Papers accepted for presentation in ACM EC 2017 (listed by first submission time):

Paper TitleAuthors and Affiliations
Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments Gerardo Berbeglia (Melbourne Business School); Gwenael Joret (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)
Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania); Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research); Jonathan Ullman (Northeastern University); Zhiwei Steven Wu (University of Pennsylvania)
A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting Ariel Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University); Junxing Wang (Carnegie Mellon University)
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms John Hatfield (University of Texas at Austin); Scott Kominers (Harvard University); Alexander Westkamp (University of Cologne)
Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks Ronen Gradwohl (Northwestern University)
Voting in the Limelight Ronen Gradwohl (Northwestern University)
The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized? Filippas Apostolos (NYU Stern School of Business); John Horton (NYU Stern School of Business)
Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers Yiwei Chen (Singapore University of Technology and Design); Cong Shi (University of Michigan)
Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase Juan Castillo (Stanford University); Dan Knoepfle (Uber Technologies); Glen Weyl (Microsoft Research and Yale University)
Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews Shrabastee Banerjee (Boston University); Chris Dellarocas (Boston University); Georgios Zervas (Boston University)
Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions Gerdus Benade (Carnegie Mellon University); Anson Kahng (Carnegie Mellon University); Ariel Procaccia (Carnegie Mellon University)
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social WelfareRichard Cole (NYU); Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Kamal Jain (Faira); Tung Mai (Georgia Institute of Technology); Vijay Vazirani (Georgia Institute of Technology); Sadra Yazdanbod (Georgia Institute of Technology)
Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players Itai Arieli (Technion); Yakov Babichenko (Technion)
A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games Noam Nisan (Hebrew University); Gali Noti (Hebrew University)
Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem Daniel Goldstein (Microsoft Reserach); R. Preston McAfee (Microsoft Corporation); Siddharth Suri (Microsoft Research); James Wright (Microsoft Research)
Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium Santiago Balseiro (Duke University); Yonatan Gur (Stanford University)
Complementary inputs and the existence of stable outcomes in large trading networks Ravi Jagadeesan (Harvard University)
Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework Sid Banerjee (Cornell University); Daniel Freund (Cornell Unviersity); Thodoris Lykouris (Cornell University)
Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities Santiago Balseiro (Duke University); Vahab Mirrokni (Google); Renato Paes Leme (Google Research)
Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making Ilan Lobel (New York University); Renato Paes Leme (Google Research); Adrian Vladu (MIT)
Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation Frank Cheng (University of Michigan); Michael Wellman (University of Michigan)
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders Alon Eden (Tel Aviv University); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University and Microsoft Reserach); Ophir Friedler (Tel Aviv University); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Hebrew University); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements Alon Eden (Tel Aviv University); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University and Microsoft Reserach); Ophir Friedler (Tel Aviv University); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Hebrew University); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)
Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing Elliot Anshelevich (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute); Shreyas Sekar (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)
The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering Rupert Freeman (Duke University); David Pennock (Microsoft Research); Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (Microsoft Research)
Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling Shuchi Chawla (University of Wisconsin); Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); Janardhan Kulkarni (Microsoft Research); Rad Niazadeh (Cornell University)
Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison Andrew Yao (Tsinghua University)
A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic Zhigang Cao (Chinese Academy of Sciences); Bo Chen (University of Warwick); Xujin Chen (Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences); Changjun Wang (Beijing University of Technology)
Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction Sepehr Assadi (University of Pennsylvania)
Optimal Multi-Unit Pricing with Private Demands Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); Nima Haghpanah (Penn State University); Christos-Alexandros Psomas (UC Berkeley)
Controlled Dynamic Fair DivisionEric Friedman (ICSI and University of California Berkeley); Christos-Alexandros Psomas (UC Berkeley); Shai Vardi (California Institute of Technology)
Forecast Aggregation Itai Arieli (Technion); Yakov Babichenko (Technion); Rann Smorodinsky (Technion)
Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match Avinatan Hassidim (Bar Ilan University and Google); Assaf Romm (Hebrew University); Ran I. Shorrer (Penn State)
The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints Dirk Bergemann (Yale University); Francisco Castro (Columbia Business School); Gabriel Weintraub (Stanford Graduate School of Business)
Fair Public Decision Making Vincent Conitzer (Duke); Rupert Freeman (Duke University); Nisarg Shah (Harvard University)
Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction Yang Liu (Harvard University); Yiling Chen (Harvard University)
Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users Debmalya Mandal (Graduate Student); Arpit Agarwal (University of Pennsylvania); Nisarg Shah (Harvard University); David Parkes (Harvard)
Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi (Sapienza University of Rome); Paul Goldberg (University of Oxford); Bart de Keijzer (CWI Amsterdam); Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome); Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University); Stefano Turchetta (Univ. of Oxford)
Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University and Microsoft Reserach); Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv University); Alan Roytman (University of Copenhagen)
Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern and MSR NE); Brendan Lucier (Microsoft); Emmanouil Pountourakis (UT Austin); Sam Taggart (Northwestern University)
Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games Christian Kroer (Carnegie Mellon University); Kevin Waugh (University of Alberta); Fatma Kilinc-Karzan (Carnegie Mellon University); Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: the General Case Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)
A Polynomial Time Algorithm For Spatio-Temporal Security Games Soheil Behnezhad (University of Maryland); Mahsa Derakhshan (University of Maryland); MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi (University of Maryland College Park); Aleksandrs Slivkins (Microsoft Research)
Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints Thanh Nguyen (Purdue); Rakesh Vohra (Penn)
Comparison-Based Choices Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard University); Johan Ugander (Stanford University)
Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers David Lingenbrink (Cornell University); Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University)
Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division Siddharth Barman (IISc); Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy (CMI)
Posted price mechanisms for a random stream of customers Jose Correa (Universidad de Chile); Patricio Foncea (Universidad de Chile); Ruben Hoeksma (Universidad de Chile); Tim Oosterwijk (Maastricht University); Tjark Vredeveld (Maastricht University)
Stable Secretaries Rann Smorodinsky (Technion); Yuval Emek (Technion); Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University and Microsoft Reserach); Boaz Patt-Shamir (Tel Aviv University); Yakov Babichenko (Technion); Ron Peretz (Bar-Ilan univ)
Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy (Stanford University); Ashish Goel (Stanford University); Kamesh Munagala (Duke University)
Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon-Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design Benjamin Roth (MIT); Ran I. Shorrer (Penn State)
From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies Artur Gorokh (Cornell University); Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University); Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University)
Combinatorial Cost Sharing Shahar Dobzinski (Weizmann); Shahar Ovadia (Weizmann)
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Evangelos Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business); Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University)
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents Simina Branzei (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Ruta Mehta (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Bifurcation Mechanism Design - From Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments Ger Yang (University of Texas at Austin); Georgios Piliouras (Singapore University of Technology and Design); David Basanta (H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Inst.)
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness Sophie Bade (Royal Holloway University of London and Max Planck Institut Bonn); Yannai Gonczarowski (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research)
Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online LearningSebastien Bubeck (Microsoft Research); Nikhil Devanur (Microsoft Research Redmond); Zhiyi Huang (The University of Hong Kong); Rad Niazadeh (Cornell University)
The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm Sepehr Assadi (University of Pennsylvania); Sanjeev Khanna (University of Pennsylvania); Yang Li (University of Pennsylvania)
Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness Georgios Amanatidis (Athens University of Economics and Business); Georgios Birmpas (Athens University of Economics and Business); Giorgos Christodoulou (University of Liverpool); Evangelos Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business)
Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms Johannes Brustle (McGill University); Yang Cai (McGill University); Fa Wu (McGill University and Zhejiang University); Mingfei Zhao (Mcgill University)
Facilitating the search for partners on matching platforms: Restricting agent actions Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School); Daniela Saban (Stanford University)
Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford Graduate School of Business); Matthew Jackson; (Stanford University)
Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets Itai Ashlagi (Stanford University); Mark Braverman (Princeton University); Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School); Peng Shi (Microsoft Research)
Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation Pieter Kleer (CWI); Guido Schaefer (CWI and VU University Amsterdam)
The Theory is Predictive but is it Complete? An Application to Human Perception of Randomness Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Annie Liang (Microsoft Research New England); Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard University)
Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets Saeed Alaei (Google); Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi (Cornell University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University and Department of Computer Science)
Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty Giorgos Christodoulou (University of Liverpool); Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Alkmini Sgouritsa (University of Liverpool)
Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities Shaddin Dughmi (Univ. of Southern California); Haifeng Xu (University of Southern California)
Matching while learning Ramesh Johari (Stanford University); Vijay Kamble (Stanford University); Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School)
Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets Erik Brinkman (University of Michigan); Michael Wellman (University of Michigan)
Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents Sampath Kannan (University of Pennsylvania); Michael Kearns (University of Pennsylvania); Jamie Morgenstern (Carnegie Mellon University and University of Pennsylvania); Mallesh Pai (Rice University); Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania); Rakesh Vohra (Penn); Zhiwei Steven Wu (University of Pennsylvania)
Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates Yu Cheng (University of Southern California); Shaddin Dughmi (Univ. of Southern California); David Kempe (University of Southern California)
Planning with Multiple Biases Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University); Sigal Oren (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev); Manish Raghavan (Cornell University)
How (Not) to Allocate Affordable HousingNick Arnosti (Columbia University); Peng Shi (Microsoft Research)