
Chair: Mike Ostrovsky

Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange
Santiago Balseiro (Columbia); Jon Feldman (Google); Vahab Mirrokni (Google); S. Muthukrishnan (Rutgers)

Near Optimal Online Algorithms and Fast Approximation Algorithms for Resource Allocation Problems
Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research); Kamal Jain (Microsoft Research); Balasubramanian Sivan (University of Wisconsin); Christopher Wilkens (UC Berkeley)

Hiring a Secretary from a Poset
Ravi Kumar (Yahoo! Research); Silvio Lattanzi (Google); Sergei Vassilvitskii (Yahoo! Research); Andrea Vattani (University of California)

11:30 - 12:30 PM
FCRC  plenary speaker: Ravi Kannan, Microsoft Research
12:30 - 1:40 PM
1:40 - 3:30 PM

Session 3: Sponsored Search
Chair: David Reiley

The Effects of Exposure Time on Memory of Display Advertisements
Daniel Goldstein (Yahoo! Research); R. Preston McAfee (Yahoo! Research); Siddharth Suri (Yahoo! Research)

Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment
Michael Ostrovsky (Stanford) and Michael Schwarz (Yahoo! Research)

Stochastic Variability in Sponsored Search Auctions: Observations and Models
Furcy Pin (Ecole Normale Superieure) and Peter Key (Microsoft Research)

[split talk]

GSP Auctions with Correlated Types
Brendan Lucier (University of Toronto) and Renato Paes Leme (Cornell)


On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Ioannis Caragiannis (University of Patras); Christos Kaklamanis (MIT); Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (University of Patras and RACTI, Greece); Maria Kyropoulou (University of Patras)

Multi-Keyword Sponsored Search
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai (Stanford)

3:30 - 4:00 PM
4:00 - 5:50 PM

Session 4: Complexity and Equilibria
Chair: Joan Feigenbaum

A Revealed Preference Approach to Computational Complexity in Economics
Federico Echinique (Caltech); Daniel Golovin (Caltech); Adam Wierman (Caltech)

Repeated Matching Pennies with Limited Randomness
Michele Budinich (Institute  for Advanced Studies, Lucca) and Lance Fortnow (Northwestern)

Polynomial-time Computation of Exact Correlated Equilibrium in Compact Games
Albert Xin Jiang (Univ of British Columbia) and Kevin Leyton-Brown (Univ of British Columbia)

Distributed Algorithms via Gradient Descent for Fisher Markets
Benjamin Birnbaum (University of Washington); Nikhil Devanur (MIcrosoft Research); Lin Xiao (Microsoft Research)

Economies with Non-Convex Production and Complexity Equilibria
Christos Papadimitriou (UC Berkeley) and Christopher Wilkens (UC Berkeley)

6:00 PM - 7:00 PM

Business Meeting (Room B)

7:30 PM - 9:30 PM
Welcome Reception
Wednesday, June 8, 2011
8:30 - 9:40 AM

Session 5: Social networks
Chair: Rahul Sami

Liquidity in Credit Networks: A Little Trust Goes a Long Way
Pranav Dandekar (Stanford); Ashish Goel (Stanford); Ramesh Govindan (Univ of Southern California); Ian Post (Stanford)

Role of Social Networks in Online Shopping: Information Passing, Price of Trust, and Consumer Choice
Stephen Guo (Stanford); Mengqiu Wang (Stanford); Jure Leskovec (Stanford)

Who Moderates the Moderators? Crowdsourcing Abuse Detection in User-generated Content
Arpita Ghosh (Yahoo! Research); Satyen Kale (Yahoo! Research); R. Preston McAfee (Yahoo! Research)


9:40 - 10:10 AM
10:10 - 11:20 AM

Session 6: Ranking, Voting, and Attribution
Chair: Shuchi Chawla

Axiomatic Attribution for Multilinear Functions
Yi Sun (MIT) and Mukund Sundararajan (Google)

Strategic Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains and Multiple-Election Paradoxes
Lirong Xia (Duke); Vincent Conitzer (Duke); Jérôme Lang (Université Paris-Dauphine)

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Rank-Order Mechanisms for User Contributed Content
Arpita Ghosh (Yahoo! Research) and Patrick Hummel (Stanford)

11:30 - 12:30
FCRC plenary speaker: Luiz Andre Barroso, Google
12:30 - 1:40 PM
1:40 - 3:30 PM

Session 7: New Directions in Mechanism Design
Chair: Yan Chen

Selling Privacy at Auction
Arpita Ghosh (Yahoo! Research) and Aaron Roth (Microsoft Research)

