Papers accepted for presentation in ACM EC 2016 (listed by submission time):

The Seasonality of Paid Search Effectiveness From A Long Running Field Test, Quinn Ye, Saarthak Malik, Ji Chen and Haijun Zhu
Petty Envy When Assigning Objects, Thayer Morrill
Economic Recommendation Systems, Gal Bahar, Moshe Tennenholtz and Rann Smorodinsky
Large market games with near optimal efficiency, Richard Cole and Yixin Tao
The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets, Rachel Cummings, David Pennock and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Decision-Making: Small Groups and the Importance of Triads, Ashish Goel and Lee David
Ironing in the Dark,Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers
Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?, Kobi Gal, Moshe Mash, Ariel Procaccia and Yair Zick
On Voting and Facility Location, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golomb
The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare, Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Herve Moulin, Ariel Procaccia, Nisarg Shah and Junxing Wang
Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains, Piotr Dworczak
Feature-based Dynamic Pricing, Maxime Cohen, Ilan Lobel and Renato Paes Leme
When should an expert make a prediction?, Amir Ban, Yishay Mansour and Yossi Azar
The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing, Vincent Cohen Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat
Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions, Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer and David Parkes
Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment, Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Computational Extensive-Form Games, Joseph Halpern, Rafael Pass and Lior Seeman
Pricing With Limited Knowledge of Demand, Maxime Cohen, Georgia Perakis and Robert Pindyck
Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern and Guy Reiner
Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Bounds in Games, Christian Kroer and Tuomas Sandholm
On The Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management In The Face of Strategic Customers, Yiwei Chen and Vivek Farias
Strategic Payment Routing in Financial Credit Networks, Frank Cheng, Junming Liu, Kareem Amin and Michael Wellman
Optimal Commitments in Asymmetric Auctions with Incomplete Information, Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, and Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang
The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models, Rachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett, Mallesh Pai and Aaron Roth
Impact of Community Structure on Cascades , Mehrdad Moharrami, Vijay Subramanian, Mingyan Liu and Marc Lelarge
Lottery Pricing Equilibria, Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Stefano Leonardi
Mechanism Design with Selective Verification, Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos and Manolis Zampetakis
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups, Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren and Moshe Tennenholtz
Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms, Joosung Lee
Optimal Auctions With Restricted Allocations, Ian Kash and Rafael Frongillo
Sybil Detection using Latent Network Structure, Grant Schoenebeck, Aaron Snook and Fang-Yi Yu
How effective can simple ordinal peer grading be?, Ioannis Caragiannis, George Krimpas and Alexandros Voudouris
A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games, Yannai Gonczarowski and Moshe Tennenholtz
Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion Games, Vittorio Bilò and Cosimo Vinci
“Strategic” Behavior in a Strategy-proof Environment, Avinatan hassidim, Romm Assaf and Ran I. Shorrer
The FedEx Problem, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna Karlin and Elias Koutsoupias
Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing Games,
Umang Bhaskar, Yu Cheng, Young Kun Ko and Chaitanya Swamy
Returns to Consumer Search: Evidence from eBay, Thomas Blake, Chris Nosko, Steven Tadelis
 Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games, Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Zhiwei Steven Wu
Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation, Shuchi Chawla and Benjamin Miller
A/B Testing of Auctions, Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline and Denis Nekipelov
On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets, Maximilien Burq, Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi
Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange, John Dickerson, David Manlove, Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm and James Trimble
Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search, Robert Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner and Glen Weyl
The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Cooperative Decision-Making can be Predicted with high Accuracy when using only Three Behavioral Types, Ziv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich and David Rand
What matters in school choice tie-breakings? How competition guides design, Itai Ashlagi and Afshin Nikzad
Fair Resource Allocation in A Volatile Marketplace, MohammadHossein Bateni, Yiwei Chen, Dragos Ciocan and Vahab Mirrokni
Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias, Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Manish Raghavan
Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets, Xiaohui Bei, Jugal Garg and Martin Hoefer
Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items, Zihe Wang and Pingzhong Tang
Arbitrage-free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer Programming, Christian Kroer, Miroslav Dudik, Sébastien Lahaie and Sivaraman Balakrishnan
Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods, Marek Pycia and Kyle Woodward
The Stochastic Matching Problem With (Very) Few Queries, Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna and Yang Li
Online Budgeted Allocation with General Budgets, Nathaniel Kell and Debmalya Panigrahi
Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions From Learning Algorithms, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Renato Paes Leme, Afshin Rostamizadeh and Umar Syed
Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions, Jacob Abernethy, Sébastien Lahaie and Matus Telgarsky
Blockchain Mining Games, Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Maria Kyropoulou and Yiannis Tselekounis
Procrastination with Variable Present Bias, Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier and Emmanouil Pountourakis
Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees, Itai Ashlagi, Costis Daskalakis and Nima Haghpanah
Dynamic Conflict on A Network, Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal and David Minarsch
A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding, Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian and Mohamed Mostagir
General Threshold Model for Social Cascades: Analysis and Simulations, Jie Gao, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh, Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu
A Near-Optimal Exploration-Exploitation Approach for Assortment Selection, Agrawal Shipra, Vashist Avadhanula, Vineet Goyal and Assaf Zeevi
Assortment Optimization under a Random Swap based Distribution over Permutations Model, Antoine Desir, Vineet Goyal and Danny Segev
Persuasion with Limited Communication, Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe and Ruixin Qiang
Competitive Equilibrium and Trading networks: A Network Flow Approach, Ozan Candogan, Markos Epitropou and Rakesh Vohra
Cadet-Branch Matching in a Quasi-Linear Labor Market, Ravi Jagadeesan
Average Case Performance of Replicator Dynamics in Potential Games via Computing Regions of Attraction, Ioannis Panageas and Georgios Piliouras
Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms, Jan Christoph Schlegel
The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms, Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken
Understanding Emerging Threats to Online Advertising, Ceren Budak, Sharad Goel, Justin Rao and Georgios Zervas
Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private Information, Kyle Woodward
Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?, Costis Daskalakis, Christos Papadimitriou and Christos Tzamos
Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction, Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael Frongillo and David Parkes
Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps, Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken and Stefano Battison
Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves, Tim Roughgarden and Joshua Wang
Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex Cover, Wang Yajun and Sam Chiu-wai Wong
Revealed Preference at Scale: Learning Personalized Preferences from Assortment Choices, Nathan Kallus and Madeleine Udell
The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs, Andrew Kephart and Vincent Conitzer
The Mysteries of Security Games: Equilibrium Computation becomes Combinatorial Algorithm Design, Xu Haifeng