ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'05)

Accepted papers

Towards Truthful Mechanisms for Binary Demand Games: A General Framework
MingYang Kao, XiangYang Li, WeiZhao Wang
Ranking Systems: The PageRank Axioms
Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz
Nearly Optimal Multi Attribute Auctions
Amir Ronen, Daniel Lehmann
Congestion Games with Failures
Maria Polukarov, Michal Penn, Moshe Tennenholtz
Interconnected Communication Networks Provisioned Selfishly
Pedro Ferreira, Marvin Sirbu
Optimal Design of English Auctions with Discrete bid Levels
Esther David, Alex Rogers, Nicholas Jennings, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kraus
Privacy-Preserving Credit Checking
Keith Frikken, Mikhail Atallah, Chen Zhang
Marginal Contribution Nets: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games
Samuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham
Differentiated Networks: Equilibrium and Efficiency
Rossella Argenziano
Graceful Service Degradation (or, How to Know your Payment is Late)
Alexandr Andoni, Jessica Staddon
True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure:Edge Deletion and VCG Payments in Graphs
Edith Elkind
Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem Using the Shapley Value
Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan
Hidden-Action in Multi-Hop Routing
Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker
Integrating Tradeoff Support in Product Search Tools for E-Commerce Sites
Pearl Pu, Li Chen
Robust Solutions for Combinatorial Auctions
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
Communication Complexity of Common Voting Protocols
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions: Demand Queries and Ascending Auctions
Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan
Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods
MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David Parkes
Dynamic and Secure B2B E-contract Update Management
Samuil Angelov, Sven Till, Paul Grefen
Fairness and Optimality in Congestion Games
Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan, Vijay Vazirani
Secure Distributed Human Computation
Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart Stubblebine
On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially Informed Environments
Ahuva Mu'alem
First-Price Path Auctions
Nicole Immorlica, David Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami
A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters
Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Michael Saks, Lan Yu
Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ICE: An Iterative Combinatorial Exchange
David Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam Juda, Sebastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan
Information Markets vs. Opinion Pools: An Empirical Comparison
Yiling Chen, Chao-Hsien Chu, Tracy Mullen, David Pennock
Content Availability, Pollution and Poisoning in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks
Nicolas Christin, Andreas Weigend, John Chuang
From Optimal Limited to Unlimited Supply Auctions
Robert McGrew, Jason Hartline
Self-Selection, Salvaging, Slacking, and Stoning: the Impacts of Negative Feedback at eBay
Tapan Khopkar, Xin Li, Paul Resnick
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Saberi

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