Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

SESSION: Session 1a

Ironing in the Dark

  • Tim Roughgarden
  • Okke Schrijvers

A/B Testing of Auctions

  • Shuchi Chawla
  • Jason Hartline
  • Denis Nekipelov

The FedEx Problem

  • Amos Fiat
  • Kira Goldner
  • Anna R. Karlin
  • Elias Koutsoupias

Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search

  • Robert Kleinberg
  • Bo Waggoner
  • E. Glen Weyl

SESSION: Session 1b

Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange

  • John P. Dickerson
  • David F. Manlove
  • Benjamin Plaut
  • Tuomas Sandholm
  • James Trimble

The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few Queries

  • Sepehr Assadi
  • Sanjeev Khanna
  • Yang Li

Cadet-Branch Matching in a Quasi-Linear Labor Market

  • Ravi Jagadeesan

Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms

  • Jan Christoph Schlegel

SESSION: Best Paper and Best Dissertation Award Presentations

Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains

  • Piotr Dworczak

Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?

  • Ya'akov (Kobi) Gal
  • Moshe Mash
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Yair Zick

SESSION: Session 2a

The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs

  • Andrew Kephart
  • Vincent Conitzer

Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items

  • Pingzhong Tang
  • Zihe Wang

Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private Information

  • Kyle Woodward

Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods

  • Marek Pycia
  • Kyle Woodward

SESSION: Session 2b

When Should an Expert Make a Prediction?

  • Yossi Azar
  • Amir Ban
  • Yishay Mansour

The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets

  • Rachel Cummings
  • David M. Pennock
  • Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Arbitrage-Free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer Programming

  • Christian Kroer
  • Miroslav Dudík
  • Sébastien Lahaie
  • Sivaraman Balakrishnan

Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction

  • Victor Shnayder
  • Arpit Agarwal
  • Rafael Frongillo
  • David C. Parkes

SESSION: Session 3a

Optimal Commitments in Asymmetric Auctions with Incomplete Information

  • Pingzhong Tang
  • Zihe Wang
  • Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang

Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation Guarantees

  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Constantinos Daskalakis
  • Nima Haghpanah

Optimal Auctions with Restricted Allocations

  • Ian A. Kash
  • Rafael M. Frongillo

Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?

  • Constantinos Daskalakis
  • Christos Papadimitriou
  • Christos Tzamos

Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements

  • Michal Feldman
  • Ophir Friedler
  • Jamie Morgenstern
  • Guy Reiner

SESSION: Session 3b

On Voting and Facility Location

  • Michal Feldman
  • Amos Fiat
  • Iddan Golomb

Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Decision-Making: Small Groups and the Importance of Triads

  • Ashish Goel
  • David T. Lee

The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare

  • Ioannis Caragiannis
  • David Kurokawa
  • Hervé Moulin
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Nisarg Shah
  • Junxing Wang

How Effective Can Simple Ordinal Peer Grading Be?

  • Ioannis Caragiannis
  • George A. Krimpas
  • Alexandros A. Voudouris

Assortment Optimization under a Random Swap based Distribution over Permutations Model

  • Antoine Desir
  • Vineet Goyal
  • Danny Segev

SESSION: Session 4a

Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias

  • Jon Kleinberg
  • Sigal Oren
  • Manish Raghavan

Procrastination with Variable Present Bias

  • Nick Gravin
  • Nicole Immorlica
  • Brendan Lucier
  • Emmanouil Pountourakis

A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding

  • Saeed Alaei
  • Azarakhsh Malekian
  • Mohamed Mostagir

Blockchain Mining Games

  • Aggelos Kiayias
  • Elias Koutsoupias
  • Maria Kyropoulou
  • Yiannis Tselekounis

SESSION: Session 4b

The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing

  • Vincent Cohen-Addad
  • Alon Eden
  • Michal Feldman
  • Amos Fiat

Lottery Pricing Equilibria

  • Shaddin Dughmi
  • Alon Eden
  • Michal Feldman
  • Amos Fiat
  • Stefano Leonardi

Online Budgeted Allocation with General Budgets

  • Nathaniel Kell
  • Debmalya Panigrahi

Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex Cover

  • Yajun Wang
  • Sam Chiu-wai Wong

SESSION: EC Plenary Talk and Kalai Prize Talk

Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform

  • M. Keith Chen

Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy: Abstract of the Kalai Prize Talk

  • Tim Roughgarden

SESSION: Session 5a

Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Bounds in Games

  • Christian Kroer
  • Tuomas Sandholm

A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games

  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing Games

  • Umang Bhaskar
  • Yu Cheng
  • Young Kun Ko
  • Chaitanya Swamy

The Mysteries of Security Games: Equilibrium Computation Becomes Combinatorial Algorithm Design