Mechanisms for Multi-Level Marketing
Yuval Emek (Tel Aviv University); Ron Karidi (Microsoft Israel); Moshe Tennenholtz (Technion and Microsoft Israel R & D Center); Aviv Zohar (Hebrew University)

Concordance among Holdouts
Scott Kominers (Harvard) and E. Glen Weyl (Harvard)

Only Valuable Experts Can Be Valued
Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research); Liad Blumrosen (Hebrew University); Nicolas Lambert (Stanford); Omer Reingold (Microsoft Research)

Single Valued Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets
Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv University); Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome); Jared Saia (University of New Mexico); Piotr Sankowski (Warsaw University)

3:30 - 4:00 PM
4:00 - 5:50 PM

Session 8: Approximation in Mechanism Design
Chair: Bobby Kleinberg

Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts
Shahar Dobzinski (Cornell) and Noam Nisan (Hebrew University)

Truth, Envy, and Profit
Jason Hartline (Northwestern) and Qiqi Yan (Stanford)

Bayesian Mechanism Design for Budget-Constrained Agents
Shuchi Chawla (University of Wisconsin); David Malec (University of Wisconsin); Azarakhsh Malekian (Northwestern)

A Truthful Randomized Mechanism for Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Optimization
Shaddin Dughmi (Stanford)

Mechanisms for Complement-Free Procurement
Shahar Dobzinski (Cornell); Christos Papadimitriou (UC Berkeley); Yaron Singer (UC Berkeley)

Thursday, June 9, 2011
8:30 - 9:40 AM

Session 9: Mechanisms with Near-Optimal Equilibria
Chair: Tim Roughgarden

Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks
Ruben Juarez (University of Hawaii) and Rajnish Kumar (Georgia Institute of Technology)

Optimal Cost Sharing Protocols for Scheduling Games
Philipp von Falkenhausen (Technische Universitat Berlin) and Tobias Harks (Technical University of Berlin)

Non-Price Equilibria in Markets of Discrete Goods
Avinatan Hassidim (MIT); Haim Kaplan (Tel Aviv University); Yishay Mansour (Tel Aviv University); Noam Nisan (Hebrew University)

9:40 - 10:10 AM
10:10 - 11:20 AM

Session 10: Market-making and computational finance
Chair: Dave Pennock

An Optimization-Based Framework for Automated Market-Making
Jacob Abernethy (UC Berkeley); Yiling Chen (Harvard); Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (Univ of California, Los Angeles)

Market Making in Mean Reversion Price Models
Tanmoy Chakraborty (Univ of Pennsylvania) and Michael Kearns (Univ of Pennsylvania)

Pseudorandom Financial Derivatives
David Zuckerman (Univ of Texas, Austin)

11:30 - 12:30 PM
FCRC  plenary speaker: Luis von Ahn, Carnegie Mellon University
12:30 - 1:40 PM
1:40 - 3:30 PM

Session 11: Matching
Chair: Kevin Leyton-Brown

Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
Itai Ashlagi (MIT) and Alvin Roth (Harvard University)

A Random Graph Model of Kidney Exchanges: Efficiency, Individual-Rationality and Incentives
Panagiotis Toulis (Harvard) and David Parkes (Harvard)

The college admissions problem with a continuum of students
Jacob Leshno (Harvard) and Eduardo Azevedo (Harvard)

Matching with Couples Revisited
Itai Ashlagi (MIT); Mark Braverman (University of Toronto); Avinatan Hassidim (MIT)

Multilateral Matching
John Hatfield (Stanford School of Business) and Scott Kominers (Harvard)

3:30 - 4:00 PM
4:00 - 5:50 PM

Session 12: Novel Equilibrium Analyses
Chair: Jason Hartline

Mean Field Equilibria of Dynamic Auctions with Learning
Krishnamurthy Iyer (Stanford); Ramesh Johari (Stanford); Mukund Sundararajan (Google)

Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design
Paul Duetting (Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne-EPFL); Felix Fischer (Harvard); David Parkes (Harvard)

Best-Response Auctions
Noam Nisan (Hebrew University); Michael Schapira (Princeton); Gregory Valiant (UC Berkeley); Aviv Zohar (Hebrew University)

Money for Nothing: Exploiting Negative Externalities
Changrong Deng (Duke); Sasa Pekec (Duke)

Non-linear Price Competition and a Common Agency with Informed Principals
Hamid Nazerzadeh (Microsoft Research); Georgia Perakis (MIT)