Papers accepted for presentation in ACM EC 2014 (alphabetically by last name of first author):
Bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsacks, Shipra Agrawal and Nikhil R. Devanur
Dynamic Matching Market Design, Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li and Shayan Oveis Gharan
Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets, Nick Arnosti, Ramesh Johari and Yash Kanoria
Optimal Allocation without Money: an Engineering Approach, Itai Ashlagi and Peng Shi
Universal Dominance and Welfare for Plausible Utility Functions, Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt
Contract Complexity, Moshe Babaioff and Eyal Winter
On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism, Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan and Renato Paes Leme
Simple Approximate Equilibria in Large Games, Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman and Ron Peretz
Optimising Trade-offs Among Stakeholders in Ad Auctions, Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian Kash, Peter Key and David Kurokaw
Re-incentivizing Discovery: Mechanisms for Partial-Progress Sharing in Research, Siddhartha Banerjee, Ashish Goel and Anilesh Krishnaswamy
Multiplicative Bidding in Online Advertising, MohammadHossein Bateni, Jon Feldman, Vahab Mirrokni and Sam Chiu-wai Wong
Cournot Competition in Networked Markets, Kostas Bimpikis, Ehsani Shayan and Rahmi Ilkilic
Reallocation Mechanisms, Liad Blumrosen and Shahar Dobzinski
Simultaneous Bayesian Auctions and Computational Complexity, Yang Cai and Christos Papadimitriou
Individual Security and Network Design, Diego Cerdeiro, Marcin Dziubinski and Sanjeev Goyal
Dynamically Eliciting Unobservable Information, Christopher Chambers and Nicolas Lambert
Approximate Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings, Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu and Anna Karlin
Inference via Auction Design, Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline and Denis Nekipelov
Generalized Second Price Auction with Probabilistic Broad Match, Wei Chen, Di He, Tie-Yan Liu, Tao Qin, Yixin Tao and Liwei Wang
Removing Arbitrage from Wagering Mechanisms, Yiling Chen, Nikhil R. Devanur, David Pennock and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Knightian Self Uncertainty
in the VCG Mechanism for
Unrestricted Combinatorial
Auctions, Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali and Zeyuan Allen Zhu
Revealing Implicit Communities to Incorporate into Recommender Systems, Euijin Choo, Ting Yu, Min Chi and Yan Sun
Why Marketplace Experimentation is Harder than it Seems: The Role of Test-Control Interference, Dominic Coey and Thomas Blake
Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from Google, Ford, and Firm X, Bo Cowgill and Eric Zitzewitz
The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice, Rachel Cummings, Federico Echenique and Adam Wierman
Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions, Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer and David Parkes
Mechanisms with Unique Learnable Equilibria, Paul Duetting, Thomas Kesselheim and Eva Tardos
Modularity and Greed in Double Auctions, Paul Duetting, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions, Paul Duetting, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Tim Roughgarden
Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries, John Fearnley and Rahul Savani
Efficient Voting via The Top-k Elicitation Scheme: A Probabilistic Approach, Yuval Filmus and Joel Oren
Optimal Impartial Selection, Felix Fischer and Max Klimm
Incentivizing Exploration, Peter Frazier, David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg and Robert Kleinberg
Strategyproof Allocation of Discrete Jobs on Multiple Machines, Eric Friedman, Ali Ghodsi and Christos-Alexandros Psomas
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Bidders with Sampling, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline and Robert Kleinberg
Trick or Treat: Putting Peer Prediction to the Test, Xi Alice Gao, Andrew Mao, Yiling Chen and Ryan P. Adams
Optimal contest design for simple agents, Arpita Ghosh and Robert Kleinberg
Buying Private Data without Verification, Arpita Ghosh, Katrina Ligett, Aaron Roth and Grant Schoenebeck
Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions, Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Elias Koutsoupias