  • Haifeng Xu

SESSION: Session 5b

The Seasonality Of Paid Search Effectiveness From A Long Running Field Test

  • Quinn Ye
  • Saarthak Malik
  • Ji Chen
  • Haijun Zhu

Returns to Consumer Search: Evidence from eBay

  • Thomas Blake
  • Chris Nosko
  • Steven Tadelis

The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Cooperative Decision-Making can be Predicted with high Accuracy when using only Three Behavioral Types

  • Ziv Epstein
  • Alexander Peysakhovich
  • David G. Rand

Understanding Emerging Threats to Online Advertising

  • Ceren Budak
  • Sharad Goel
  • Justin Rao
  • Georgios Zervas

SESSION: Session 6a

Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation

  • Shuchi Chawla
  • J. Benjamin Miller

Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions From Learning Algorithms

  • Hamid Nazerzadeh
  • Renato Paes Leme
  • Afshin Rostamizadeh
  • Umar Syed

A Near-Optimal Exploration-Exploitation Approach for Assortment Selection

  • Shipra Agrawal
  • Vashist Avadhanula
  • Vineet Goyal
  • Assaf Zeevi

Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves

  • Tim Roughgarden
  • Joshua R. Wang

SESSION: Session 6b

General Threshold Model for Social Cascades: Analysis and Simulations

  • Jie Gao
  • Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh
  • Grant Schoenebeck
  • Fang-Yi Yu

Impact of Community Structure on Cascades

  • Mehrdad Moharrami
  • Vijay Subramanian
  • Mingyan Liu
  • Marc Lelarge

Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups

  • Noga Alon
  • Michal Feldman
  • Yishay Mansour
  • Sigal Oren
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

Dynamic Conflict on a Network

  • Marcin Dziubiński
  • Sanjeev Goyal
  • David E.N. Minarsch

SESSION: Session 7a

Pricing with Limited Knowledge of Demand

  • Maxime C. Cohen
  • Georgia Perakis
  • Robert S. Pindyck

The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models

  • Rachel Cummings
  • Katrina Ligett
  • Mallesh M. Pai
  • Aaron Roth

Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games

  • Yishay Mansour
  • Aleksandrs Slivkins
  • Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • Zhiwei Steven Wu

Persuasion with Limited Communication

  • Shaddin Dughmi
  • David Kempe
  • Ruixin Qiang

SESSION: Session 7b

Computational Extensive-Form Games

  • Joseph Y. Halpern
  • Rafael Pass
  • Lior Seeman

Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets

  • Xiaohui Bei
  • Jugal Garg
  • Martin Hoefer

Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach

  • Ozan Candogan
  • Markos Epitropou
  • Rakesh V. Vohra

Average Case Performance of Replicator Dynamics in Potential Games via Computing Regions of Attraction

  • Ioannis Panageas
  • Georgios Piliouras

SESSION: Session 8a

Strategic Payment Routing in Financial Credit Networks

  • Frank Cheng
  • Junming Liu
  • Kareem Amin
  • Michael P. Wellman

Sybil Detection Using Latent Network Structure

  • Grant Schoenebeck
  • Aaron Snook
  • Fang-Yi Yu

Economic Recommendation Systems: One Page Abstract

  • Gal Bahar
  • Rann Smorodinsky
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps [Extended Abstract]

  • Steffen Schuldenzucker
  • Sven Seuken
  • Stefano Battiston

SESSION: Session 8b

Petty Envy When Assigning Objects

  • Thayer Morrill

"Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-proof Environment

  • Avinatan Hassidim
  • Assaf Romm
  • Ran I. Shorrer

On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets

  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Maximilien Burq
  • Patrick Jaillet
  • Vahideh Manshadi

What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings?: How Competition Guides Design

  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Afshin Nikzad

SESSION: Session 9a

The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms

  • Timo Mennle
  • Sven Seuken

Mechanism Design with Selective Verification

  • Dimitris Fotakis
  • Christos Tzamos
  • Manolis Zampetakis

Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms

  • Joosung Lee

SESSION: Session 9b

Large Market Games with Near Optimal Efficiency

  • Richard Cole
  • Yixin Tao

Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

  • Jacob Abernethy
  • Sébastien Lahaie
  • Matus Telgarsky

On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers

  • Yiwei Chen
  • Vivek F. Farias

SESSION: Session 10a

Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions

  • Paul Dütting
  • Felix Fischer
  • David C. Parkes

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment

  • Santiago R. Balseiro
  • Omar Besbes
  • Gabriel Y. Weintraub

Feature-based Dynamic Pricing

  • Maxime C. Cohen
  • Ilan Lobel
  • Renato Paes Leme

SESSION: Session 10b

Fair Resource Allocation in A Volatile Marketplace

  • Mohammad Hossein Bateni
  • Yiwei Chen
  • Dragos Florin Ciocan
  • Vahab Mirrokni

Revealed Preference at Scale: Learning Personalized Preferences from Assortment Choices

  • Nathan Kallus
  • Madeleine Udell

Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion Games

  • Vittorio Bilò
  • Cosimo Vinci