Posters (Location: Vrijthof Museum / Grand Café Maastricht Soiron)

Session 1a
Auction Theory (Session Chair: Constantinos Daskalakis, Location: Lecture Hall)

Ironing in the Dark
Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers

A/B Testing of Auctions
Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline and Denis Nekipelov

The FedEx Problem
Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna Karlin and Elias Koutsoupias

Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search
Robert Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner and Glen Weyl

Session 1b
Matching (Session Chair: Kyle Woodward, Location: Aula Gothic)

Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange
John Dickerson, David Manlove, Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm and James Trimble

The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few Queries
Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna and Yang Li

Cadet-Branch Matching in a Quasi-Linear Labor Market
Ravi Jagadeesan

Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms
Jan Christoph Schlegel

Best paper and best dissertation presentations
(Session Chairs: Yiling Chen and Eva Tardos, Location: Greek Aula)

Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
Piotr Dworczak (Best Paper with Student Lead Author Award)

Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?
Kobi Gal, Moshe Mash, Ariel Procaccia and Yair Zick (Best Paper Award)

SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award presentation by Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Session 2a
Mechanism Design and Auction Theory (Session Chair: Hamid Nazerzadeh, Location: Lecture Hall)

The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs
Andrew Kephart and Vincent Conitzer

Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items
Zihe Wang and Pingzhong Tang

Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private Information
Kyle Woodward

Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods
Marek Pycia and Kyle Woodward

Session 2b
Information Elicitation (Session Chair: Jacob Abernethy, Location: Aula Gothic)

When Should an Expert Make a Prediction?
Amir Ban, Yishay Mansour and Yossi Azar

The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets
Rachel Cummings, David Pennock and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Arbitrage-Free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer Programming
Christian Kroer, Miroslav Dudik, Sébastien Lahaie and Sivaraman Balakrishnan

Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction
Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael Frongillo and David Parkes

Session 3a
Mechanism Design and Auction Theory (Session Chair: Shuchi Chawla, Location: Lecture Hall)

Optimal Commitments in Asymmetric Auctions with Incomplete Information
Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, and Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang

Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation Guarantees
Itai Ashlagi, Costis Daskalakis and Nima Haghpanah

Optimal Auctions with Restricted Allocations
Ian Kash and Rafael Frongillo

Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
Costis Daskalakis, Christos Papadimitriou and Christos Tzamos

Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern and Guy Reiner

Session 3b
Computational Social Choice (Session Chair: Glen Weyl, Location: Aula Gothic)

On Voting and Facility Location
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golomb

Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Decision-Making: Small Groups and the Importance of Triads
Ashish Goel and Lee David

The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Herve Moulin, Ariel Procaccia, Nisarg Shah and Junxing Wang

How Effective Can Simple Ordinal Peer Grading Be?
Ioannis Caragiannis, George Krimpas and Alexandros Voudouriss

Assortment Optimization under a Random Swap based Distribution over Permutations Model
Antoine Desir, Vineet Goyal and Danny Segev

(GAMES) von Neumann lecture by Sylvain Sorin, (Location: Lecture Hall)

Session 4a
Models of Behavior and Internet Applications (Session Chair: Pingzhong Tang, Location: Lecture Hall)

Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias
Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Manish Raghavan

Procrastination with Variable Present Bias
Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier and Emmanouil Pountourakis

A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding
Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian and Mohamed Mostagir

Blockchain Mining Games
Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Maria Kyropoulou and Yiannis Tselekounis

Session 4b
Market Algorithms (Session Chair: Vahab Mirrokni, Location: Aula Gothic)

The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
Vincent Cohen Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat

Lottery Pricing Equilibria
Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Stefano Leonardi

Online Budgeted Allocation with General Budgets
Nathaniel Kell and Debmalya Panigrahi

Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex Cover
Wang Yajun and Sam Chiu-wai Wong

Session 5a
Computational Game Theory (Session Chair: Grant Schoenebeck, Location Lecture Hall)

Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Bounds in Games
Christian Kroer and Tuomas Sandholm

A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games
Yannai Gonczarowski and Moshe Tennenholtz

Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing Games
Umang Bhaskar, Yu Cheng, Young Kun Ko and Chaitanya Swamy

The Mysteries of Security Games: Equilibrium Computation Becomes Combinatorial Algorithm Design
Xu Haifeng

Session 5b
Online Behavior and Systems (Session Chair: Ian Kash, Location: Aula Gothic)

The Seasonality Of Paid Search Effectiveness From A Long Running Field Test
Quinn Ye, Saarthak Malik, Ji Chen and Haijun Zhu

Returns to Consumer Search: Evidence from eBay
Thomas Blake, Chris Nosko and Steven Tadelis