Clinching Auctions Beyond Hard Budget Constraints, Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme
Bounds for the Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria, Paul Goldberg and Aaron Roth
The Wisdom of Smaller, Smarter Crowds, Daniel Goldstein, Preston McAfee and Siddharth Suri
Manipulation of Stable Matchings using Minimal Blacklists, Yannai Gonczarowski
Routing and staffing when servers are strategic, Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Sherwin Doroudi, Amy Ward and Adam Wierman
Two-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences, Guillaume Haeringer and Vincent Iehlé
Strategic Information Platforms - Selective Disclosure and The Price of ``Free'', Chen Hajaj and David Sarne
The polarizing effect of network influences, MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi, Hamid Mahini and David Malec
Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue, Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy and Sam Taggart
Strategy-Proofness, Investment Efficiency, and Marginal Returns: An Equivalence, John Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Kominers
Differentially Private and Incentive Compatible Recommendation System for Adoption of Network Goods, Kevin He and Xiaosheng Mu
Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems, Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Misdirected Search Effort in a Matching Market: Causes, Consequences and a Partial Solution, John Horton
Cryptographically Blinded Games: Leveraging Players' Limitations for Equilibria and Profit, Pavel Hubacek and Sunoo Park
A General Volume-Parameterized Market Making Framework, Jacob Abernethy, Rafael Frongillo, Xiaolong Li and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Information Aggregation in Exponential Family Markets, Jacob Abernethy, Sindhu Kutty, Sébastien Lahaie and Rahul Sami
Incentivized Optimal Advert Assignment via Utility Decomposition, Frank Kelly, Peter Key and Neil Walton
Time-Inconsistent Planning: A Computational Problem in Behavioral Economics, Jon Kleinberg and Sigal Oren
Extensive-Form Game Abstraction With Bounds, Christian Kroer and Tuomas Sandholm
Size versus truthfulness in the House Allocation problem, Piotr Krysta, David Manlove, Baharak Rastegari and Jinshan Zhang
Neutrality and Geometry of Mean Voting, Sébastien Lahaie and Nisarg Shah
Strategic Trading in Informationally Complex Environments, Nicolas Lambert, Michael Ostrovsky and Mikhail Panov
A Dynamic Network Game for the Adoption of New Technologies, Matt Leduc
Characterizing Strategic Cascades on Networks, Travis Martin, Grant Schoenebeck and Michael Wellman
Long-run Learning in Games of Cooperation, Winter Mason, Siddharth Suri and Duncan Watts
A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria, Reshef Meir, Omer Lev and Jeff Rosenschein
Network Formation Games with Heterogeneous Players and the Internet Structure, Eli Meirom, Shie Mannor and Ariel Orda
An Axiomatic Approach to Characterizing and Relaxing Strategyproofness in One-sided Matching, Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken
Whole Page Optimization: How Page Elements Interact with the Position Auction, Pavel Metrikov, Fernando Diaz, Sébastien Lahaie and Justin Rao
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation, Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal
Optimizing Prices in Descending Clock Auctions, Tri-Dung Nguyen and Tuomas Sandholm
The Complexity of Fairness through Equilibrium, Abraham Othman, Christos Papadimitriou and Aviad Rubinstein
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problem, Alexander Peysakhovich and Drew Fudenberg
Fair Enough: Guaranteeing Approximate Maximin Shares, Ariel Procaccia and Junxing Wang
Reasoning about Optimal Stable Matchings under Partial Information, Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Irving and Kevin Leyton-Brown
Asymptotically Truthful Equilibrium Selection in Large Congestion Games, Ryan Rogers and Aaron Roth
Towards A Better Measure of Business Proximity: Topic Modeling for Analyzing M&As, Zhan Shi, Gene Moo Lee and Andrew B. Whinston
Local Computation Mechanism Design, Shai Vardi, Avinatan Hassidim and Yishay Mansour
Optimal mechanisms with simple menus, Zihe Wang and Pingzhong Tang
Level-0 Meta-Models for Predicting Human Behavior in Games, James Wright and Kevin Leyton-Brown
A Dynamic Model of Certification and Reputation, Simpson Zhang and Mihaela van der Schaar
