Reception

Opening

Keynote Address by Matthew O. Jackson
(session chair: David Easley)
Centrality, Gossip and Diffusion of Information in Networks

Session 1 (session chair: Itai Ashlagi)

Strategic Trading in Informationally Complex Environments
Nicolas Lambert, Michael Ostrovsky and Mikhail Panov

Incentivizing Exploration
Peter Frazier, David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg and Robert Kleinberg

Optimal Auctions for Correlated Bidders with Sampling
Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline and Robert Kleinberg

An Axiomatic Approach to Characterizing and Relaxing Strategyproofness of One‐sided Matching Mechanisms
Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken

Session 2a (session chair: Shuchi Chawla)

Generalized Second Price Auction with Probabilistic Broad Match
Wei Chen, Di He, Tie-Yan Liu, Tao Qin, Yixin Tao and Liwei Wang

Expressiveness and Robustness of First‐Price Position Auctions
Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer and David Parkes

Optimising Trade‐offs Among Stakeholders in Ad Auctions
Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian Kash, Peter Key and David Kurokaw

Optimizing Prices in Descending Clock Auctions
Tri-Dung Nguyen and Tuomas Sandholm

Session 2b (session chair: Siddharth Suri)

A Dynamic Network Game for the Adoption of New Technologies
Matt Leduc

Characterizing Strategic Cascades on Networks
Travis Martin, Grant Schoenebeck and Michael Wellman

The polarizing effect of network influences
MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi, Hamid Mahini and David Malec

Re-incentivizing Discovery: Mechanisms for Partial‐Progress Sharing in Research
Siddhartha Banerjee, Ashish Goel and Anilesh Krishnaswamy

Session 3a (session chair: Michal Feldman)

Clinching Auctions Beyond Hard Budget Constraints
Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme

Deferred‐Acceptance Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation
Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal

The Performance of Deferred‐Acceptance Auctions
Paul Duetting, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Tim Roughgarden

Session 3b (session chair: Yiling Chen)

Individual Security and Network Design
Diego Cerdeiro, Marcin Dziubinski and Sanjeev Goyal

Cryptographically Blinded Games: Leveraging Players' Limitations for Equilibria and Profit
Pavel Hubacek and Sunoo Park

The Complexity of Fairness through Equilibrium
Abraham Othman, Christos Papadimitriou and Aviad Rubinstein

Session 4a (session chair: Jason Hartline)

Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
Zihe Wang and Pingzhong Tang

Modularity and Greed in Double Auctions
Paul Duetting, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Elias Koutsoupias

Approximate Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings
Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu and Anna Karlin

Session 4b (session chair: Ariel Procaccia)

Efficient Voting via The Top‐k Elicitation Scheme: A Probabilistic Approach
Yuval Filmus and Joel Oren

A Local‐Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria
Reshef Meir, Omer Lev and Jeff Rosenschein

Universal Dominance and Welfare for Plausible Utility Functions
Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt

Neutrality and Geometry of Mean Voting
Sébastien Lahaie and Nisarg Shah

Chair: David Parkes
Light breakfast provided.

Session 5a (session chair: Scott Kominers)

Optimal Allocation without Money: an Engineering Approach
Itai Ashlagi and Peng Shi

Two‐Sided Matching with One‐Sided Preferences
Guillaume Haeringer and Vincent Iehlé

Dynamic Matching Market Design
Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li and Shayan Oveis Gharan

Misdirected Search Effort in a Matching Market: Causes, Consequences and a Partial Solution
John Horton

Session 5b (session chair: Boi Faltings)

Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal‐Agent Problems
Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Removing Arbitrage from Wagering Mechanisms
Yiling Chen, Nikhil R. Devanur, David Pennock and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Information Aggregation in Exponential Family Markets
Jacob Abernethy, Sindhu Kutty, Sébastien Lahaie and Rahul Sami

A General Volume‐ Parameterized Market Making Framework
Jacob Abernethy, Rafael Frongillo, Xiaolong Li and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Session 6a (session chair: Felix Brandt)

Reasoning about Optimal Stable Matchings under Partial Information
Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Irving and Kevin Leyton-Brown

Manipulation of Stable Matchings using Minimal Blacklists
Yannai Gonczarowski

Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets
Nick Arnosti, Ramesh Johari and Yash Kanoria

Size versus truthfulness in the House Allocation problem
Piotr Krysta, David Manlove, Baharak Rastegari and Jinshan Zhang

Session 6b (session chair: Vahab Mirrokni)

The Wisdom of Smaller, Smarter Crowds
Daniel Goldstein, Preston McAfee and Siddharth Suri

Revealing and Incorporating Implicit Communities to Improve Recommender Systems
 Euijin Choo, Ting Yu, Min Chi and Yan Sun

Trick or Treat: Putting Peer Prediction to the Test
Xi Alice Gao, Andrew Mao, Yiling Chen and Ryan P. Adams

Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from Google, Ford, and Firm X
Bo Cowgill and Eric Zitzewitz

Session 7a (session chair: Craig Boutilier)

Incentivized Optimal Advert Assignment via Utility Decomposition
Frank Kelly, Peter Key and Neil Walton

Strategyproof Allocation of Discrete Jobs on Multiple Machines
Eric Friedman, Ali Ghodsi and Christos-Alexandros Psomas

Time‐Inconsistent Planning: A Computational Problem in Behavioral Economics
Jon Kleinberg and Sigal Oren

Session 7b (session chair: Jacob Abernethy)

Towards A Better Measure of Business Proximity: Topic Modeling for Analyzing M&As
Zhan Shi, Gene Moo Lee and Andrew B. Whinston

Why Marketplace Experimentation is Harder than it Seems: The Role of Test‐Control Interference
Dominic Coey and Thomas Blake

Whole Page Optimization: How Page Elements Interact with the Position Auction
Pavel Metrikov, Fernando Diaz, Sébastien Lahaie and Justin Rao

Session 8a (session chair: Ron Lavi)

Local Computation Mechanism Design
Shai Vardi, Avinatan Hassidim and Yishay Mansour

Reallocation Mechanisms
Liad Blumrosen and Shahar Dobzinski

Knightian Self Uncertainty in the VCG Mechanism for Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions
Alessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali and Zeyuan Allen Zhu

Session 8b (session chair: Michael Wellman)

Extensive‐Form Game Abstraction With Bounds
Christian Kroer and Tuomas Sandholm

Bounds for the Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria
Paul Goldberg and Aaron Roth

Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries
John Fearnley and Rahul Savani

Session 9 (session chair: Tuomas Sandholm)

Fair Enough: Guaranteeing Approximate Maximin Shares
Ariel Procaccia and Junxing Wang

Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue
Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy and Sam Taggart

Mechanism Design for Data Science
Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline and Denis Nekipelov

Banquet at Google

Buses will leave the Sheraton at 6pm.
Address for people arriving on their own:
Mass Cafe
1015 Joaquin Road
Mountain View, CA 94043

Session 10a (session chair: Angelina Vidali)

Routing and staffing when servers are strategic
Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Sherwin Doroudi, Amy Ward and Adam Wierman

Multiplicative Bidding in Online Advertising
MohammadHossein Bateni, Jon Feldman, Vahab Mirrokni and Sam Chiu-wai Wong

Cournot Competition in Networked Markets
Kostas Bimpikis, Ehsani Shayan and Rahmi Ilkilic

Session 10b (session chair: Felix Fischer)

Network Formation Games with Heterogeneous Players and the Internet Structure
Eli Meirom, Shie Mannor and Ariel Orda

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Large Games
Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman and Ron Peretz

Asymptotically Truthful Equilibrium Selection in Large Congestion Games
Ryan Rogers and Aaron Roth

Session 11a (session chair: Robert Kleinberg)

On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism
Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan and Renato Paes Leme

Strategy‐Proofness, Investment Efficiency, and Marginal Returns: An Equivalence
John Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Kominers

Optimal Impartial Selection
Felix Fischer and Max Klimm

Session 11b (session chair: Arpita Ghosh)

Long‐run Learning in Games of Cooperation
Winter Mason, Siddharth Suri and Duncan Watts

Strategic Information Platforms ‐ Selective Disclosure and The Price of ``Free''
Chen Hajaj and David Sarne

Level‐0 Meta‐Models for Predicting Human Behavior in Games
James Wright and Kevin Leyton-Brown

Session 12a (session chair: Kevin Leyton-Brown)

Mechanisms with Unique Learnable Equilibria
Paul Duetting, Thomas Kesselheim and Eva Tardos

Simultaneous Bayesian Auctions and Computational Complexity
Yang Cai and Christos Papadimitriou

Contract Complexity
Moshe Babaioff and Eyal Winter

Optimal contest design for simple agents
Arpita Ghosh and Robert Kleinberg

Session 12b (session chair: Preston McAfee)

Buying Private Data without Verification
Arpita Ghosh, Katrina Ligett, Aaron Roth and Grant Schoenebeck

Differentially Private and Incentive Compatible Recommendation System for Adoption of Network Goods
Kevin He and Xiaosheng Mu

A Dynamic Model of Certification and Reputation
Simpson Zhang and Mihaela van der Schaar

The Empirical Implications of Privacy‐Aware Choice
Rachel Cummings, Federico Echenique and Adam Wierman

Session 13 (session chair: Nicole Immorlica)

Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Nonequilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem
Alexander Peysakhovich and Drew Fudenberg

Dynamically Eliciting Unobservable Information
Christopher Chambers and Nicolas Lambert

Bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsacks
Shipra Agrawal and Nikhil R. Devanur