Papers accepted for presentation in ACM EC 2015 (alphabetically by last name of first author):

Low-Cost Learning via Active Data Procurement, Jacob Abernethy, Yiling Chen, Chien-Ju Ho and Bo Waggoner
Managing Innovation in a Crowd, Daron Acemoglu, Mohamed Mostagir and Asuman Ozdaglar
Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising, Nick Arnosti, Marissa Beck and Paul Milgrom
Short Lists in Centralized Clearinghouses, Nick Arnosti
Truthful Mechanism Design via Correlated Tree Rounding, Yossi Azar, Martin Hoefer, Idan Maor, Rebecca Reiffenhäuml and Berthold Voecking
Price Competition, Fluctuations and Welfare Guarantees, Moshe Babaioff, Renato Paes Leme and Balasubramanian Sivan
Commitment Without Regrets: Online Learning in Stackelberg Security Games, Nina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Nika Haghtalab and Ariel Procaccia
Mechanisms for Fair Attribution, Eric Balkanski and Yaron Singer
A Ride Whenever you Need One: The Value of Dynamic Pricing in Ride-sharing Platforms, Siddhartha Banerjee, Ramesh Johari and Carlos Riquelme
Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard, Siddharth Barman and Katrina Ligett
Designing Dynamic Contests, Kostas Bimpikis, Shayan Ehsani and Mohamed Mostagir
Learning What's Going On: Reconstructing Preferences and Priorities from Opaque Transactions, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour and Morgenstern Jamie
Ignorance is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching With Few Queries, Avrim Blum, John Dickerson, Nika Haghtalab, Ariel Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm and Ankit Sharma
Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticultural Perspective, Nicolas Bousquet, Zhentao Li and Adrian Vetta
Redesigning the Israeli Medical Internship Match, Slava Bronfman, Noga Alon, Avinatan Hassidim and Assaf Romm
Sound Auction Specification and Implementation, Marco Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange and Colin Rowat
Competitive analysis via benchmark decomposition, Ning Chen, Nick Gravin and Pinyan Lu
Robust Dynamic Pricing With Strategic Customers, Yiwei Chen and Vivek Farias
Combining Traditional Marketing and Viral Marketing with Amphibious Influence Maximization, Wei Chen, Fu Li, Tian Lin and Aviad Rubinstein
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints , Costis Daskalakis, Nikhil Devanur and Matthew Weinberg
Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist , Costis Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos
Online reputation management: Estimating the impact of management responses on consumer reviews, Proserpio Davide and Georgios Zervas
Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies, Nikhil Devanur, Morgenstern Jamie, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Matthew Weinberg
Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller, Masterov Dimitriy, Uwe Mayer and Steven Tadelis
A non-asymptotic approach to analyzing kidney exchange graphs , Yichuan Ding, Dongdong Ge, Simai He and Christopher Ryan
Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round, Paul Duetting, Thomas Kesselheim and Eva Tardos
Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms, Paul Duetting and Thomas Kesselheim
Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory, David Easley and Arpita Ghosh
Online Stochastic Budgeted Allocation with Traffic Spikes, Hossein Esfandiari, Nitish Korula and Vahab Mirrokni
Bias and Reciprocity in Online Reviews: Evidence From Field Experiments on Airbnb, Andrey Fradkin, Elena Grewal, David Holtz and Matthew Pearson
Dynamic Fair Division with Minimal Disruptions , Eric Friedman, Christos-Alexandros Psomas and Shai Vardi
Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction, Hu Fu, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier and Philipp Strack
Markets with Production: A Polynomial Time Algorithm and a Reduction to Pure Exchange, Jugal Garg and Ravi Kannan
Core-competitive Auctions, Gagan Goel, Mohammad Khani and Renato Paes Leme
Public projects, Boolean functions and the borders of Borders theorem, Parikshit Gopalan, Noam Nisan and Tim Roughgarden
Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints, Masahiro Goto, Fuhito Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, Akihisa Tamura and Makoto Yokoo
Reverse Mechanism Design, Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline
Hidden Substitutes, John Hatfield and Scott Kominers
Full Substitutability in Trading Networks, John Hatfield, Scott Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp
Integrating Market Makers, Limit Orders, and Continuous Trade in Prediction Markets, Hoda Heidari, Sébastien Lahaie, David Pennock and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
At What Quality and What Price?: Eliciting Buyer Preferences as a Market Design Problem, John Horton and Ramesh Johari
Making the Most of Your Samples, Zhiyi Huang, Yishay Mansour and Tim Roughgarden
Efficient Allocation via Sequential Scrip Auctions, Gil Kalai, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz
Private Pareto Optimal Exchange, Sampath Kannan, Morgenstern Jamie, Ryan Rogers and Aaron Roth
Smooth Online Mechanisms: A Game-Theoretic Problem in Renewable Energy Markets, Thomas Kesselheim, Robert Kleinberg and Eva Tardos
Team Performance with Test Scores, Jon Kleinberg and Maithra Raghu
Faster First-Order Methods for Extensive-Form Game Solving, Christian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinç, Karzan and Tuomas Sandholm
Leximin Allocations in the Real World, David Kurokawa, Ariel Procaccia and Nisarg Shah
Customer Referral Incentives and Social Media, Ilan Lobel, Evan Sadler and Lav Varshney
Improved Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets,Pinyan Lu and Tao Xiao
Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms, Brendan Lucier and Vasilis Syrgkanis
Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration, Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins and Vasilis Syrgkanis
Near-Optimum Online Ad Allocation for Targeted Advertising, Joseph (Seffi) Naor and David Wajc
Econometrics for Learning Agents, Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos
Near Feasible Stable Matchings with Complementarities, Thanh Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra
The Burden of Risk Aversion in Mean-Risk Selfish Routing, Evdokia Nikolova and Nicolas Stier-Moses
Assigning more students to their top choices: A tiebreaking rule comparison, Afshin Nikzad, Itai Ashlagi and Assaf Romm
Decentralized Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game, Bary Pradelski
Inducing Approximately Optimal Flow Using Truthful Mediators, Ryan Rogers, Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman and Zhiwei Steven Wu
An Approximate Law of One Price in Random Assignment Games, Assaf Romm and Avinatan Hassidim
Why Prices Need Algorithms, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Simple Mechanisms for a Combinatorial Buyer, Aviad Rubinstein and Matthew Weinberg
Approximability and Incentives in Adaptive Seeding, Aviad Rubinstein, Lior Seeman and Yaron Singer
Procurement Mechanisms for Differentiated Products, Daniela Saban and Gabriel Weintraub
Estimating the causal impact of recommendation systems using observational data, Amit Sharma, Duncan Watts and Jake Hofman
Information Asymmetries in Common Value Auctions with Discrete Signals, Vasilis Syrgkanis, David Kempe and Eva Tardos
Matching with Stochastic Arrival, Neil Thakral
Incentive-compatible experimental design, Panos Toulis, David Parkes, Elery Pfeffer and James Zou
The Wisdom of Multiple Guesses, Johan Ugander, Ryan Drapeau and Carlos Guestrin
Generalized Decision Scoring Rules: Statistical, Computational, and Axiomatic Properties, Lirong Xia
Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments, Jonathan Yaniv, Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache, Yossi Azar, Joseph (Seffi) Naor and Inna Kalp-Shaltiel
The The Impact of the Sharing Economy on the Hotel Industry: Evidence from Airbnb's Entry in Texas, Georgios Zervas, Proserpio Davide and John W. Byers