The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Cooperative Decision-Making can be Predicted with high Accuracy when using only Three Behavioral Types
Ziv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich and David Rand

Understanding Emerging Threats to Online Advertising
Ceren Budak, Sharad Goel, Justin Rao and Georgios Zervas

(GAMES) Morgenstern talk by Thomas Palfrey (Location: Lecture Hall)

Session 6a
Revenue Optimization and Pricing (Session Chair: Sven Seuken, Location: Lecture Hall)

Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation
Shuchi Chawla and Benjamin Miller

Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions From Learning Algorithms
Hamid Nazerzadeh, Renato Paes Leme, Afshin Rostamizadeh and Umar Syed

A Near-Optimal Exploration-Exploitation Approach for Assortment Selection
Agrawal Shipra, Vashist Avadhanula, Vineet Goyal and Assaf Zeevi

Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves
Tim Roughgarden and Joshua Wang

Session 6b
Social Networks (Session Chair: Alex Peysakhovich, Location: Aula Gothic)

General Threshold Model for Social Cascades: Analysis and Simulations
Jie Gao, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh, Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu

Impact of Community Structure on Cascades
Mehrdad Moharrami, Vijay Subramanian, Mingyan Liu and Marc Lelarge

Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren and Moshe Tennenholtz

Dynamic Conflict on A Network
Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal and David Minarsch

Session 7a
Pricing, Privacy and Economics of Information (Session Chair: Sebastien Lahaie, Location: Lecture Hall)

Pricing with Limited Knowledge of Demand
Maxime Cohen, Georgia Perakis and Robert Pindyck

The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models
Rachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett, Mallesh Pai and Aaron Roth

Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games
Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Zhiwei Steven Wu

Persuasion with Limited Communication
Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe and Ruixin Qiang

Session 7b
Market Equilibrium and Equilibrium Computation (Session Chair: Richard Cole, Location: Aula Gothic)

Computational Extensive-Form Games
Joseph Halpern, Rafael Pass and Lior Seeman

Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets
Xiaohui Bei, Jugal Garg and Martin Hoefer

Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach
Ozan Candogan, Markos Epitropou and Rakesh Vohra

Average Case Performance of Replicator Dynamics in Potential Games via Computing Regions of Attraction
Ioannis Panageas and Georgios Piliouras

Session 8a
Trust, Recommendation and Financial Systems (Session Chair: Matt Weinberg, Location: Lecture Hall)

Strategic Payment Routing in Financial Credit Networks
Frank Cheng, Junming Liu, Kareem Amin and Michael Wellman

Sybil Detection Using Latent Network Structure
Grant Schoenebeck, Aaron Snook and Fang-Yi Yu

Economic Recommendation Systems
Gal Bahar, Moshe Tennenholtz and Rann Smorodinsky

Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken and Stefano Battison

Session 8b
Market Design (Session Chair: Felix Fischer, Location: Aula Gothic)

Petty Envy When Assigning Objects
Thayer Morrill

“Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-proof Environment
Avinatan hassidim, Romm Assaf and Ran I. Shorrer

On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets
Maximilien Burq, Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi

What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings? How Competition Guides Design
Itai Ashlagi and Afshin Nikzad

Session 9a
Mechanism Design (Session Chair: Ron Lavi, Location: Concert Hall)

The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms
Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken

Mechanism Design with Selective Verification
Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos and Manolis Zampetakis

Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms
Joosung Lee

Session 9b
Efficiency and Pricing (Session Chair: Vasilis Syrgkanis, Location: Aula Gothic)

Large Market Games with Near Optimal Efficiency
Richard Cole and Yixin Tao

Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
Jacob Abernethy, Sébastien Lahaie and Matus Telgarsky

On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers
Yiwei Chen and Vivek Farias

Session 10a
Dynamic Mechanism Design and Position Auctions (Session Chair: Nima Haghpanah, Location: Lecture Hall)

Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer and David Parkes

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment
Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub

Feature-based Dynamic Pricing
Maxime Cohen, Ilan Lobel and Renato Paes Leme

Session 10b
Resource Allocation and Preference Revelation (Session Chair: Iannis Caragiannis, Location: Aula Gothic)

Fair Resource Allocation in A Volatile Marketplace
Mohammad Hossein Bateni, Yiwei Chen, Dragos Ciocan and Vahab Mirrokni

Revealed Preference at Scale: Learning Personalized Preferences from Assortment Choices
Nathan Kallus and Madeleine Udell

Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion Games
Vittorio Bilò and Cosimo Vinci

SIGecom Test of Time Award presentation, by Craig Tovey and Michael Trick
(Session Chair: Ulle Endriss, Location: Lecture Hall)

Farewell BBQ (Location: Mensa)