Posters accepted to ACM EC 2016 (listed by submission time):
Bayesian Opponent Exploitation in Imperfect-Information Games, Sam Ganzfried
The Costs and Benefits of Ridesharing: Sequential Individual Rationality and Sequential Fairness, Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Koyel Mukherjee and Theja Tulabandhula
Spontaneous Referrals and Explicit Rewards, Joosung Lee
A Continuum Model for the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism, Irene Lo and Jacob Leshno
Designing Information Elicitation Mechanisms That Reward Truth-telling, Yuqing Kong and Grant Schoenebeck
Analyzing Games with Ambiguous Player Types using the MINthenMAX Decision Model, Ilan Nehama
Pricing Public Goods for Simultaneous and Sequential Sales, Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra and Michal Feldman
A Market Framework for Eliciting Private Data, Bo Waggoner, Rafael Frongillo and Jacob Abernethy
Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion, Shaddin Dughmi and Xu Haifeng
Recovering Games from Perturbed Equilibrium Observations Using Convex Optimization, Juba Ziani, Venkat Chandrasekaran and Katrina Ligett
Trade-offs in School Choice: Comparing Deferred Acceptance, the Naive and the Adaptive Boston Mechan, Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken
Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back, Ludwig Dierks and Sven Seuken
Estimating Mobile Advertisers' Willingness-to-pay Using Consumer Tracking Data, Richard Chen and Khai Xiang Chiong
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents, Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Ruta Mehta
On Selfish Creation of Robust Networks, Ankit Chauhan, Pascal Lenzner, Anna Melnichenko and Martin Münn
The Approximation Ratio of the k-Lookahead Auction, Shahar Dobzinski and Nitzan Uziely
A General Statistical Framework for Designing Strategy-proof Assignment Mechanisms, Harikrishna Narasimhan and David Parkes
Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility, Albert Michael, Vincent Conitzer and Giuseppe Lopomo
Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation, Catherine Moon and Vincent Conitzer
Asymptotically Tight Bounds for Inefficiency in Risk-Averse Selfish Routing, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova and Nicolas Stier-Moses
Game Abstractions for Counterfactual Prediction in Online Markets, Mark Hou, Eric Sodomka and Nicolas Stier-Moses
On Elicitation Complexity, Rafael Frongillo and Ian Kash
A Geometric Perspective on Minimal Peer Prediction, Jens Witkowski and Rafael Frongillo
Contingent Payment Mechanisms to Maximize Resource Utilization, Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir and David Parkes and James Zou
Discrete and Continuous Generalized Mirror Descents in Atomic Congestion Games, Po-An Chen
Regret-Based Pruning in Extensive-Form Games, Noam Brown and Tuomas Sandholm
Clearing a Financial Network with Credit Default Swaps is PPAD-hard Even Without Default Costs, Steffen Schuldenzucker
Nonparametric identification in English auctions with absentee bidding, Marleen Marra
