Posters accepted to ACM EC 2017 (listed by submission time):

Online Bootstrapping for Efficient Exploration, Dean Eckles and Maurits Kaptein
Iterating the Ultimatum Game: A software package for simulating mixed populations, Maurits Kaptein
Smoothing Method for Approximate Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium, Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina and Tuomas Sandholm
Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules, S. Matthew Weinberg, Jon Schneider and Ariel Schvartzman
Multiplicative Weights with Constant Step-Size in Congestion Games: Convergence,Limit Cycles & Chaos, Gerasimos Palaiopanos, Ioannis Panageas and Georgios Piliouras
Bayesian Group Decisions: Algorithms and Complexity, Ali Jadbabaie, Elchanan Mossel and M. Amin Rahimian
Bounds on the price of anarchy for a more general class of directed graphs in opinion formation, Po-An Chen, Yi-Le Chen and Chi-Jen Lu
Automated Design of Robust Mechanisms, Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer and Peter Stone
Fair Social Choice in Dynamic Settings, Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi and Vincent Conitzer
Proper Proxy Scoring Rules, Witkowski Jens, Pavel Atanasov, Lyle Ungar and Andreas Krause
Aversion to Uncertainty and Its Implications for Revenue Maximization, Shuchi Chawla, Kira Goldner, J. Benjamin Miller and Emmanouil Pountourakis
Faster and Simpler Algorithm for Optimal Strategies of Blotto Game, Soheil Behnezhad, Sina Dehghani, Mahsa Derakhshan, MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi and Saeed Seddighin
Cascades and Myopic Routing in Nonhomogeneous Kleinberg's Small World Model, Jie Gao, Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu
Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth, Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Guangda Huzhang, Biaoshuai Tao and Jiajun Wu
Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria, Yakov Babichenko and Aviad Rubinstein
Pricing Identical Items, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong
Stability of Service under Time of Use Pricing, Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Alexander Holroyd, Anna Karlin, James Martin and Balasubramanian Sivan
Bernoulli Factories and Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design, Shaddin Dughmi, Jason Hartline, Robert Kleinberg and Rad Niazadeh
Sample Complexity of Multi-Item Profit Maximization, Nina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm and Ellen Vitercik
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning, Paul Duetting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan and David Parkes
Geometry of gross substitutes valuations, Stephen Raach and Sven de Vries
Certified Computation in Crowdsourcing, Themis Gouleakis, Christos Tzamos and Manolis Zampetakis
Social Choice Mechanisms for Agents with General Utilities, Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir and David Parkes
Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms, Fei Fang, Hongyao Ma and David Parkes
Approximate Modularity Revisited, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
On the Ratio of Revenues Between Selling in a Bundle and Separately, Ron Kupfer
Simple Mechanisms for Subadditive Buyers via Duality, Mingfei Zhao and Yang Cai
A Bandit Framework for Strategic Regression, Yang Liu and Yiling Chen
Settling the Complexity of Leontief and PLC Exchange Markets under Exact and Approximate Equilibria, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay Vazirani and Sadra Yazdanbod
SATS: A Universal Spectrum Auction Test Suite, Michael Weiss, Ben Lubin and Sven Seuken