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• Archive

  • 2024 22.1
  • 2023 21.1
  • 2022 20.1 20.2
  • 2021 19.1 19.2
  • 2020 18.1 18.2
  • 2019 17.1 17.2
  • 2018 16.2
  • 2017 16.1
  • 2016 15.1 15.2
  • 2015 14.1 14.2
  • 2014 13.1 13.2
  • 2013 12.1 12.2
  • 2012 11.1 11.2
  • 2011 10.1 10.2 10.3
  • 2010 9.1
  • 2009 8.1 8.2
  • 2008 7.2 7.3
  • 2007 6.2 7.1
  • 2006 5.5 6.1
  • 2005 5.3 5.4
  • 2004 4.3 5.1 5.2
  • 2003 3.4 4.1 4.2
  • 2002 3.1 3.2 3.3
  • 2001 2.1 2.2 2.3
  • 2000 1.1

• Tweet

• Introduction
  • Editor's Introduction
    • VINCENT CONITZER
• Online Advertisement Marketplaces
  • The Pathologies of Online Display Advertising Marketplaces
    • BENJAMIN EDELMAN
• Reputation Mechanisms in Online Marketplaces
  • Designing Aggregation Mechanisms for Reputation Systems in Online Marketplaces
    • CHRISTINA APERJIS and RAMESH JOHARI
• Matching Markets
  • Matching, Cardinal Utility, and Social Welfare
    • ELLIOT ANSHELEVICH and SANMAY DAS
  • Competitive Equilibria in Matching Markets with Budgets
    • NING CHEN, XIAOTIE DENG, and ARPITA GHOSH
• Prediction Markets
  • Connections Between Markets and Learning
    • YILING CHEN and JENNIFER WORTMAN VAUGHAN
• Markets with Competing Mechanism Designers
  • Competition in Mechanisms
    • MALLESH M PAI
• Winner Determination in Markets
  • Approximability of Combinatorial Problems with Multi-agent Submodular Cost Functions
    • GAGAN GOEL, CHINMAY KARANDE, PUSHKAR TRIPATHI and LEI WANG
• Puzzles
  • Editor's Puzzle: Borrowing as Cheaply as Possible
    • VINCENT CONITZER
  • Solution to Exchanges 7.1 Puzzle: Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination
    • JOHANNA Y. HE

ISSN 1551-9031

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